# Daily Report

# East Europe

FBIS-EEU-90-225
Wednesday
21 November 1990

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FBIS-EEU-90-225 21 November 1990

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## CSCE Summit Meeting Continues in Paris

### Albanians on Failure To Gain Membership

*AU2011212890 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 2100 GMT 20 Nov 90*

["Statement of the Albanian Delegation at the CSCE Summit Meeting in Paris"]

[Text] Albania, although taking part in the CSCE summit as an observer, appreciates its importance in the belief that this meeting will give fresh impetus to cooperation and understanding and will contribute to a more secure and peaceful future in our continent. Our view has been and remains that security is real when it is general and for everybody, when it becomes durable and does not merely rely on the political and military dimension, but on social and economic development, and on narrowing the gulf of economic inequality. Everything that happens on our continent affects and interests the Albanian people, like every other European people.

Albania has therefore welcomed the positive European processes of the CSCE, is committed to the implementation of the principles of its documents, and has expressed its desire and will to join fully in it.

Bearing the above in mind, the failure (?to reach a consensus) for the full participation of Albania (?in this summit) is incomprehensible. [Passage indistinct] for full participation in this meeting has nothing to do with the CSCE, and its spirit and content. This attitude comes from a revival of the past, which brought nothing good to Europe.

Historically, Albania has never separated its destiny from that of the other peoples of the continent. It has determinedly contributed to and continues to contribute to peace and security in the region of the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and in Europe. It has never threatened or trampled on anybody. Albania is an active participant in Balkan cooperation, which is now an integral part of European processes. For this very reason, the Balkan countries, in their message addressed to this meeting, welcomed Albania's application to take full part in the Paris summit meeting of the CSCE, and expressed the desire for this application to be accepted.

As hitherto, Albania will continue to advance in the spirit of European developments, and will make its modest contribution to the entire CSCE process.

The Albanian delegation reemphasizes that it considers the Paris summit to be of special importance for Europe's future.

### Romania's Iliescu Addresses Meeting

*AU2111110790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0848 GMT 21 Nov 90*

[Text] Paris, ROMPRES, 21/11/1990—"On the second day of the summit we heard further addresses by heads of state and government. Like I said on the very first day, the promising beginning has been confirmed", noted Romania's president. "The atmosphere, the spirit that prevailed reflected the unanimous wish to open a new stage in our continent's life. Everybody stressed that a period of confrontation came to an end and a new stage, of collaboration and common security of the whole continent started", said President Iliescu. A few addresses of today, which I have pointed out in my own address, stressed this fact. Austria's Mr. Vranitzky, [Norway's] Mrs. Gro Harlem Brundtland, [Germany's] Chancellor Kohl emphasized that the economic and political stability in the East-European countries that with their own transformations have brought about transformations in the political life of continent and of the present-day world as a whole serves the interests of stability of the whole of Europe. And it is a matter of mutual interest of all countries in the continent to sustain these peoples' efforts for overcoming the difficulties all have to cope with in the transformation of the political and economic life, in promoting the reforms toward a market economy", Romania's president said.

### Iliescu Meets Poland's Mazowiecki, Others

*AU2111111490 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0902 GMT 21 Nov 90*

[Text] Paris, ROMPRES, 21/11/1990—"Today I have had several important meetings, with the representatives of Sweden, Denmark, Finland and with the Polish prime minister. They have all been held in an open, friendly spirit of understanding", said Romania's President Ion Iliescu.

"I should like to point out the particularly fruitful and straightforward talks I have had with the Northern countries' chief delegates, who, generally speaking, showed a poised attitude to the transformation process in Eastern Europe, to the course given to the economic reform in Romania and took a positive, amiable stand of solidarity with the efforts we are making to overcome difficulties, to bring our share to the success of the all European developments.

"With Premier Mazowiecki I have had a very friendly exchange of views on the developments in our countries, with the sincere wish to share our experience. As is known, Poland has a lead on us. They embarked on these changes long before us. In Romania, things evolve much more densely and at a faster pace. We can learn from their experience about the phenomena occurring during the transition to a market economy, price liberalization included, about the difficulties encountered. We have also expressed our wish to lay our bilateral relations on new foundations, to reactuate our present ties, political, economic and cultural fact of special significance for the future development of the relationships between Poland and Romania."

### Romania's Nastase Meets Swiss Counterpart

*AU2111105090 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1002 GMT 21 Nov 90*

[Text] Paris, ROMPRES, 21/11/1990—Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase said he was confident Romanian-Swiss relations would be developed on firmer grounds and with more alluring prospects. In his dialogue with the Swiss Foreign Minister Rene Felber, Adrian Nastase was of the opinion that the inertia still existing in the relations between Romania and Switzerland was due rather to a neutral country policy that needed very clear convictions before committing itself.

The Swiss Foreign Minister Rene Felber told a ROMPRES reporter Romanian-Swiss relations met with no obstacles but a certainty was needed the reforms under way in Romania were irreversible and would be continued so that Romania should get still closer to democratic Europe.

### International Experts Meet on Constitutional Issues

*AU2011094690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0917 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 20/11/1990—A scientific symposium on "Constitutional Mutations and Prospects in East Europe" started in Bucharest on November 19, organized by the Commission on Drafting Romania's Constitution by collaboration with the Romanian Association for International Law and International Relations (ADIRI).

As many as forty parliamentarians and experts in constitutional law participate, from Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the USSR, the U.S., Yugoslavia, as well as representatives of the European Parliament and of the Council of Europe. Romania is represented by the members of the Commission on Drafting the Constitution. The debates will focus on papers delivered by foreign and Romanian participants in connection with the relation between the legislative, executive and juridical power, the fundamental human rights, local autonomy, the control of the constitutionality of laws and the presidential institution.

Views will be exchanged on the mutations and prospects in East Europe. On the other hand, the meeting meets a concrete necessity of the drafting commission, i.e. to take advantage of the experience of other countries with democratic tradition.

Thanking in behalf of Romania's Parliament for the participation in the symposium, Dan Martian, speaker of the Assembly of Deputies, emphasized the changes, the important evolutions in Romania after the December 1989 revolution, showing that it had opened the path to democracy. He quoted in that connection the May 20 elections and the formation of the power bodies. We are in full process of endorsement of the bills and draft normative acts meant to ensure the juridical power, the speaker said, pointing out that the constitutional matters held a place of prime importance. The drafting commission represents Romania's whole political spectrum. We hope that by its very composition, this commission is a guarantee as regards the drafting of the constitution so badly needed by Romania, a constitution that should meet the present needs and create the framework for a future democratic development. For this, it should get acquainted with everything positive amassed in time, be open to everything positive in point of constitutional law. That is why, we wanted this symposium to be attended not only by great experts in the countries of East Europe who have to cope with problems similar to ours, but also experts in constitutional law from other countries, from important geographical zones outside Europe. We think your participation in this symposium will be most helpful, will give us ideas, standpoints which we will have to take account of in the drafting of our constitution. That is why we pin great hopes on this symposium and on the dialogue we will have with some of you in the period ahead, when the drafting of the constitution starts, Dan Martian concluded.

### Comparison of Alia Speech on Constitutional Change

*AU2011142090*

Tirana BASHKIMI in Albanian on 14 November carries on pages 1-2 a 2,200-word item entitled "Changes to the Constitution—Legal Support for New Democratic Changes—Speech by Comrade Ramiz Alia, President of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, to the People's Assembly Session in Tirana on 13 November." The BASHKIMI report has been compared with the Tirana Domestic Service Albanian version published in the 14 November East Europe DAILY REPORT, pages 2-4, revealing the following variations:

Page 3, column two, first full paragraph reads: The strengthening and development of the rule of law makes necessary a review of the constitutional provisions which concern the field of justice, both as regards the composition, interconnection, and dependence of its organs, and the better definition of their competences, and in the presentation on a wider scale of certain democratic achievements in this field. In this connection, there is a demand to study a more just exercise of control over the constitutionality of legal acts and by-laws, and the solution of so-called administrative conflicts. (supplying indistinct words and rephrasing)

Same page, same column, second full paragraph, sentence nine to end of paragraph reads: Nevertheless, the range of the measures which have been taken and are continually being taken in connection with the democratization of the whole of the country's political, economic, and social life, make necessary a review of the articles connected with the rights and freedoms of citizens, with the aim of supplementing, deepening, and extending the content of these provisions. In this context, among other things, there is room to include the problem of the freedom of citizens to travel within the state and abroad, of course, according to the established legal norms, the right of citizens to take part in social organizations and associations recognized by law, the civil, administrative, and criminal responsibilities of employees who violate citizens' rights, etc. (supplying indistinct passages and changing punctuation)

Page 4, column one, first partial paragraph, sentence two reads: They have stood up against all kinds of behavior which harm the homeland's interests, cause division, and hinder their unity, including religious divisions. (changing "communities" to "divisions")

Same page, same column, first full paragraph, last sentence reads: Motivated by care for them, and going deeper into the problem of the rights of the national minorities, and regardless of their characteristics, there is scope for some adjustments, especially regarding these citizens' communication with the nation to which they belong. (supplying indistinct words and rephrasing)

Same page, same column, fifth full paragraph, first sentence reads: Comrade deputies, to examine and decide on the proposals for changes and additions to the Constitution of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, which must be presented to the next session of the People's Assembly, it is necessary to form a special commission. (confirming queried word)

### Membership of Constitutional Commission Announced

*AU2011173790 Tirana BASHKIMI in Albanian 14 Nov 90 p 3*

["Decree on the Creation of a Special Commission To Examine Additions to the Constitution of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania"]

[Text] In order to examine the need for additions to the existing Constitition and to determine the way in which they can be introduced in accordance with the political, economic, and social developments which have taken place in our country since 1976, when the present Constitution was announced, the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, on the proposal of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, has decreed:

I. The creation of a special commission to examine the present Constitution and to make the necessary additions.

II. The membership of the commission will be as follows:
1. Ramiz Alia, chairman.
2. Kleanthi Koci, secretary, president of the Supreme Court.
3. Ali Kaza, member, chairman of the Executive Committee of Diber District People's Council.
4. Aranit Cela, member, deputy to the People's Assembly.
5. Belul Lufo, member, deputy to the People's Assembly.
6. Dritero Agolli, member, chairman of the Albanian Writers and Artists League.
7. Egon Gjadri, member, director of the Institute of Hydroelectric Studies.
8. Ela Tase, member, teacher, honored sportswoman.
9. Enver Halili, member, minister of justice.
10. Foto Cami, member, chairman of the Permanent Foreign Affairs Commission of the People's Assembly.
11. Gjergj Sauli, member, candidate of legal sciences.
12. Hashim Zyberi, member, hero of socialist labor, brigadier in construction work.
13. Hysen Lacej, member, professor, director of the Corn and Rice Institute.
14. Ismail Lleshi, member, dean of the Faculty of Political and Legal Science.
15. Lavdie Ruci, member, deputy president of the Albanian Women's Union.
16. Lisen Bashkurti, member, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Union of Working Youth.
17. Luan Omari, member, academic secretary of the Academy of Sciences of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.
18. Muhamet Kapllani, member, deputy minister of foreign affairs.

19. Namik Dokle, member, secretary to the General Council of the Trade Unions of Albania.
20. Nexhmije Hoxha, member, chairman of the General Council of the Democratic Front of Albania.
21. Niko Ceta, member, veteran.
22. Niko Gjyzari, member, minister, general secretary to the Council of Ministers of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.
23. Niko Kacalidhe, member, writer, teacher.
24. Qemal Disha, member, economist, general secretary to the Ministry of Finance.
25. Ramadan Kamberi, member, deputy chief of the General Staff of the People's Army.
26. Sabit Broka, member, dean of the Faculty of Medicine, doctor of sciences.
27. Skender Gjinushi, member, minister of education, professor, doctor.
28. Shaban Demiraj, member, professor, member of the Academy of Sciences.
29. Terezina Marubi, member, heroine of socialist labor, member of the Presidium of the People's Assembly.
30. Tish Daja, member, composer, people's artist.
31. Vasil Anagnosti, member, director of the Lukove Agricultural enterprise in Sarande District, hero of socialist labor.

III. The draft law "On Some Additions to the Constitution of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania," after being prepared by the commission, will be subjected to broad discussion with the working masses and will be submitted for approval to the People's Assembly.

IV. This decree comes into effect immediately.

Tirana, 13 November 1990.
Decree No. 196.
For the People's Assembly of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania,
[Signed] Sali Shijaku, secretary; Petro Dode, chairman of the Presidency.

### Conventional Arms Reduction Treaty Hailed

*AU2011151090 Tirana ATA in English 1100 GMT 20 Nov 90*

["Important Leap on Disarmament in Europe—The Newspaper 'ZERI I POPULLIT' Writes"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, November 20 (ATA)—Dwelling on the treaty signed by the leaders of the NATO member countries and of the Warsaw Treaty at the beginning of the summit Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the perceptible slashing of conventional arms stocks of each military bloc in Europe, the newspaper "ZERI I POPULLIT" writes among others in a commentary:

The member countries of these alliances did away with a considerable burden in the biggest arms race the history of the continent has ever known. A new page is opened up to this continent to make its peoples and nations live in peace and friendship among them. As a result of the objective, positive and democratic developments in Europe and in the relations between the East and West, the treaty is assessed as a genuine leap towards the easing of confrontation, the reduction of weapons and later of the military troops as well as the strengthening of mutual confidence and general security.

"ZERI I POPULLIT" stresses that this is an important achievement in the actual situation when a general opinion is being created that the international problems cannot be solved through old concepts and methods and the threats and dangers to peace and general security can not be eliminated. The decision on the destruction of the conventional weapons in Europe adopted at the beginning of the CSCE Paris summit is encouraging and indicates the road towards the security of European peoples and nations, which might be real and stable only if a general security for all is created.

The necessity of destroying these kinds of weapons in Europe and the indispensability of undertaking other constructive steps towards general disarmament, the newspaper stresses, is based on a very great political motif which is linked with the future and destinies of all the sovereign peoples and countries of the continent. The European peoples, who for years on end have lived under the weight of growing menace and danger of the armaments race are first and foremost interested in liquidating every kind of lethal armament in Europe, "ZERI I POPULLIT" writes in conclusion.

### Trade Minister Leaves for Balkan Tourism Meeting

*AU2011193990 Tirana Domestic Service in Albanian 1900 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Pajtim Ajazi, minister of domestic trade, left for Yugoslavia today to take part in the 23d Balkan Tourism Conference, to be held in Belgrade on 21-25 November 1990.

### SDS Demands Resignation; Ready To Lead Nation

*AU2011202390 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Declaration of the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces]

[Text] The past three days of nationwide protests against the passivity of the government, organized by the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], demonstrated our united political will. The government of Mr. Andrey Lukanov must resign [words indistinct]. This is an expression of the people's dissatisfaction.

The SDS categorically declared its readiness to assume responsibility for our motherland, which has suffered so much during the decades of communist totalitarianism. We are no longer capable of holding back the justified protest of our compatriots.

The SDS Coordinating Council acquainted itself with the demands of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation for the resignation of Mr. Lukanov and fully supports the readiness to strike, as announced by the confederation. Regardless of the development of the political situation after Thursday, 22 November 1990, the SDS Coordinating Council will issue a new declaration.

### Supports Call For 26 Nov Strike

*AU2111084390 Sofia BTA in English 2243 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Sofia, November 20 (BTA)—The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) [SDS] supports the appeal for a general political strike made by the Podkrepa labour confederation.

The strike will probably be declared on Monday, November 26, if Andrey Lukanov's one-party socialist government does not resign by that time.

We can no longer hold in check people's discontent, it is said in the UDF declaration. It is added that the final decision for the general strike will be made after President Zhelev and Prime Minister Lukanov come back from Paris and after parliament holds its sitting on Thursday, November 22.

In the meantime the Podkrepa strike committee has announced that besides the 17 UDF parties and organizations, other political formations, such as the alternative socialist association, the one that split from the BSP, also declared they are ready to go on strike.

All big cities Plovdiv, Varna, Bourgas, Pleven, Gabrovo, Lovech, and a number of towns inform they are ready for strike.

### BSP Spokesman Not Expecting Lukanov To Resign

*AU2011182490 Sofia BTA in English 1732 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Sofia, 20 Nov (BTA)—Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov's government has presented a proposal for a gradual rise in prices to the competent committees of the Grand National Assembly, an economic expert of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) announced at today's news conference given by the socialist parliamentary group. Mr. Stoyu Dulev, deputy minister of economy, explained that Mr. Lukanov's government had taken into account the recommendations made by the opposition Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) [SDS] on the problem of prices. BSP spokesman Dimitur Yonchev predicted that the draft budget submitted by the present cabinet would receive 20 to 30 votes over 50 percent in parliament, thus suggesting that he did not expect Mr. Andrey Lukanov's government to resign—something on which the opposition insists.

The question of the legitimacy of the government should be decided by parliament, Mr. Yonchev underlined, while his colleague Filip Bokov was sharply opposed to the attempts at making dictates through street pressure and strikes. Mr. Bokov stated that the leader of the opposition, Dr. Petur Beron, "has assumed very serious responsibility" by making calls on the supporters of the UDF to react if Mr. Lukanov does not resign on Thursday [22 November]. The Socialist MP said that he was not sure the readiness for a general strike declared by the Podkrepa Labor Confederation is perfectly legal. In his opinion such a drive would deliver the final blow to the country's shattered economy. But the Socialists would not respond to the opposition through mass drives of their own, because they want to avoid mounting tensions which could have unpredictable consequences.

Mr. Yonchev expects that in the present campaign of changing the party cards thirty to fifty percent of the one-time one-million- strong Communist Party will renew their membership in the BSP. In answer to the question if there will be further disclosures as to the culprits for the present crisis in Bulgaria, he likened the renewal of the party to "a delivery which cannot be stopped, no matter how painful it may be".

The sixteen national representatives of the BSP who have recently made the sensational declaration that they would form a parliamentary "mini-faction" have no intention to split from the parliamentary group of the BSP, one of them—MP Klara Marinova stated. She sees the group as a generator of ideas for the faction of the Socialists.

### Glasnost Club Declaration on Cabinet Crisis

*AU2011204490 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] The Federation of the Clubs for Glasnost and Democracy considers that the rapid political and economic reform is the only way out of the third national catastrophe.

The experience of the last few months shows that this task is beyond the forces of the government of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. According to the federation, this is a result of the irreconcilable contradiction between the reform and democratic socialism—the Socialists' final goal. It also is a result of the BSP apparatus' lack of interest in changing the system.

The Lukanov government will enter Bulgaria's history as the government of passivity and parliamentary paralysis, the declaration reads. Only a cabinet formed by the SDS could lead the country out of destruction. In the name of the motherland's salvation, we demand the immediate resignation of Mr. Lukanov and his government, the document reads.

If Mr. Lukanov refuses to resign, the federation appeals to the people's representatives, regardless of their political color and place in the National Assembly hall, to vote nonconfidence to the socialist government and urges the chairman of the Republic to entrust the SDS with forming the new cabinet.

### Former Communist Leaders Deny Personal Guilt

*AU2011152590 Sofia BTA in English 1415 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Sofia, 20 Nov (BTA)—"No one is to blame" for the unprecedented crisis in Bulgaria, at least according to the former high-ranking officials of the Zhivkov regime: Mr. Pencho Kubadinski, Mr. Dimitur Stoyanov, Mr. Grisha Filipov, Mr. Emil Khristov, Mr. Vasil Tsanov, Mr. Grigor Stoichkov, Mr. Petko Danchev, Mr. Ognyan Doynov and General Khristo Ruskov.

A special edition of the Bulgarian Journalists Union's weekly "POGLED", issued today, is entirely devoted to the political responsibility of those senior aides of Todor Zhivkov for the disastrous socioeconomic state of present-day Bulgaria. This responsibility, however, turns out to be either nonexistent or insignificant, "POGLED" quotes those people as testifying before the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Auditing Commission.

"It's all lies and slanders," says Mr. Pencho Kubadinski, a long-serving Politburo member, when confronted with accusations of gross embezzlement on the basis of documentary evidence derived from the archives of the former CC [Central Committee] of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] and of the security and protection service (UBO). He claims he has not spent a penny on his hunting expeditions in Bulgaria, in Europe, Asia and Africa. He always told Zhivkov the truth "point-blank" and due to his "numerous arguments with Zhivkov" was sent to lead the official organization Fatherland Front.

"I'm not the one who propped up Zhivkov's autocratic regime," says Mr. Dimitur Stoyanov, a former minister of internal affairs, who also dismisses as "slander" the accusations of an authoritarian style of work. Mr. Stoyanov, believed to be one of the masterminds and the key figures in the Bulgarian Muslims' forcible name-changing campaign, "disclaims all responsibility" for the repressions and shifts the blame on to Mr. Georgi Tanev, the former BCP boss in the town of Kurdzhali, southeastern Bulgaria, as well as to Todor Zhivkov, Mr. Stoyan Mikhaylov, Mr. Petur Mladenov and Mr. Georgi Atanasov. "The USSR kept silent, and we took it as consent," Mr. Dimitur Stoyanov says in connection with the Muslims' assimilation campaign which plunged Bulgaria into complete international isolation.

Mr. Stoyanov says his only "trouble", not guilt, "that is going to weigh heavy on my mind for the rest of my life" is his "poor orientation" on November 10, 1989 when he voted against the removal of Todor Zhivkov from the BCP leadership.

"My work in the government had become an endless torment. Milko Balev kept an eye on all activity and informed against me to Todor Zhivkov, seeking my removal," says Mr. Grisha Filipov, another ex-top official. The former prime minister of Bulgaria in the early 80s claims that what he achieved he achieved "in spite of Zhivkov's gross and inconsistent interventions in the work of the Council of Ministers" and says that he had been too "faint-hearted" to resign.

As to what Mr. Grisha Filipov did achieve, "POGLED" quotes Mr. Kiril Zarev, a long-serving State Planning Committee chief: "For more than two decades we have been working on a new economic mechanism. As a rule, the drafting was directed by Grisha Filipov. As a result, our economy was in a constant stress."

"I do not regret anything," says Mr. Emil Khristov, a former close aide of Todor Zhivkov. He claims he "had nothing to do" with the entourage of the former head of state.

For his part Mr. Vasil Tsanov, a former secretary of the CC of the BCP in charge of agriculture, "simply can't make out" why, when and by whom Bulgaria's 25 plants manufacturing farming machinery were eliminated. Nor does he know why the national budgetary allocations for farming investment had dropped over the last seven or eight years. "I can't remember being personally loyal to Todor Zhivkov," Mr. Tsanov claims. He was born in a neighboring village to Zhivkov's and was promoted by the former secretary general to "a position of responsibility in the party".

"POGLED" runs profiles of Mr. Grigor Stoichkov, who imposed a news blackout on the increased radiation levels in Bulgaria after the Chernobyl disaster; of Mr. Petko Danchev, coming from the same town as Zhivkov

and, according to the weekly, responsible for the devastation of the chemical and the biological industry; and of Mr. Ognyan Doynov, a "prominent Bulgarian expert in futile economic reforms", currently employed at the corporation owned by the well- known British businessmen Mr. Robert Maxwell, according to "POGLED".

### Zhivkov To Be Sentenced on Embezzlement Charge

*AU2011213390 Sofia BTA in English 2053 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Sofia, 20 Nov (BTA)—An action will be taken shortly against Todor Zhivkov, the new prosecutor general of Bulgaria, Mr. Martin Gunev, announced to the BULGARIAN TELEGRAPH AGENCY this evening.

The former leader No. 1 will be tried for 26 million leva he "used for his own benefit and for the benefit of other persons by abusing his power", Mr. Gunev's formulation goes. The flats Todor Zhivkov gave to different persons by using the departmental housing funds of the CC [Central Committee] of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] and the funds of the People's Councils (a list of which was published in the press) and the motor cars sold through the former Security Guard Department are also added to his criminal activity.

Zhivkov's closest aide Milko Balev, will be tried for using funds for his own and for the benefit of third persons.

The Prosecuting Magistracy is holding inquiries into other cases of criminal acts perpetrated by other communist leaders—criminal acts of negligence, the conclusion of unprofitable deals with foreign partners, power abuse for personal benefit. The following people are under investigation or suspects: former BCP CC Politburo members Ognyan Doynov and Grisha Filipov; former Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov; former BCP CC Secretary Emil Khristov; former Minister of the Economy Stoyan Ovcharov; Khristo Khristov, Georgi Karamanev, Lazar Prichkapov (the last three occupied less important positions).

The investigation against Grigor Stoichkov, former deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, is nearing its end—he is accused of criminal inactiveness after the Chernobyl accident.

The Prosecuting Magistracy is holding an inquiry into the activity of the members of the Politburo of the CC of the BCP and of the Council of Ministers. Investigation is being held to find the culprits for the crisis in agriculture, the misproportions in the country's economy, the harmful construction of inexpedient industrial projects, the upsetting of the ecological balance, the catastrophic growth of the country's foreign debt. Those who are personally responsible for the adoption of the wrong decisions will also be taken to task, Mr. Gunev stated.

The Prosecuting Magistracy has instructed the minister of the interior to hold an inquiry into the cases of people reported missing or killed after September 9, 1944 when the Communists came to power. An investigation will be made of the motives for the killing, the perpetrators, the instigators and the aides. The investigation will be under the control of the Prosecuting Magistracy.

Mr. Gunev informed that there were changes of personnel in the Prosecuting Magistracy. There will be further changes in it, the regional and district Prosecuting Magistracies included.

### Zhelev Discusses Political Situation, Policies

*AU2011142590 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 20 Nov 90 p 7*

[Report on interview with President Zhelyu Zhelev by Franz Kadell; place and date not given: "In Politics One Is so Restricted by Circumstances"]

[Text] Those who met Zhelyu Zhelev one year ago looked into two lively eyes in which flashed ideas that seemed to be both on earth and in the universe at the same time. The small apartment in Sofia's suburbs with the rotting window frames was not a cage, because the heart of the dissident is free. A happy man? At any rate, not an unhappy one.

Today Zhelyu Zhelev's eyes are not shining. Rather, his voice seems to be embarrassed. In the spacious rooms of the presidential palace where Zhivkov resided before him, an interview with the head of state is scheduled. A golden cage for the philosopher. An unhappy man. At any rate, not a happy one.

His speech to the United Nations was a great success. Bulgaria is no longer a communist state, he declared. How can this be since the old totalitarian Communists continue their rule as new democratic Socialists? "I meant by this statement that Bulgaria no longer has the structures of a totaliarian state. Neither the unity party nor the monopoly of the governing party exist any longer. The one-party control of the mass organizations is no longer given. The media are also free. The people can write what they want and in the way they want."

Why does he say this with so little emphasis? This is also his personal victory! He struggled and suffered for it. Criticism of Lenin resulted in the expulsion of the former komsomol star pupil in 1964. The communists recognized themselves in the mirror of his book entitled *Fascism* (1982), which earned him the hatred of his party and the admiration of the opposition. Zhelev adds a sentence: "By the way, the president is criticized most." Why? The answer shows his vulnerability in a new reality: "All are criticized. For various reasons. There are people who want to attract attention—as is normal in a democracy."

Zhelev also exercised criticism, but he was interested in the cause, in the system, not in persons or publicity.

Papers were smuggled to Deutsche Welle and Radio Free Europe, which transmitted Zhelev's thoughts. The media were the weapon of the thinker against the oppressors. Janus, however, turned his head. Now Zhelev is looking at the weapons of those who participate in the everyday political struggle against the philosopher in politics.

There the former Communists, who gained the majority in the elections in June, continue to be the authority. They knew how to do things. In the country the mayors went from door to door to facilitate the casting of votes. What is the anticommunist president's attitude toward his head of government, Andrey Lukanov, a cunning politician from the third generation of a noble communist family? "We will judge the people by their words, by the commitment in practice. We know that Mr. Lukanov was a Politburo candidate member and a deputy prime minister. However, among all the people, he proved to be the most flexible. An able politician, a professional."

A new chance for the old professional of the old system? How far can Zhelev's understanding go? When Lukanov was responsible as foreign trade minister, debts of $10.3 billion were accumulated in five years. What is his comment on this? "These billions were accumulated under Zhivkov. Zhivkov developed a speculative economy. Brezhnev always granted a double quota of oil, one half of it was provided for domestic demand, the other half was processed and exported. Foreign currency was received in exchange for the second quota. In this way Bulgaria was able to keep up the appearance of a stable economy—in contrast to the other East European countries which were actually shaken by crises. Then we were so shaken that we were taken aback." Is Zhivkov therefore alone to blame? Are the dictator and the party the same? "I do not want to express by this that Mr. Lukanov does not share the responsibility, but he did not decide the basic questions."

Why did the Socialists choose precisely one of their sharpest critics as president? "It was not the Socialists who elected me, this happened with the help of part of the socialists in parliament. I also realized that if the position of president was not given to the opposition, this might result in the dissolution of parliament and the tension might cause processes that would be hard to control."

Only on the sixth ballot was Zhelev elected in early August. The Socialists opposed above all the election of Social Democrat Petur Dertliev. They were afraid of the popularity of this brilliant speaker in debates. Not only malicious tongues asserted that the Socialists finally supported Zhelev because they thought that they could more easily get a sensitive idealist down. Representation is indeed not Zhelev's line. When he visited a village in the north and one of the assembled people shouted, "Three cheers for the president!" the celebrated man blushed and murmured humbly: "I have to go now." It was not he who chose politics, but it chose him. The communist heap of ruins came to the prophet.

Now he is sitting in the presidential palace. What a contrast to Zhivkov, who, like Zhelev, was the son of peasants! Like Zhelev, Zhivkov wrote books; so many that everybody asked how this could be possible, which was already meant as an answer. Zhivkov sought prestige, while Zhelev is looking for the truth. Zhivkov had palaces all over the country, Zhelev wants to keep his shabby apartment.

What about Zhivkov? Will he be brought to trial? "The investigations have been concluded. Legal proceedings are pending, but he will soon turn 80, and, according to my knowledge of our legislation, it is not certain whether he will be sentenced, fictitiously sentenced. I am not sure about that."

Zhivkov's Bulgaria was Moscow's Bulgaria. How are things to go on? "In the economic sector we are closely tied to the USSR, and nobody is able to change this with a magic wand. The USSR accounts for two-thirds of our trade. Almost all plants are organized in such a way that Soviet raw materials are needed, so that nobody—irrespective of who takes over in Bulgaria—can eliminate this factor. In contrast to this, there are radical changes in the field of politics. We take the West as a guideline since only there can we get help to reform our economy."

Competence and managers are required for this, and money; these are things Bulgaria does not have. How should this work? "What is lacking at the moment is the consensus of the political forces. This is the most important thing. We have good, serious economic experts, but, of course, not enough of them. In fact, we have to train experts first." Where? "Many countries offer us this—the United States, France, and Germany, as well." This will take years and the situation is becoming increasingly difficult. Food ration cards for basic foodstuffs. Hardly any gasoline. Coffee is out of the question.

"Money is the greatest problem. I think, however, that if a consensus among the political forces is really achieved—the deferment of our debts is supported by the IMF—we will gradually succeed in putting things right again." What can Bulgaria offer? "Nothing at the moment." Really nothing? "I was not acquainted with the details of foreign trade opportunities, but I think that we can participate in the field of tourism or electronics. A developed country actually has to take us as we are and help us to further develop. We are a small country in Europe."

The sadness of the last words is more deeply felt. Bulgaria, with its christian culture in the Middle Ages, 500 years of Ottoman rule, its blossoming in the 19th century, and a capital in which a European feels ten times more at home than in Bucharest, sees itself as a beggar in the corner of history. Why is Zhelev only thinking of the economy? The development in Yugoslavia and Romania is very risky. Is Bulgaria the most likely country to become a stabilizing factor in the Balkans?

The opportunity for a sketch. This suits Zhelev. The formulations become more precise: "Stabilization of the economic situation and afterward of the political constellation in the country itself. Bulgaria, which is geopolitically in the center of the Balkans, might play such a role as a stabilizing factor." The political idealist instead of the idealistic politician: "This is the noblest role, the worthiest role that we might play. This would be our contribution to European security and finally to world security."

His face becomes animated. Does he want to remain a politician? The president raises his arms: "No." When might that be? "Let us hope in two or three years." That is, when a new constitution is to be adopted. Then he is again the old Zhelyu Zhelev: His eyes are flashing, his voices becomes stronger. What does he want to do then? "Return to my profession, which is very good and offers great opportunities. There is far more scope than in politics. In politics one is severely restricted by circumstances."

### Proposal Made To Form 'Government of Experts'

*AU2011203890 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 19 Nov 90 p 1*

[Engineer Georgi Borislavov article: "Government of Experts!"]

[Text] We are ruled by a president from the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and a government of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP]. The results are evident. We are marching toward a total economic catastrophe. Contrary to the opinion that if the president comes from the ranks of the democratic opposition and the government issues a program on privatization and market economy, "rivers of aid" will start flowing toward Bulgaria, we still have not received even the notorious fodder corn from the United States.

What are the guarantees that if the Bulgarian Government is formed by the SDS, aid from the West will start to pour over Bulgaria, as Krustyo Petkov, chairman of the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria, said, without asking the millions of his organization's members whether they hold the same view? Why did the trade union leader not remember our people's saying that "God gives, but He does not fill the pockets?" Instead of Him, it was Metropolitan Pimen who appealed to our people to work—which is the most certain road of overcoming the crisis and deserve foreign aid, because precisely if we work well, can we guarantee that we will be able to return the loans and capital investments.

Who must dominate the government? Actually, why should this question be posed in a political form? The BSP proved that it cannot rule alone. The SDS has not proven anything yet, but uses beautiful phrases and declarations to describe the competence of its leaders and experts. This competence is yet to be proven in action!

What guarantees are there that an SDS government will indeed be competent, and that our people will not again become "laboratory rats" for new experiments? I think more and more, and so do many other people with common sense, that the young political figures strive for power not because of any great care for the people or for the outcome of the crisis (or catastrophe). Their zeal and bitterness show that they have great personal ambitions to fish in troubled water, i.e., to utilize the confused situation for their career striving toward ministerial posts. This applies both to some of the "blue" and a part of the "red" politicians, without forgetting of course the most vociferous "orange" politicians. As it seems at the moment, only the Movement for Rights and Freedoms has no overt ambitions for power, except behind-the-stage moves on its part....

What outcome is there? I think that the new government must be solely and exclusively dominated by competence, i.e., the "party of the competent," which has no color. To placate political passions and achieve consensus, the president must entrust a competent and uncompromised expert with forming the government. He must be a nonparty member, independent vis-a-vis the political parties, and at the same time, highly authoritative. I think that nobody doubts the possibility of finding such a person in Bulgaria!

Afterward, the new premier must select and propose a team, without taking into consideration what political force should dominate the government. The only consideration in selecting a minister should be his proven high competence in a certain area, something which should be proven indeed and not in words.

It would be wonderful if competence and only competence dominates the new government of our suffering country. Then the government's program will be a good one, acceptable to all, realistic, and feasible.

### Presidential Aide Ludzhev on Changes in Policy

*AU1811181790 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 6 Nov 90 p 1*

[Interview with presidential aide Dimitur Ludzhev by Volen Siderov; place and date not given—"Bridge of Confidence"]

[Excerpts] [Siderov] Mr. Ludzhev, you were also in the past in Zhelyu Zhelev's "circle." What is the difference between the adviser to the president and the roundtable expert?

[Ludzhev] At the moment we are witnessing the disintegration of the old relations, cliches, and mentality, and are forming new ones, without the final result being in sight. The chairman of the Republic and the institution he represents are a typical example. Foreign policy, in addition to the legislative initiative, is one of the most important spheres of his activity. However, in practice, the Constitution does not draw the limits of the president's activities. This also applies to his crew. There are

several of us around him. We tested our concept during the visit to the United States and France. We established contacts. However, all this must be formed as a well-constructed strategy, which consists of specific elements. You can imagine how much work we have. It is necessary to form a team that will ensure the leading place of the chairman of the Republic in foreign policy and create institutions which at this moment of transition could serve as bridges toward new relations. The Foreign Aid Agency is such an institution. [passage omitted]

[Siderov] The opinion has been expressed that those who have participated in one way or another in the leadership of the country, are preferable to the "rookies." What is your opinion?

[Ludzhev] Since we are implementing the transition toward market economy and strive toward democracy, it would be logical to approach precisely the countries with an established democracy. We need new people who have a clear awareness that what is to be done represents the correct road. Some people talk about experience. The old members of the apparatus simply have been trained under a situation which nobody needs today. Those people have a completely different mentality. When we speak about the cadre policy we must not speak only about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but also about our military relations and the direct relations between certain intelligence services and foreign affairs services. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must look for young and competent people, whose basic goal should be to improve Bulgaria's image. We do not have a Bulgarian lobby in America or Europe. We need people with character, who will be accepted in a completely different manner. The bridge of confidence is the bridge of practically connecting Bulgaria with our past enemy—the democratic world. [passage omitted]

[Siderov] How do you see the outcome of the government crisis?

[Ludzhev] The government crisis actually exists for months. Its basis is the lack of a responsible factor capable of adopting radical steps toward the reform. We are in a state of passivity. We must strive toward forming a government which, without haggling about terms and conditions, will implement the exceptionally difficult task of leading the country out of the crisis. A coalition government by itself cannot resolve the problem if nothing essential changes. Obviously, a cabinet is necessary in which the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] will be the dominating force. I hope that the forces in the parliament will regroup themselves after a part of the Bulgarian Socialist Party parliamentary faction supports an SDS government. I would call such a government a government of national responsibility.

## SDS' Ludzhev Views Opposition's History, Goals

*AU1511115690 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 7 Nov 90 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Dimitur Ludzhev, deputy chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces, SDS, by Major Lyubomir Denov; place and date not given—"SDS: What Kind of Evolution?"]

[Excerpts] [Denov] Mr. Ludzhev, after one year of intensive life, there is no doubt that the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] has changed significantly. However, before we deal with its near future let us touch upon the frequent criticism that recently the SDS has become a totalitarian organization.

[Ludzhev] The SDS is an organization that was born in the struggle for democracy and to a certain degree it reflects its development in Bulgaria at the present stage. It is a truly democratic coalition—a combination of several parties, organizations, and movement, each preserving its autonomy. No one can force it to do anything. The accusation of becoming a totalitarian organization is simply ridiculous, at least for me, somcone who is in this organization's "kitchen." [passage omitted]

[Denov] What are the main tendencies in the development of the SDS?

[Ludzhev] You know that according to the well-known political protocol, the organizations forming the SDS assumed the commitment to remain in this structure until the adoption of the new Constitution, and the subsequent elections. I cannot predict what will happen afterward. For the time being various tendencies exist. First of all, I would like to note that after the elections the SDS already has two political centers—the Coordinating Council and the Parliamentary Union—and while they coordinate their activity, I would say that the group of deputies is rather independent....

[Denov] However, both have the same leader....

[Ludzhev] Oh, no.... I disagree with the opinion that if the leader is the same than everything is the same. This is not the structure of the former Bulgarian Communist Party.... Look at the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] parliamentary group. It consists of factions and ideological currents, and often they disagree. We do not only have different groups, but also many independent deputies, who on several occasions violated decisions of the parliamentary union.... I am not afraid of this phenomenon. We continue to learn to live under conditions of democracy. [passage omitted]

[Denov] What could change if a new political situation emerges, in which the SDS forms its own government?

[Ludzhev] Such a development, which also depends on the centrifugal forces within the BSP, could lead to a new restructuring of the SDS. I mean the evident tendencies

of forming a centrist movement of the modern conservative kind both within and outside the SDS. [passage omitted]

[Denov] Recently, people started talking seriously about the presidential idea of forming a program-based government, however, with the SDS having the dominating role. Could you define the "dominating role" concept?

[Ludzhev] This means a government in which the SDS will have the guarantees that it could conduct policy in directions it envisages, and that the members of this government will have a chance to really and directly apply and control the implementation of this policy. [passage omitted]

[Denov] Is the Ministry of National Defense a part of this "dominating role?"

[Ludzhev] The issue of the Ministry of National Defense is especially interesting. Our program explicitly demands that a political figure, a civilian, be appointed to the post of minister of national defense, and we continue to adhere to this demand. Simultaneously, we do not forget that at the present stage the president of the Republic, as commander in chief of the Armed Forces, implements to a certain degree some control over the Army. However, this is insufficient not because of any special reasons, but because of the lack of established procedures. A practically total autonomy of the military leadership of various structures of the state, the parliament, and even the Council of Ministers is evident, and this is a consequence of the previous regime. We still have to establish new mechanisms which will allow us to implement efficient control over the military leadership on the part of the Commission on National Security at the Grand National Assembly. [passage omitted]

### President Zhelev Greets Officer Legion Conference

*AU1411153990 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 12 Nov 90 p 1*

[Message from President Zhelyu Zhelev to the First National Conference of the Georgi Sava Rakovski Officers Legion of the Bulgarian People's Army in Sofia on 9-10 November]

[Text] Gentlemen officers!

Bulgarian brothers!

You are gathered here, united by the patriotic idea that coincides with the main goal of our present social and political development: to rally and unite around the national ideas.

All Bulgarian officers and citizens are confronted with a specific task: to contribute according to their ability and forces to destroying the totalitarian system that caused so must suffering. For decades the profession and rank of officer lost part of its traditional prestige and was artificially lowered. To restore the authority and prestige of the Bulgarian officer, which is one of your goals, is also one of the requirements of the new time.

The depoliticization of the Army and its personnel is another important goal that coincides with the direction in which our society is already heading. I greet you and wish you succes in traveling this road worthily, from its difficult beginning to its successful completion.

The traditional military values—dignity, honesty, courage, selflessness, and self-sacrifice in the name of the motherland—were neglected but never forgotten. The attempt to replace them by ideological loyalty and obedience to a single party proved unsuccessful. Now it is absolutely essential to restore those values and return them to the heart of every soldier.

Bulgarian officers!

You are the guardian of our sacred land and guarantors of our security, and peaceful work and sleep. This is a great honor and an even greater responsibility. Be worthy of our confidence!

Be worthy heirs of our fathers and grandfathers, who covered Bulgarian weapons with eternal combat glory!

Keep the Bulgarian national flag pure and unsullied!

In your persons I greet all patriotic Bulgarian officers, bearers of the eternal traditions of the nation's restoration period and the 1,300-year-old staunch Bulgarian spirit.

I wish you fruitful work for the benefit of our people. I am convinced that our road to the democratic rule-of-law state will be easier if you all contribute your share to strengthening the changes in society and to strengthening our national security!

### 2d Group of Nationals Departs Iraq After Delay

*AU2011212690 Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian 2100 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Mr. Zdravko Velev from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed us about the following:

The Bulgarian Embassy in Baghdad reports that after repeated postponements in the previously announced flight of Bulgarian citizens from Iraq, the Iraqi authorities have canceled it because of a malfunction, which cannot be repaired until tomorrow morning.

After long negotiations an agreement has been reached, and at 2045 another smaller aircraft took off from Baghdad. It carries 128 persons and the luggage of the entire group that was supposed to fly earlier. The aircraft is expected to arrive at Sofia Airport at 2345.

At the moment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is making efforts to obtain Turkey's permission for the flight of a second aircraft, on which the remaining 41 Bulgarian citizens will arrive later tonight or early

tomorrow morning. Some 39 of them are from Transcomplex and two from Bulgargeomin.

### Zhelev Meets Gorbachev in Paris; Aid Discussed

*AU2011192390 Sofia BTA in English 1855 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Paris, 20 Nov (BTA)—Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, president of Bulgaria, and Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the USSR, met here today for the first time.

Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov and Foreign Minister Lyuben Gotsev also attended the meeting which was held in the residence of the Soviet ambassador in Paris.

Before the meeting, in the presence of journalists, Mr. Gorbachev said that the two sides could make it without an interpreter. Mr. Andrey Lukanov, who was born in Moscow, said he was ready to do the interpretation.

The meeting lasted 40 minutes. Then President Zhelev was interviewed by a group of Bulgarian journalists. "On the whole our goal is the same, although we are approaching it by different roads. But the goal is the same—parliamentary democracy and market economy. The pace of advancement is different too," he said.

According to Dr. Zhelev he was assured by Mr. Gorbachev that "on the whole the Soviet Union will keep the volume of its power resources supply" to Bulgaria.

"We hope that there will be no cold and darkness this winter," he said.

The Bulgarian president repeated his invitation to President Gorbachev to visit Bulgaria. As the program of both sides is very busy, the visit would take place at the earliest convenience.

### Greets Thatcher, Spain's Gonzalez

*AU2111090690 Sofia BTA in English 2327 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Paris, 20 Nov (BTA)—Today the president of Bulgaria, Dr. Zhelyu Zhelev, had meetings with Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of Great Britain, and with Mr. Felipe Gonzalez, prime minister of Spain.

Prime Minister Thatcher stated her country is prepared to support Bulgaria when the problems of the latter are discussed in the European Community, the Council of Europe and at international forums.

Prime Minister Gonzalez said at the meeting with the Bulgarian president that Spain is ready to intercede with the European organizations for giving urgent aide to Bulgaria.

### Meets Mitsotakis Along With Lukanov

*AU1911135690 Sofia BTA in English 1312 GMT 19 Nov 90*

[Text] Paris, 19 Nov (BTA)—President Zhelyu Zhelev received last night Greek Prime Minister Konstandinos Mitsotakis. After a one-hour talk the two made statements in front of journalists.

Said Dr. Zhelev: "We are greatly pleased with this meeting between friends which are ready to expand their cooperation in all spheres: from the military to the economic one. This is in the spirit of the processes which are now taking place in Europe and will contribute to the strengthening of stability in the Balkans. As a friendly country Greece is offering us a number of advantageous conditions for economic cooperation which is now of essential importance for us. We became aware of the great opportunities which are now existing and which include the establishment of free zones, the allotment of a special credit for Bulgaria, the extension of communications and the improvement of transport between the two countries. These matters will be discussed in detail at the forthcoming talks in Sofia for which Mr. Mitsotakis will arrive on December 6."

"We had a very useful friendly meeting," the Greek prime minister said. "We confirmed the two countries positions for rapprochement and strengthening of relations. Athens and Sofia boast of friendly relations. We would like to develop them in the spirit of peace in the Balkans. We are talking about development of talks in all spheres: defense, economy, etc. We confirmed we had common positions and common interests in the region and we stated once again that friendship between the Greek and the Bulgarian peoples is not influenced by the political parties is foundations are, therefore, sound and are guarantees for the future."

Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov was present at the meeting in the Bulgarian Embassy.

According to BTA correspondents the Greek side is studying the possibilities for allotment to Bulgaria of a special loan to the amount of 50 million dollars. Some survey work is done related to the establishment of free frontier zones between the two countries, and in the military sphere there will be a possible exchange of visits between the two countries defense ministers.

### Zhelev Speech at Paris CSCE Summit Reported

*AU2011192590 Sofia BTA in English 1843 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Paris, 20 Nov (BTA)—"The future of Bulgaria and of the whole continent depends on building up all-European security structures and conducting cooperation with the participation of the United States and Canada," President Zhelyu Zhelev stated today, addressing the summit meeting of the CSCE member-nations.

Dr. Zhelev voiced Bulgaria's assurance that the new guarantees for the country's national security could be provided only within the context of the all-European process, by further improving the code of behavior, the foundations of which were laid by the ten guiding principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

"Today a new approach should be applied by taking into account the changes which have taken place of late in the world and by bearing in mind that a group of European countries are still outside the context of conventional disarmament," Dr. Zhelev said. "When working out the approach it is important to foresee and prevent any potential threat to security on a regional level."

Bulgaria's president stressed that political courage and imagination are needed for working out the mechanisms of multilateral and bilateral consultations and cooperation which would not allow former East-West confrontation be substituted by opposition based on old historical stereotypes.

President Zhelev emphasized that the rising of extreme nationalism and chauvinism is dangerous for the democratization of Europe. "They become especially dangerous when turned into a policy of the state or when they are supported by the state," he said. He declared himself to be for a dialogue between the different points of view, for tolerance and moderation which he considers to be the most important components of the foundations of European understanding.

The Bulgarian president suggested that the question of grouping the problems of interethnic relations in a separate "basket" be discussed. "They should be solved by strictly respecting the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of each country and by absolutely respecting basic human rights," he underlined.

Of late Bulgaria has convincingly proved she is building up her policy towards her neighbors in this spirit. The Bulgarian Turks were restored to their human rights which were grossly violated by the previous regime, Dr. Zhelev reminded.

The Bulgarian president stressed that Bulgaria is greatly interested in all problems related to economic cooperation. "We consider the development of economic cooperation to be of vital importance for Bulgaria's democratization; we believe that our partners in Eastern Europe could not be indifferent to it too," Dr. Zhelev said. He emphasized that Bulgaria is ready to bear the burden of tough and unpopular measures, relying at the same time on the new European solidarity.

President Zhelev dwelt on the problem of the concrete mechanisms through which the all-European process could be advanced in the future. He declared himself to be for a maximally flexible approach; new structures must be created, but the potentials of the existing ones should also be made use of. "We attach particular importance to the parliamentary aspect of the all-European process and we back up the idea of setting up a parliamentary assembly of the all-european process on the basis of the now existing Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe," the Bulgarian president said. He pointed out that it is necessary to establish a small permanent secretariat and suggested Prague as its seat.

President Zhelev said that the changes which are taking place in Bulgaria at the moment are sweeping and irreversible. "Having completely restored her national sovereignty, new Bulgaria became an independent subject of international relations and she is doing everything which is within her powers to make her comeback to the community of the states with civilized foreign political behavior," Dr. Zhelev underlined in his speech delivered at the summit meeting in Paris.

### Kuwait Ready To Invest in 'Priority Sectors'

*AU2111085790 Sofia BTA in English 2252 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Sofia, 20 Nov (BTA)—Kuwait is ready to make investments in the priority sectors of the Bulgarian economy, Mr. 'Abd-al-Wahab al-Harun, chief investment manager of the Kuwaiti investment office in London, said at a meeting he had here today with Mr. Belcho Belchev, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of finance of Bulgaria. At the meeting the two sides discussed the possibility of Kuwait's giving some aide to Bulgaria in recognition of the fact that Bulgaria is one of the countries defending the just cause of Kuwait. The possibilities for cooperation in banking and finance were also considered.

The Kuwaiti guest was received by Vice President Atanas Semerdziev.

### Parliamentarians Visit NATO Headquarters

*AU2011151190 Sofia BTA in English 1424 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Brussels, 20 Nov (BTA)—At the invitation of the US Mission to NATO, a group of Bulgarian MP's paid a visit to the North Atlantic Alliance's Headquarters here.

They were received by Dr. Manfred Woerner, secretary general of NATO, and conferred with the US Ambassador Mr. William Taft and with other high-ranking NATO officials.

The Bulgarian officials told their hosts that Bulgaria is in a process of shifting its foreign policy priorities and that it wants to pursue friendly relations with the NATO member countries.

The sides exchanged views on the parliamentarians' role in the promotion of relations between Bulgaria and the NATO members.

At the end of their visit, the Bulgarian MP's met with generals and officers at the Supreme Allied Command Europe.

### Assembly Chairman Todorov Receives EC Delegation

*AU2011184490 Sofia BTA in English 1737 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Sofia, 20 Nov (BTA)—Bulgaria will take its place in Europe again, the chairman of the Committee for Democracy Through Law with the Council of Europe, Mr. Antonio la Pergolla, who was on a two-day visit here said.

He had meetings with Mr. Nikolay Todorov, chairman of the Grand National Assembly, with the president of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, with deputy ministers and jurists at which the possibilities of the committee's helping along the establishment of democratic structures in the country during the transition from a one-party regime to political pluralism were discussed.

Bulgaria should open to Europe, to its cultural heritage and its scientific researches, Mr. Pergolla said. He chairs yet another Council of Europe committee which is working on a Pan-European program for scientific research and expressed his assurance that Bulgaria will support and take part in the creation of the program. In his opinion this would be the first step towards the Bulgaria's integration in the Council of Europe.

Bulgaria already has a representative at the Committee for Democracy Through Law.

### Army Chief Interviewed on Warsaw Pact Agreement

*AU1311150790 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA in Bulgarian 7 Nov 90 pp 1, 4*

[Interview with Colonel General Radnyu Minchev, first deputy minister of national defense and commander in chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army, by Vladi Vladkov and Krasimir Uzunov; place and date not given: "The Power of Weapons Declines"; first paragraph is NARODNA ARMIYA introduction]

[Text] The Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Pact member countries at the level of ministers of foreign affairs and heads of the General Staffs of the member countries, ended recently. Colonel General Radnyu Minchev, first deputy minister of national defense and commander in chief of the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army [BNA], answers the questions of our journalists.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Colonel General, as head of the BNA General Staff, did you return satisfied from Budapest? Do you feel more secure now?

[Minchev] The question is rather complicated. I think that the national security of every country now and in the future must be sought not at the level of quantity of weapons and military equipment, but first of all through further improving relations between the individual countries, both in the Balkans and Europe. In other words, not the power of weapons, and their quantity and quality, but the consolidation of peaceful policy that must be based on closer cooperation between the separate countries in various areas of life should guarantee the security of every country. Recent tendencies, both in the Balkans and Europe, give grounds to be satisfied with the Budapest meeting. Thus I am not a pessimist about our national security.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Do you think that the Balkans, Europe, and the world are ready for the supremacy of the nonmilitary means of guaranteeing national security? Recent events in the Persian Gulf do not support this thesis.

[Minchev] The establishment of all-European systems of security and cooperation is a matter of time, because all countries are interested in this. I think that such systems will be created soon after signing the Conventional Arms Limitation Treaty in Paris on 19 November. Naturally, all countries will make efforts to turn those structures into real instruments. This is especially important against the background of recent events in the Persian Gulf.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Could you cite some more specific figures of the Budapest agreement that affect Bulgaria?

[Minchev] I can cite very specific figures, but I shall do this later. NARODNA ARMIYA will be the first newspaper to receive this information. For the time being I can say that in general we are satisfied with the limits of the various kinds of weapons we received within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. The quantity of combat aircraft, helicopters, combat armored vehicles, artillery systems with a caliber over 100 mm, and bridge-building equipment completely cove our needs in terms of sufficiency. As a country situated in a complex military-political region, we expected to receive more tanks. Nevertheless, we are still receiving more tanks than many other East European countries. It is true that we are not in Central Europe. However, there is a certain quantity for the flanks, which must be divided among Bulgaria, Romania, and certain Soviet military okrugs, while in NATO the tanks for the southern flank are divided only between Greece and Turkey.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Colonel General, until recently it was assumed that complete unity of thought was characteristic of the Warsaw Pact. Was this also the case during the meeting of the special commission that had to determine the national levels?

[Minchev] No, I cannot say this. The road toward the final document was full of lively discussions, arguments, and essential compromises on the part of the separate countries. However, justice requires me to say that each country travelled its road with a sense of responsibility. All representatives of the six countries were permeated by the awareness that this is one of the main issues of our time. Without signing this document it would have been

impossible to find a real conclusion to the Vienna talks, and the Paris summit would have been impossible.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] What will happen, according to the agreement, if a country would like to increase its maximum levels?

[Minchev] If one of the contracting countries would like to increase the maximum levels of its conventional weapons and equipment it must inform all contracting countries about this. The right to such an increase is granted only with the agreement of all interested contracting countries, thus the relevant instructions are not violated.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] What happens if a particular country withdrawing from the agreement feels that it does not correspond to the needs of its national security?

[Minchev] If a particular country withdraws from the treaty that will be signed in Paris, it ceases to be a party to this agreement. A state that decides to withdraw from the agreement must inform the country where the agreement is deposited (in this case, Hungary), at least 90 days before the date of the presumed date of withdrawal. Within 21 days consultations of all contracting countries are to take place and the grounds for the withdrawal must be explained.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] After all this, would you like to exchange your post as head of the BNA General Staff with a similar post in one of the Central European armies?

[Minchev] No. Every soldier is the right man in his own country. I am used to the difficulties, and Bulgaria, which is situated in the Balkans, has never had it too easy....

## Semerdzhiev Receives Turkish Health Minister

*TA2011190590 Ankara TRT Television Network in Turkish 1800 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Health Minister Halil Sivgin, who is continuing contacts in Sofia, has been received by Bulgaria's vice president, Atanas Semerdzhiev.

Speaking at the meeting, Semerdzhiev said that Bulgaria is pleased with the positive changes taking place in its relations with Turkey. He pointed out that conditions are suitable for the development of bilateral relations and for the strengthening of ties. He added that there is potential for extensive economic cooperation among the countries that have shorelines on the Black Sea.

Sivgin said that he shares Semerdzhiev's hope that relations will speedily improve and develop. The health minister pointed out that Turkey is developing and wants to share this development with its neighbors.

Our correspondent Feza Sezen reports that Health Minister Sivgin was also received by Bulgarian Assembly speaker Nikolay Todorov. Sivgin also visited three hospitals near Sofia.

## Romanian Ship Spills Oil in Port of Burgas

*AU2111125090 Sofia BTA in English 2138 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Sofia, 20 Nov (BTA)—At about 02:00 hrs this morning some Bulgarian sailors discovered a great fuel oil slick in Port Burgas. The oil fuel spill came from the Zolau, a Romanian merchant vessel, which poured its own fuel into the water due to reasons yet unknown. All forces available at port Burgas have been mobilized. In 12 hours the cleanup crews managed to take in about 20 tons of fuel oil and to prevent the spreading of the slick outside the port and into the open sea.

The work is going on, because pier walls and ships have been hit by the slick. There has never been such a big oil spill in port Burgas before. The most severe sanctions will be imposed on the offenders. The captain of the merchantman will have to pay a maximum fine of about 100 thousand leva; besides the Penal Code contains provisions for imprisonment of up to five years in such cases. The ecological damages will be calculated separately.

## Prime Minister Calfa Defends His Televised Speech

*AU1611172090 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 15 Nov 90 p 1*

[Interview with CSFR Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa by VEREJNOST correspondent Andrej Javorsky in Prague on 13 November: "Federal Vision of the Federation"]

[Text] [Javorsky] Prime Minister Calfa, after your television appearance, in the eyes of many, you have apparently become an advocate of the hard federal centralism or even Prague centralism. Could you describe your personal stance on this issue?

[Calfa] I have no idea what is the cause for such conclusions because I defined in my speech the concept of federation only in general terms, and I do not believe that I could say less than I actually did. If you analyzed it, you would find that approximately 90 percent of what I defined as the federal program actually is assented to in the constitutional bill. Hence, in no way can it be interpreted as a review of the issues on which we fundamentally disagree with the republics. It was a federal vision of the federation defined on the federal level. In other words, it is that which was required from us by the media, public, representative bodies, etc.; i.e., that which was viewed as an absence of federal opinion with all the reverses it involves. Thus, it was not any centralist vision; I repeat that approximately 90 percent of it is agreed upon anyway. The Army issue is settled, the financial matters too are already settled, and basically in the way I described it in my speech. Of course, we have not reached the bank issue as yet (this interview took place during an intermission in the competence talks in the afternoon on Tuesday, 13 November 1990). This will probably give rise to a more extensive debate but the positive attitude in seeking a solution is there. We have at our disposal constitutions of other federal states, so, when the going is rough, we scan them for their solutions. The effort to get it together is definitely present.

[Javorsky] So, one could say that the topic of these talks is the allocation of the federally accepted minimum to the competence of the federation and of the republics?

[Calfa] You are being difficult, you only think in terms of maximum-minimum, who will gain what. I have to tell you one thing, we simply do not have any experience with this. We have a two-nation federation, which in itself is unique in the world. We only have some twenty years of experience, perhaps a little more, with what we have now. Well, and now, armed with world theory and our experience, we are trying to create something on a new qualitative basis. I would say that we are beginning to build an old house anew. Now, tell me, how many bricks did I take of the old house? I have no idea. I will not even try to find out, I will leave it to you.

[Javorsky] Thank you for the interview.

## Knazko Comments on Calfa's 12 Nov TV Speech

*AU1611171390 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 15 Nov 90 p 2*

[Statement by Milan Knazko, Slovak Republic internal relations minister, on CSFR Prime Minister Marian Calfa's 12 November television speech: "You Are Not Right, Mr. Calfa"]

[Text] Milan Knazko, Slovak Republic international relations minister, requested the publication of his standpoint toward Monday's [12 November] television speech delivered by CSFR Prime Minister Marian Calfa. The standpoint reads:

"Your speech contained just enough demagogy to be successful if it had been delivered some five years ago. Your comparison of Czechoslovakia to that human body and its autopsy evoked a picture of a mortuary in my mind—maybe because such an idea about our federation is dead for a long time. Let the dead rest in peace, Mr. Calfa. We are not one body, one head, one heart, two kidneys, and so on.

"If we are to continue this metaphoric speech then I have to say that we are two bodies—with two heads, two hearts and with all organs that belong to them. Hence, we are two persons, two friends, and, maybe, two relatives. We jointly own our house, our garden, and a piece of forest. We have a lot in common. We also have a lot of identical opinions. There are also things, however, which we do not share but I do not want to speak about them because I am strongly convinced that we have to build on what brings us together.

"I almost forgot one thing. We have a joint property manager. A property manager who takes care of our house, property, and common interests. He does what those two friends want him to do, that is, what is useful, beneficial, or necessary in the interests of their common cause. The property manager manages. He does not delegate the spheres of competence to the tenants and owners of a common house.

"The main thing is that he cannot take away the right of these two friends to make decisions about their home and about themselves. If a property manager has such ambitions then he is usually replaced.

"Mr. Prime Minister, our state was established as Czechoslovakia, a state of two equal nations. Please, do not speak about a unitarian state in such no uncertain terms. The fact that the hyphen [in the name of the state in 1918] disappeared so quickly was a fatal mistake that causes today's trauma. The then assertion that Czechoslovakia represented one nation was not truthful. Your parable about a single body is of the same value."

### Assembly Committees Discuss Bill on CPCZ Assets

*LD1611141890 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1130 GMT 16 Nov 90*

[Text] The Constitutional and Legal Committees of the Federal Assembly today discussed the draft constitution bill on the return of the assets of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ], or, to be more precise, of its follow-up organizations. According to this law the assets and the ownership rights of the CPCZ—or rather of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, the Communist Party of Slovakia, the Party of Democratic Left, and the CPCZ as well as of their bodies, departments, enteprises, and economic facilities—should be nationalized and made the property of the state without compensation. With regard to the fact that the current constitution has no provision for nationalization without compensation, this bill will be, in fact, a change of the Constitution and will therefore be a constitutional bill.

After the debate which took up all morning, Deputy Josef Micl proposed to end the debate and to adjourn discussion to a later date. Only the CPCZ deputies voted for this proposal and the debate therefore continues.

### Approves Handover of Assets

*LD1611221590 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 2100 GMT 16 Nov 90*

[Excerpts] Today at the joint session of the two chambers, the deputies of the Federal Assembly approved a law on metrology. [passage omitted]

The deputies went on to discuss a government bill of the constitutional law on the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] assets being handed back to the people of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic.

Federal Deputy Prime Minister Pavel Rychetsky stressed that the law was neither an act of revenge nor a confiscation law. He pointed out the fact that the CPCZ's debts toward our society are significantly bigger than the value of the assets in question. In the past 20 years alone its direct subsidies amounted to 5.6 billion korunas and indirect subsidies amounted to 2.6 million korunas.

The bill was supported by both joint speakers of the chambers.

Deputy Pavol Kanis said on behalf of the communist deputies' club that the party was prepared to hand over its assets to the state by the end of this year. He went on to propose to end the discussion about this law.

Deputy Jozef Baksay supported the government bill on behalf of the clubs of deputies of the Civic Forum, Public against Violence, and Christian Democratic Movement. He noted that the Communist Party has one year to hand back what its predecessors stole from the people. His view was supported also by the representatives of the Christian Democratic Union, the Slovak National Party, and the Movement for Self-Administrative Democracy—the Society for Moravia and Silesia.

The deputies of the Federal Assembly subsequently approved the constitutional law on the CPCZ assets being handed back to the people.

### Parties Satisfied With Czech-Slovak Dialogue

*AU1611140390 Prague CTK in English 2034 GMT 14 Nov 90*

[Text] Prague Nov 14 (CTK)—Over 160 representatives of several dozen parties, groups, and movements from all over Czechoslovakia supported today the dialogue which has started between the Czechs and Slovaks and saw it as the most effective method of removing misunderstanding and mistrust.

The participants in a meeting at Prace, South Moravia said that with the exception of the Slovak National Party all favored the coexistence of the Czechs and Slovaks as two equal nations in one state.

The meeting was organized by an umbrella body known as the Assembly of Political Parties, Movements, and Groups in Czechoslovakia and a similar body in Slovakia. 73 parties, movements, and groups were represented at what they described as the first state-wide political dialogue. They were mostly groups which failed to gain the number of votes necessary for being elected to parliament last June. They voiced the conviction that a resolute removal of the economic remainders of directive socialist centralism and its substitution by modern social-concerned market economy was a most effective way to political, economic, social, and ecological stability of the Czechoslovak federation.

### Press Reports on Power-Sharing Agreement

*AU1611154490*

[Editorial Report] Czech and Slovak newspapers on 15 November publish commentaries on the talks between teams of the Federal, Czech, and Slovak Governments held in Prague on 13 November, which—according to Federal Prime Minister Calfa—resulted in an agreement on the "complete draft of amendments to the constitutional law on the Czechoslovak federation in the part concerning the division of powers between the federation and the republics."

Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech on 15 November on page 1 carries a 700-word "ha, bh"-signed commentary entitled "Offensive, Endeavor, Line." The commentary points out that there is "general satisfaction" with the outcome of the talks because they "represent a generally acceptable compromise" and because "the state will not fall apart."

At the same time the commentary cautions against excessive optimism. It stresses that the Christian Democratic Movement, a "strong" member of the Slovak coalition government, has not renounced its long-term

goal of an independent Slovak bank of issue, a separate Slovak representation in international bodies, and "the idea of a sovereign Slovakia." It also observes that, in contrast to the general optimism of participants in the Prague talks, "Slovak Prime Minister Meciar was leaving with a certain skepticism."

The HOSPODARSKE NOVINY commentary also ponders the future of the country's constitutional arrangement. In this context it mentions a report by Peter Green, the UPI correspondent in Prague: "According to an unidentified highly placed official who is close to President Vaclav Havel, to whom Peter Green refers, Czechoslovakia could be divided into five republics in an effort to calm down the separatist moods. Such a solution is reportedly gaining in popularity in the circles of the Federal Government. P. Green writes that, according to this scenario, the five future republics would be Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, East Slovakia, and West Slovakia. According to the UPI report, the plan is conceived as a way of satisfying Slovak nationalists while at the same time keeping Czechs and Slovaks within a functioning Federal republic."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 15 November on page 3 carries a 650-word Jan Fuelle commentary entitled "Sensations." The commentary concentrates on one "interesting fact" about the 13 November talks. Fuelle observes that "for the first time" the Slovak delegation was chaired by Slovak National Council Chairman Frantisek Miklosko, rather than by Prime Minister Meciar. He also notes that while Miklosko and Jan Carnogursky were leaving the talks "very satisfied," Vladimir Meciar refused to speak to anyone and "remained on the balcony alone for about 20 minutes." Fuelle speculates that the Slovak prime minister may have been "contemplating whether he, with his straightforward attitude and his always clearly formulated views, is a match for his prevaricating [lavirujici] partners in the coalition and in the movement which had nominated him to his post."

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 15 November on page 1 carries an 800-word Jaroslav Vajs commentary entitled "State of Emergency." Vajs expresses skepticism about the outcome of the talks, despite the optimistic assessments by participants in them. He observes that no communique on the talks was issued and that disagreements on many issues (declaration of a state of emergency, jurisdiction over the railroads, ownership of natural resources, and control over radio and television) remain and have only been shelved. Vajs does not believe that the talks produced a "final compromise and an end to disputes" and suspects that "in a year's time the same people may be facing the very same issues [of division of powers] when working on the new constitution."

A similar attitude is expressed by Prague PRACE in Czech commentator Petr Hirsch. In a 600-word commentary entitled "On Thin Ice," published on 15 November on page 1, Hirsch says that the agreement reached on 13 November does not mean that "everything has been resolved." He stresses that the agreement still needs to be approved by the Czech, Slovak, and Federal parliaments and that its passing in the Slovak parliament, in particular, will not be "free of conflicts." Hirsch continues: "Let us hope that common sense prevailed this time. But let us not indulge in any great illusions. The governments approved the fact that the republics and the federation will each have their own special budget but these budgets still remain to be filled with specific figures. Given the difficulties of putting together the agreement on the division of powers, it is easy to imagine the tug-of-war over the budget."

Commentaries on the Prague talks are published also by Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES and Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 15 November. In a 500-word commentary in Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES on page 2, entitled "Federation After a Difficult Delivery," Zdenek John expresses relief at the fact that the protracted tussle over the distribution of powers is over and that the governments no longer have any excuse for delaying the formulation of their policies until after the jurisdiction issue is settled. Writing in RUDE PRAVO, commentator Igor Sirota welcomes the fact that most disputed issues (such as the conclusion of international agreements by the republics, the federation's possibility to redistribute financial resources, a single bank of issue) have been settled. Although he concedes that disagreements persist on the management of railroads and telecommunications, on the access of central bodies to state media, on the division of natural resources between the republics, and on who can declare a state of emergency, he believes that "all this can be settled in a reasonable way, under the condition that the political forces in the republic agree on the country's future constitutional framework."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 15 November on pages 1 and 2 carries a 1,200-word Frantisek Melis report on the Prague talks, entitled "Is Slovakia Satisfied?" Melis contrasts the negative assessment of the Prague talks by Slovak Prime Minister Meciar with the positive assessment by the other members of the Slovak delegation and wonders: "Who does, in fact, speak the objective truth about the Prague talks? To what degree have the ideas of the Slovak delegation about the division of powers really been fulfilled?"

## Government Passes Extrajudicial Rehabilitation Bill

*AU2111141990 Prague CTK in English 2116 GMT 19 Nov 90*

[Text] Prague Nov 19 (CTK)—The Czechoslovak Government discussed and passed at its special session here today a bill on extrajudicial rehabilitation.

This law follows up the earlier approved law on judicial rehabilitation and aims at at least partial remedying the wrongs committed by the totalitarian regime from February 25, 1948 when it seized power to January 1, 1990.

The law solves mainly confiscation of property, unlawful imprisonment, stay in forced labor camps, expulsion from schools, dismissal from work, etc.

The law provides for financial compensation. Dismissals from work will be compensated for in determining the amount of pensions.

The compensation will be applied only to physical persons who are Czechoslovak citizens.

The bill will be submitted to the federal parliament.

### Trade Unions Demand Higher Minimum Wage

*AU1611132390 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 14 Nov 90 p 2*

["(ZR)"-signed report: "The Minimum Wage Should Be 1,600-1,700 Korunas"]

[Text] Prague—The subsistence minimum (covering expenditure on the most essential items, but excluding expenditure on long-term consumer goods) should be between 1,600 and 1,700 korunas. Roman Kovac, president of the Czech and Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions, made this statement in an interview given to CTK and the daily PRACA on Tuesday [13 November].

The social minimum and the minimum wage should, according to him, be set in accordance with this sum. In contradiction to this, as CTK adds, the government assumes that an average of 1,323 korunas will cover the subsistence minimum. It suggests a sum of 1,650 korunas for the minimum wage.

During their forthcoming negotiations with the government and employers, the trade unions will demand that—in connection with the increased cost of living—wages and social allowances be valorized (revised in accordance with the increased cost of living) according to an agreed percentage.

Although wages will, obviously, fall behind a little, they should be valorized within the shortest possible time limits. "It is difficult to agree to the government's proposal which reckons with a revision once every six months or once a year. Only a monthly time limit is acceptable," said R. Kovac.

### Calfa Discusses Economic Situation, Reforms

*LD1711001290 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1730 GMT 16 Nov 90*

[Remarks by Czechoslovak Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa in Lucenec on 16 November—recorded]

[Text] The results achieved in the development of the national economy since the beginning of the year cannot be evaluated as very positive. The imbalances in the national economy have become more marked. The results of financial management in the enterprise sphere has deteriorated; however, it is interesting that the people, in general, are earning more than in previous years, but now too the money is very quickly spent. The level of savings in our currency has fallen. Many reports are circulating among the people; these are sometimes premature, sometimes distorted, and sometimes they are absolute rumors and, in certain cases, even deliberate rumors. Naturally these cause a very unpleasant disruption to supplies and the whole market, and that is why Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus, for example, had to go on television to explain what the situation is in respect of price increases, as far as the Federal Government's decisions are concerned.

I can tell you that no price increases are being prepared—neither for 1 December nor for any other date this year. [applause] We have even postponed what is being bandied around for some reason among our people; namely, that the price of energy, heat, and so forth is to be increased. I can say that this year this will not be the case. [applause] That does not mean that there will be increases later. [laughter]

As for price increases on imported goods—goods from abroad—it must be realized that they do not simply set their prices according to our wish. Those goods have a price, we buy them, and we therefore sell them at a price equal to the conversion of their price into Czechoslovak currency. This is a process which is actually dictated by inexorable market forces.

From the point of view of the reform, the year 1991 which is ahead of us is a crucial year. Its success will be measured not so much by actual economic growth, but by the extent to which the components of the market mechanism begin to manifest themselves. In the foreign sphere, especially foreign economic relations, our aim will be not to allow—and I can tell you this is extremely difficult—not to allow our foreign debt to grow, and to stabilize our currency exchange rate. The Federal Government is under daily pressure in precisely these areas, and so far we have successfully withstood it, because whatever we do, leaving debts for our children is for someone else—it is simply not something we are going to do.

We expect that beginning with a two-year period following on from the enactment of the new legislation, there will be a gradual cranking up of economic growth. The consequences of this will mean that, after a transitional downturn, the living standard of our people, among other things, will also begin to grow.

### Slovak Council Approves Constitution Amendment

*LD2011210190 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 2030 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Today's session of the eighth meeting of the Slovak National Council ended after 2100. After extensive discussion the deputies approved the government draft bill on a constitutional law of the Federal Assembly, which changes the present constitutional law on the Czechoslovak federation. Vladimir Meciar

described the submitted amendement as a sensible compromise on which all three governments were able to agree in such a way as not to cause a constitutional crisis.

### Movement for Independent Slovakia Holds Rally

*LD2011210990 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 2030 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Several thousand people gathered in the Slovak National Uprising Square in Bratislava late this afternoon for a rally organized by the Movement for Independent Slovakia. Criticism of the government bodies of the Slovak Republic and the federation could be heard again at the meeting. An open letter from the movement addressed to Cardinal Tomasek [primate of Bohemia], in connection with his criticism of hunger strikes in support of the language law, was read out loud. The authors of the letter are asking him not to interfere in Slovak affairs.

The participants at the meeting also adopted a memorandum addressed to the Slovak Government and parliament [National Council], in which they demand, among other things, the proclamation of the independence of the Slovak Republic.

### Meciar Stresses Need for 'Political Peace'

*AU1611145990 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 14 Nov 90 p 13*

[Interview with Slovak Republic Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar by an unidentified reporter; place and date not given: "We Need Political Peace"—reprinted from NOVE SLOVO No. 46]

[Text] [NOVE SLOVO] How do you feel after the Slovak Government's hard days and before uneasy days to come?

[Meciar] My feelings are almost identical in both cases. The situation has not been easy since day one and it is not going to be easy, either. There is no reason for optimism.

[NOVE SLOVO] Will the situation change after a new interior minister is appointed?

[Meciar] I do not know yet who will become the new interior minister. We have only said that the Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] will put forward candidates and a commission will select the minister. We will try to avoid candidates who are closely tied to a particular party or movement and who have certain traits in their character. Of course, we will also take his qualifications into account.

[NOVE SLOVO] Are you satisfied with the composition of the existing government and their qualifications?

[Meciar] As far as the composition of the government is concerned, we have to make an agreement with all the coalition members upon the rules according to which changes will be made to the composition of the government. It is no secret that A. Andras was not the only one whom I proposed to replace.

I discussed draft changes—with pertinent parties—that will have to be made at the ministry [of interior] where I can see a lack of concept and no results, and where it is necessary to take action against some personnel. I presented this draft six weeks ago.

[NOVE SLOVO] Will the coalition survive another crisis?

[Meciar] Hardly. I, myself, do not know how to define the existing situation—whether it is a peace or truce and whether we will seek a method of cooperation or not. If a few hours after the agreements had been concluded something happened that should not have happened, if leading representatives had to distance themselves from their collaborators because of evident violation of these agreements, then we have a signal here telling us from where the tension comes. As far as the KDH and their feeling of victory is concerned, I am happy for their victory. There are various kinds of victory, including Pyrrhic victory.

[NOVE SLOVO] What if there is another government crisis. It is not easy to give up fighting for power. What is in store for the Slovak nation?

[Meciar] It will depend on from where the crisis comes. It is quite possible that a government composed of specialists, supported by parliamentary minority, will be established, and that this government will have to make efforts to gain the support of the majority in parliament. A complicated relationship between the government and parliament will arise, yet it will be possible to retain stability. If we were unsuccessful in forming the government, then also a parliamentary crisis could arise, resulting in new elections, probably. The existing legal code does not count with this possibility.

[NOVE SLOVO] There is an agreement under preparation by which relations within the coalition will be governed. Representatives of the KDH are skeptical toward it, however. They say that an agreement can be made with Gal, Tatar and others from the Public Against Violence [VPN] movement, yet they are afraid that they could meet with obstacles when dealing with people who have higher positions. Are those fears realistic?

[Meciar] Not at all. I do not understand why the Meciar-KDH relationship is constantly being seen as a confrontation. I can have objections against the leading representative of the KDH, yet this does not mean that I am against the KDH. I can have objections to the way they work and these objections do not pertain to the political program of this movement at all. Or, I can have objections to their political program if it oversteps the limits of coalition agreements and governmental program. If we want to jointly hold on to some direction then we have to be united on some basic ideas. If there is lack of harmony in opinions then it will have an impact on work

results. And, if I am dissatisfied with someone's work results then I have to tell him it openly.

[NOVE SLOVO] You have indicated that you were dissatisfied with the work of some government officials and you have said that there is an absence of the unity needed to reach a compromise solution. Do you have in mind, beside some ministers, also some of your deputy prime ministers?

[Meciar] You are very close.

[NOVE SLOVO] How do you want to improve this society politically and economically without achieving harmony within the coalition?

[Meciar] The first thing is to conclude a political peace in the country. It could be achieved only if all political forces which can influence the peace in the country conclude a political agreement. I am fighting for peace in the country, even at the cost of confrontation with individuals of whom I think that they fuel the unrest. My idea is a strong state.

[NOVE SLOVO] What appearance and what face do we want to assume on our way to Europe and the world?

[Meciar] Above all, we are searching for our own appearance, own image, and own behavior. This process is influenced by what we have inherited from the past and also by the fact that the future is uncertain. We absorb a lot from foreign models, we do a lot as we go along, and, of course, we make mistakes. A certain role is played here by fact that we are building a new state. For example, the political orientation of the right wing is consolidating faster than that of the left wing or the center, that is, there is a certain imbalance in the political life. This is why it may seem that everything shifts to the right. It is a known fact, however, that action causes a reaction and helps shape the other political wing. We are searching for our own economic system and state administration and we are also searching for a new place for the citizens in the society, human rights, and new form of democracy, etc

[NOVE SLOVO] This is the way we could describe our existing political spectrum. The VPN movement represents the center and the KDH represents right conservative wing. A strong left wing is lacking. As yet. Do you not miss it in your government?

[Meciar] When talking about the right wing—there are parties that are more rightist than the KDH. As far as the left wing is concerned, it does belong to the political spectrum. The left wing is organizationally and numerically weaker than other groups, for which there are historical reasons. I think that the left wing will form after a certain time. Without a right wing, center, or left wing political life becomes unbalanced. If the left wing is missing then the fight between the right wing and the center is understood as if the center were a left-wing deviation. And this is dangerous.

## Meciar Delivers Speech on Federal Systems

*LD2011220490 Bratislava Domestic Service in Slovak 1820 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Speech by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar at the Slovak National Council session in Bratislava on 20 November—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] As promised, in Radiojournal Extra we now present highlights from the speech by Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar delivered at the eighth Slovak National Council session:

[Meciar] They asked us: Why do the Slovaks keep highlighting the issue of federation and why do they resume a public discussion of these issues? The answer is simple. The reason is because we have never been a federative state. While an authentic federation and other types of federation are discussed, I can say that the structure we had was on the level of federal bodies, but the function ability of these bodies was so restricted that it was equal to a decentralized unitary state with large numbers of ministries and with three governments. And thus what we want now is not to dream up a new federation. What we want now is to implement at long last the idea of federation in the form in which it has existed for more than 200 years. When we discuss the relations between two republics—the Slovak and the Czech Republics—we discuss the relations between two equal partners. Under this equality we understand legal equality, political equality, and equal powers in the management of internal affairs. We shall aim our efforts at expressing this equality also in the sphere of the economy with the premise that each of us will independently run his own patch and live by his own means. The arrangement of their mutual relations is a matter for our peoples and these two republics.

Immediately after we started analyzing the whole thing, the question of what kind of state set up we wanted appeared on the agenda. The Slovak Republic Government proposed to arrange relations between the Czech and the Slovak Republics on the federative principle. We proceed from the premise that the basis of the state is a free citizen associated in a free community; free communities are associated in free republics, and the republics, as sovereignty bearers, transfer a part of their sovereignty to the federal bodies in the aspects advantageous for them.

This was countered by the idea of decentralizing the federation, which was submitted by the federal bodies. This means that instead of giving priority recognition to republican bodies, specifically in theoretical terms of course, instead of adopting the theory of sovereignty of the republics and of transfer or division of sovereignty, which have been known in history and legal theory for 202 years, we discussed in Prague whether these 202-years-old theories do, in fact, exist. And these were the discussions we had to have with the specialists, who had contributed to the drafting of constitutions in the past. And from this endeavor aimed solely at decentralization

ensued certain difficulties which affected the talks on all problems. The fact which upset me personally was when, instead of implementing our natural rights, as a counter-proposal and some kind of theoretical conception we kept receiving a kind of autopsy.

Naturally, the theory—in particular, the concept of the Slovak Republic—met with hard criticism from unionists. We have been criticized for the following things which they did not like:

First, there is the fact that this state consists of two partners and that two are not enough because one partner always depends on what the other partner does. Thus proposals were put forward for these relations to be arranged differently: There was a proposal to set up a three-member federation—Slovakia on one side, on the other side Bohemia, and in between them Moravia and Silesia. We did not accept this proposal; we have rejected it. There was also a proposal to give up the republics and transfer to a lands system arrangement: for the Czech lands, the Moravian and Silesian, and the Slovak lands to exist. We understood the demands of the Moravian and Silesians, we said, but that we consider it possible to implement them in the framework of the Czech Republic. We insisted that in the future it should be a state of two nations, that it would exist as a state of two subjects.

Then a proposal was submitted to us to abolish the federation system entirely and to introduce a federal [spolkovy] arrangement of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. In the framework of this federal arrangement it was envisioned, or rather it was proposed for Slovakia to be divided into two parts: the Kosice part with the east part of Slovakia and the west Slovak part with Bratislava while liquidating the republic's government and its national organs. Then a Moravian part, a Silesian part as federal countries [spolkove krajiny], and Bohemia was to be an independent federal country. Regarding this proposal, I naturally said that this idea would perish as its authors would perish. I think that the requirement of the unity of Slovak territory is not only political but also economic. The internal arrangement is our business and no one should interfere in it!

After debates which have been held on this, the outcome is that this idea is being posponed by two to three years and that then we can come back to it—not with me, however!

The second point for which we are being criticized is that the basic mistake of this state lies in the fact that it is constructed on a national principle. This means that the national moment is being stressed, that the state has to consist of it.

We have been told that our efforts sometimes represent the 19th century and that such matters are not being dealt with in such a way anywhere in Europe. If the constitutional relations between Czechs and Slovaks were arranged—at the very beginning in 1918—in harmony with the Cleveland Treaty [October 1915]—then we would today have had 72 years of experience in the building of a common state and not having to be correcting the mistake made at its birth.

A proposal has been put forward to us to adopt—as a principle for our future work—a thesis that a citizen belongs to a federation, that he is federal while a nation is republican. I would like to say that in the present constitutional law, every citizen is a citizen of the federation but at the same time he is a citizen of a republic. There cannot be a single citizen who would not belong anywhere, who would not come from anywhere and we see the belonging to a nation as a positive and not a negative motive.

The second question on the form of the state was the question of a confederation. To tell you the truth, there was no one to discuss the confederation with. This idea was completely unacceptable for the Czech political representatives. Thus it has only emerged a few times in conversations and then it was no longer discussed.

Several times we have had the question of an independent state on the talks agenda. Czech political representatives, above all, have been returning to it. They have been referring to activities of nationalists—they were not fully aware of their [the nationalists'] strength and demanded that we should express ourselves clearly whether we want to stay in a common state or not, whether we want to break up the state or not. Political complications have arisen during talks recently as a consequence of the decision of the Christian Democratic Movement assembly in Kosice which defined certain things quite clearly and told us this: Why are we to postpone the breaking up of the state for ever? If you want to do it then tell us when, and the best thing would be if you do it immediately. This was said several times in the course of talks.

A referendum on the issue of whether we are determined or not to live in a common state has also been proposed. We have rejected the draft of this referendum. We have given the assurance that Slovaks do wish to live in a common state, and if the Czech side should decide something different then we would be sorry but we would be able to come to terms with it.

Ladies and gentlemen, I submit to you a draft of a new constitutional bill. I too can envisage a different result. However, we have to be aware of the fact that this which we have submitted to you is a sensible compromise proposal which all three governments have been able to agree in order not to cause a constitutional crisis.

We regard this outcome of the work as a result and completion of the first stage of the issue concerning the transfer of powers to the jurisdiction of the republics. Therefore, the many problems which were the subjects of our disputes, for example the question of state secretaries of the ministries, the question of running customs administration, and some foreign trade issues were adjourned until the drafting of new constitutions. We expect that these new constitutions will be adopted by

the end of October 1991. The process of drafting constitutions has so far been encountering different approaches. The unionists say that the federation constitution must be adopted first, so that it will be clear what is left for the republics. We must announce that this is not the way in which a federation should be built. Republican constitutions will be adopted first and from them it will be clear how much the republics will transfer to the federation in the spheres which are of interest to it and which issues the republics want the fedration to run for them.

The question, which kept springing up in theoretical debates and directly in the talks, still stands. This boils down to the reality that in fact there is no legal act which would express the will of the Slovaks and Czechs to live in a common state. This is why there are misgivings about the idea of a federative set up as something which ensued from the will of the peoples. In order to rectify this error, we told the Czech Republic Government about our willingness to draft and conclude with them a state treaty on the forming of a common state. And when this state treaty is adopted we could propose the constitution of the federation for approval.

I was approached in the discussions on more than one occasion by representatives of Slovak parties and political movements who said that this was always the case, that when there was a politically opportune momement the Slovaks achieved certain positive legal amendments, and that later these were gradually dropped and the whole process was reversed. Where is the guarnatee that this will not be repeated? We are seeking guarantees in the form of legal mechanisms and we therefore suggested that a law on the founding of a constitutional court be adopted as soon as possible. If the federation takes a long time to consider the adoption, or rather the implementation of the constitutional act on the constitutional court, we propose that this constitutional law be adopted by the Slovak National Council and that the Slovak constitutional court does not recognize as valid that which will contradict the agreed rules.

Also, if the ideas of coexistence are to be implemented to the extent to which we proposed them, they must proceed from the principles of economic cooperation and economic independence.

The worst thing that could happen to us would be if we could not implement the rights which we are being given the responsibility which we are taking over in the management. We are aware of the fact that we are taking over powers at a time of great economic changes and great social shocks. The government and the Slovak National Council which will act according to these rules are taking over responsibilities not when they are starting to build but when they have to prevent the abolition of the building project, so to speak. Many people expect that we shall not be able to cope with this. I say: Let them!

The question remains open, however, what will happen if we submit this proposal to the Federal Assembly. Two things can happen: Either it will be adopted or it will not be adopted. After the talks which we have held, I cannot reject the possibility of the second alternative,that is, that it will not be passed. And so we shall hold talks with deputies representing the Slovak side, with all of them who are in the Federal Assembly—I do not mean only the Slovak National Party deputies but all Slovaks in the Federal Assembly—to brief them on the contents of the proposed changes, their meaning and purpose, in order that they can defend them. Thus, it is very important for the proposal put forward by the Slovak National Council and the Czech National Council to be suitable for the deputies of both sides to unite on the basis of those proposals. There is a poem say: Hold this moment, it is beautiful! If I could paraphrase this I would say: Hold the moment, it is historic! [applause]

## Havel Hopes Slovaks Will Gain Identity

*AU1611145390 Bratislava AHOJ EUROPA (VEREJNOST Wednesday Supplement) in Slovak 14 Nov 90 p 1*

[Interview with CSFR President Vaclav Havel by Lubomir Feldek in Bratislava "during the president's visit to Slovakia in the last days of October": "Both National Identity and Democracy"—first paragraph is AHOJ EUROPA introduction]

[Text] CSFR President Vaclav Havel's visit to Slovakia in the last days of October was rich in planned as well as unplanned events. The planned events included the bestowal of an honorary doctorate at Comenius University, the president's attendance of his play Memorandum at the "Korzo 90" theater, or his participation in a holy mass at Sastin. Among the unplanned events was his conversation with hunger strikers in front of the Slovak National Council building, but also the demonstrative welcome accorded to the president by the newly formed "Initiative in the Defense of Democracy" before the Astoria building. In his tight schedule the president also found 10 minutes for an interview for AHOJ EUROPA.

[Feldek] A year ago, it was on 27 November, when we brought to the Civic Forum the news that in Bratislava the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia's power monopoly had already fallen, you uttered a memorable sentence: "The Slovaks are ahead of us." In those days it took only one week in Slovakia for a civic society based on the ideal of a democratic federation to be born. Since then, all kinds of things have slowed us down, particularly—and not for the first time—the dissonance between nationalism and democracy....

[Havel] I believe that the phase of national stir and awakened national ambitions, including the phase when this atmosphere is exploited by extremists and separatists, is a necessary phase which we must go through. At the same time I hope that we will manage to go through it quickly and successfully. It seems to me that the Slovak nation is unfortunate in that in moments of historic choice the situation always developed in such a way that the nation had to opt either for national identity or for

democracy. It has never, in fact, had the chance to have both—national identity as well as democracy. Or, to be more precise, the scales of history always tilted to the wrong side. And it seems to me that Slovakia and the Slovak nation now have the chance to gain within the framework of the federation their true national identity as well as the chance to gain this identity in democratic conditions, that is, in the conditions of a true civic society, in the conditions of genuine respect for human rights. I am confident that the Slovak nation will seize this chance. This is a very important historical moment and I am confident that everything will end well, although it is apparent that it will still hurt a bit and that these efforts will yet be subjected to all kinds of tests.

[Feldek] They say that everything bad is good for something. Do you believe that in this phase of development when a new movement in defense of democracy is being born, even those segments of society will get and seize the chance to make a positive impact which slept through the gentle revolution and which, fortunately, also slept through the phase of attempts at destabilization?

[Havel] I believe that this is a very good idea. We should definitely do everything we can so that the bad things turn out to be good in some way.

[Feldek] What, then, is your forecast, on the eve of the first anniversary of the gentle revolution?

[Havel] I believe that we are far from having achieved a definitive victory. We still have plenty of work to do. I even believe that the most difficult moments and tests are still in store for us. It is obvious what the nature of these tests will be. We will be facing them, above all, in the economic and social spheres. But there are also many other problems that had been accumulating for years, were simmering somewhere under the surface, and have now burst into the open.

They will have to be dealt with and it will not be easy. It is becoming apparent that it is even more difficult to build a new democratic system than it was to destroy the old, totalitarian one. In spite of everything I am confident, however, that all will end well, that we will survive the tests and difficult moments, and that we shall live to see the ideals for which this revolution strove really implemented.

## Commentary Notes 'Differentiation' in VPN Ranks

*AU1611170790 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 15 Nov 90 p 3*

[Igor Cibula commentary: "Civic Forum Versus the Public Against Violence Movement"]

[Text] At the beginning of next week, the Slovak Government should consider the compromise version of the jurisdiction law agreed upon by participants in the Prague meeting involving representatives from the three governments and the chairmen of the national parliaments. Meciar's cabinet will be asked to express its opinion on the draft constitutional law on the transfer of some authority from the federation to the republics following today's approval by the Federal Government. In this connection, it is curious that the majority of Slovak National Council committees have already discussed this version of the jurisdiction law which was originally approved by the three prime ministers 10 days ago when it was not envisaged that Prime Minister Marian Calfa's own ministers would actually express their lack of faith in him.

In this context, it is impossible to expect that the Slovak Government will automatically approve the version of the law sent to it today from Prague. Similarly, it may be assumed that Slovak National Council deputies will not hesitate to point out how the Pragocentric bureaucracy is placing obstacles before the endeavor to implement the national republics' primary sovereignty within the federation. It would not be surprising if opposition deputies in the Slovak parliament ask constitutional officials from the Public Against Violence [VPN] movement how they view the standpoint adopted by their coalition partner, Civic Forum [OF], apropos the philosophy for the federation, a philosophy defined in Trencianske Teplice. The OF Council insists that the CSFR as "a sovereign state with a freely elected Federal Assembly and its own Federal Government has a direct given right to take the first step in determining jurisdiction in the interest of the whole."

An even more urgent question will be asked by VPN voters who, in the last few days in particular, have noticed a significant differentiation in the views expressed by this movement's representatives in the highest constitutional posts. While Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar asserts the priority interests of the Slovak Republic with his usual vehemence, Slovak National Council Chairman Frantisek Miklosko has managed to be a little more "flexible." Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa, who for understandable reasons remains under the sway of the Pragocentric model for Czech-Slovak relations, defends "the chance for Slovakia" from a diametrically opposite position. In this connection, it is interesting to recall that all of this had been observed by Petr Prihoda, the Czech prime minister's press secretary, when he recently made a public reference to Calfa's contradictory stances.

Klaus' stubbornness in not acceding to some of the demands made by the national republics is too unilaterally motivated. He is not taking the real political situation in Slovakia into consideration. Here the majority of citizens, to date, remain on the platform of a joint Czech and Slovak state. However, under altered circumstances caused by social tension—brought about by radical economic reform—the burden of responsibility will be placed on the Federal Government. This very issue may make the future of the Czechoslovak state more problematic!

### Panic Withdrawals From Slovak Banks Subside

*AU1611130990 Bratislava VEREJNOST in Slovak 14 Nov 90 p 2*

[Milan Maloch report: "The 'Dough' Will Not Go Down the Drain"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] What is the response [to rumors of the freezing of bank deposits] by Alojz Ondra, general director of the State Savings Bank of Slovakia. Approximately on 1 January 1990, we had 93 billion korunas on deposit from the public and organizations (organizations were responsible for about two percent of this amount). Since the beginning of the year, however, we have recorded a decline in the savings rate, that is the ratio of deposits to the total income of the population. While it used to be four to five percent, this year the rate declined to two percent (by comparison—it is 18 percent in the FRG and 20 percent in Japan). By the end of October the citizens' savings and checking account deposits declined by 3.1 billion korunas, and the declining trend continues in November, so our records show the decline is 4.2 billion korunas. We took positive measures by increasing the interest rate by one percent on the average. That is 930 million on the amount of deposits and these expenses will be manifested in all commercial banks in the Slovak Republic. Expenses are automatically reflected in higher interest and the interest in higher prices. Hence a citizen will pay more and the infamous spiral of inflation commences. [passage omitted]

We need a stable currency, our koruna, and the entire economy should be stable, Alojz Ondra said, and immediately added that an unfavorable situation arose when we had to replenish our monetary reserves from the General Credit Bank. That is a common technical operation but, unfortunately, our customers misinterpreted the action.

The general director already has information that in the regional, local branches of the State Saving Bank of Slovakia the situation is getting back to normal. This is the case despite the fact that a billion korunas was withdrawn in Central Slovakia, and in Prievidza [town in Central Slovakia] where traditionally people had the largest deposits they now withdrew the most. The withdrawal fever has ended in Kosice and the crowds in front of the savings bank are vanishing. It is also a demonstration of the fact that savings of thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands hidden at home are not at all safe and even with respect to the place of realization of the buying power of our man—the customer of our financial institution—things do not look very optimistical. [passage omitted]

### Havel, Dienstbier Meet With Netherlands Leader

*LD2011224890 Prague CTK in English 1954 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Paris Nov 20 (CTK correspondent)—Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel met here today with Dutch Premier Ruud Lubbers. Also present were the two countries' Foreign Ministers Jiri Dienstbier and Hans van den Broek.

Presidential spokesman Michael Zantovsky said that Havel mentioned the support given to him from Holland in the "hard years". Havel expressed regret at his failure to pay a planned visit to this country, adding that he might visit it probably in March 1991.

There are no differences between these two countries, Zantovsky said. Czechoslovakia and Holland view identically the problem of human rights and will mark together the 400th birthday anniversary of Czech scholar Jan Amos Komensky.

Havel also supported Lubbers' idea of a single European energy system. The president pointed out that Czechoslovakia has good knowledge of the power situation in the East as well as production facilities that might be used.

### South African Foreign Minister Leaves for Romania

*LD1611175490 Prague CTK in English 1405 GMT 16 Nov 90*

[Text] Bratislava Nov 16 (CTK)—South African Foreign Minister Roelof F. Botha had talks here today with Slovak Minister for External Relations Milan Knazko.

After the talks he briefed journalists of the course of his unofficial trip which took place at the invitation of his Czechoslovak counterpart Jiri Dienstbier.

Asked about further development of bilateral relations, Botha said that both sides agreed on the establishment of consular relations, which are sufficient for the time being, in his opinion, as they can ensure trade, tourism, visas, passports, etc. These relations will be raised to embassy level after some time, he said, stressing broad possibilities of the two countries' economic cooperation in particular.

Botha and his wife, who arrived here on November 13, then left for the Romanian capital of Bucharest.

### Assembly Discusses Transit of Refugees

*LD1611221890 Prague CTK in English 2115 GMT 16 Nov 90*

[Text] Prague Nov 16 (CTK)—Czechoslovak parliament was informed today by Federal Interior Minister Jan Langos that he and his Polish and Hungarian colleagues will jointly call on European leaders to solve the problem of refugees heading from the East and South for the West through concerted action.

Central Europe now serves as a "bumper" corridor for the refugees. In Czechoslovakia, the flow of refugees was started by Albanians and Kurds from Turkey at the beginning of the year, followed by a mass influx of Romanians in the summer. Other nationalities include

Afghans, Soviet and Bulgarians. At the start of November there were about 650 refugees in three refugee camps in Czechoslovakia. Many of those coming to Czechoslovakia try to illegally cross the border to Germany, some of them successfully while others are intercepted.

To place the problem of refugees on a legal footing, the parliament today passed a relevant bill which ensures for refugees a position which gives them advantages over other foreigners and which is close to that of Czechoslovak citizens.

Minister Langos said that Czechoslovakia would accept about 3,000 refugees yearly.

Thus far, Czechoslovakia has had no law on refugees, only one on granting asylum. The new legislation is in tune with fundamental international agreements on refugees. Under it, the refugee status can be granted to a foreigner who has well-grounded apprehension of persecution in his homeland for reasons of race, religion, nationality, belonging to a social group or political conviction.

## Foreign Ministry Official Views Security Needs

*AU2011114590 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 17 Nov 90 p 3*

[Interview with David Meiszter, deputy state secretary at the Foreign Ministry, by Tibor Eszes; place and date not given: "Mutually Satisfactory Guarantees—David Meiszter on Hungarian and Soviet Security Interests"; first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] Acknowledging the Soviet's justified security interests, Hungary is promoting bilateral agreements with its neighbors for the period after the Warsaw Pact is gone; agreements that guarantee that the Soviet Union will not be attacked from or through Hungarian territory—Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky said in London recently. What do the relevant Hungarian concepts contain?

[Meiszter] In its general foreign and security policy concepts, the Hungarian Government, which has to adhere to the appeal of the Hungarian parliament urging Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, is paying special attention on preparing for the new situation that will emerge in the period following the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact. When learning about the relevant Hungarian concepts, our partners keep asking us about Hungary's ability to protect its own security interests after the elimination of the Warsaw Pact's military umbrella.

[Eszes] They obviously refer to some kind of "security vacuum" and the uncertainty emerging from the new situation....

[Meiszter] The essence of the Hungarian concepts in preparing for the new conditions is that we are promoting various kinds of parallel negotiations and agreements. At the same time that we are preparing our departure from the Warsaw Pact, we also endeavor to create a completely new type of security system free of any bloc-related policy. In addition to our active work carried out at the CSCE forum, we try to join the integration organizations that have been successfully operating in Europe for some time, and we also endeavor to develop various forms of cooperation with NATO. On the other hand, we are also urging the creation of a certain regional cooperation in this area. As Geza Jeszenszky also pointed out, we would like to achieve bilateral agreements with our neighboring countries—first of all with the Soviet Union—which would provide mutually satisfactory guarantees of respecting each other's security interests.

[Eszes] Has Moscow already reacted to this endeavor?

[Meiszter] We have presented our relevant concepts at two various levels in the Soviet Union, and the unofficial reactions have been positive so far. We have also announced our willingness to begin concrete negotiations at the level of experts and, in my opinion, these negotiations could lead to results in a short time.

[Eszes] You did not mention other neighbors.

[Meiszter] For the time being, we declared our concepts at various forums, so our concrete proposals will not take our other neighbors by surprise.

## Foreign Ministry Comments on Visit to Romania

### Meeting Postponement Discussed

*AU2111101890 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 19 Nov 90 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Imre Szokai, deputy state secretary of the Foreign Ministry, by Attila Seres; place and date not given: "Summit: We Are Waiting for Romanian Suggestions"; first paragraph is NEPSZABADSAG introduction]

[Text] Imre Szokai led the Hungarian expert delegation that visited Bucharest last weekend. The delegation conveyed President Arpad Goncz's verbal greetings, and it aimed to prepare the coming meeting of the Romanian and Hungarian heads of state. It is well known that Romanian President Ion Iliescu informed Szokai that the mid-December date suggested for the meeting by Hungary was not convenient for Bucharest. Our correspondent asked Szokai about the reasons for this refusal, and about the results of the expert negotiations last week.

[Seres] Who originally suggested that the meeting be held in mid-December?

[Szokai] That was our suggestion. Following Ion Iliescu's invitation to Arpad Goncz, and taking into account Hungarian domestic events and the president's schedule, we thought that this date would be convenient.

[Seres] Did President Iliescu give any explanation when you met him in person?

[Szokai] No, he did not mention why this date was not convenient for him, but we did not even expect an explanation.

[Seres] Thus, a Hungarian-Romanian presidential meeting can hardly take place this year.

[Szokai] I asked President Iliescu the same question, and he replied that he did not see the possibility of an explicit bilateral meeting between heads of state in the near future; he suggested that we come back to this issue at a later date.

[Seres] During the course of negotiations, was there any possibility of discovering the reasons for the postponement? Do you feel that the Romanian side is not prepared for certain things yet?

[Szokai] Yes, I think that your hypothesis is correct, although that is merely my own explanation. My impression is that Romania is not yet ready for cooperation on issues that we consider to be fundamental. Naturally, the dividing line does not go between Hungary and Romania, but between major European developments

and Romania's standpoint. The other reason why Romania is not yet ready for cooperation is linked to the country's domestic situation. Romania is on the eve of the anniversary of its revolution, and in relation to this, several events are anticipated which completely monopolize the Romanian leadership's attention.

[Seres] What were the main topics brought up during the expert negotiations in Bucharest? Are there any questions that show a rapprochement between the standpoints of the two countries?

[Szokai] We went over all the major issues concerning our bilateral relations. Earlier on, in Budapest, we had already outlined the possibility of joint actions to be taken on some matters of detail, as well as the possible initiation of consultation and cooperation on such matters. However, there is absolutely no rapprochement on fundamental issues.

[Seres] What issues are you referring to?

[Szokai] Our suggestion to create a mixed intergovernmental national minority committee met with the greatest resistance. The Romanian side rejected our proposal by saying that the national minorities question was an issue of international dimensions that could not be settled on the level of bilateral relations. That is nonsense. Indeed, the Romanians themselves admit that this issue has an international projection, therefore, it cannot be an internal affair. This being the case, the question could also be subject to debate on a bilateral level, if only the will was there. Second, we suggested once again that a bilateral national minority charter should be drawn up. This charter would be an open document in which we would summarize all the principles and standards of behavior featured in European documents. This would be the elaboration of a synthesis that would take into account elements unique to Eastern Europe. If we accepted this charter in our Hungarian-Romanian relations, then we could secure the possibility for others to join. I am convinced that with such a document, we could act as an example to the rest of the world, showing that even the most serious questions can be solved. However, the Romanian side also ruined this opportunity. The third issue on which we did not make any progress was the fate of the Romanian refugees on our soil. Bucharest does not even agree with the phrasing; the Romanian citizens who are stranded in Hungary, who have fled here to look for prosperity, are not refugees in Bucharest's eyes. It is to be feared that on this issue, the Romanian standpoint is motivated by petty prestige aspirations, yet several thousand well-trained experts would return to their country if only the humane conditions for their return were secured. The fourth fundamental question on which the Romanian side responded negatively was the reopening of our general consulate in Cluj. That is incomprehensible for two reasons. First, in December 1989, President Iliescu already promised Gyula Horn that our general consulate would be opened. Second, the FRG has since opened a new consulate, Yugoslavia and other countries are operating their diplomatic missions without any problems, so under these circumstances, the continued closure of the Hungarian general consulate can only be seen as a discriminatory act.

[Seres] What comes next? Are we going to wait for Bucharest to suggest a convenient time for the Hungarian-Romanian presidential meeting?

[Szokai] We cannot do anything else. However, we are not only waiting for the date; we also want Bucharest to tell us, at long last, what point they see in this summit.

### Official Statement Published

*LD2011122590 Budapest MTI in English 1045 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[All quotation marks as received]

[Text] Budapest, 19 Nov (MTI)—On Monday evening [19 November] Janos Herman, spokesman for the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, forwarded the following statement to the Hungarian News agency MTI:

'The visit to Romania by Imre Szokai, deputy secretary of state at the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, was aimed at continuing the bilateral consultation started in Budapest in July. He also had a verbal message from the president of the Republic of Hungary to President Iliescu.

'In the course of the consultation, we also wished to adopt a protocol on the questions held important by any of the sides for the normalisation of relations. Such a concrete and matter-of-fact document could have served as a basis for various expert talks on the given problems.

'The Romanian side initially supported the idea, but later held it unacceptable that the protocol include questions it considered undesirable. For this reason, the Bucharest talks did not produce the desired result despite the great efforts on Hungary's part.

'While the Hungarian side accepted every question raised by the Romanian side to be recorded—since it would not even have a right to reject it, the Romanian side claimed the right to formulate the Hungarian proposals as well. The reason why the protocol was not finalised was the Romanian refusal to lay down in any form the affair of Romanian refugees staying in Hungary. Its reaction to the Hungarian proposals was that there were no Romanian refugees, and the refugee issue as such was non-existence for Romania.

'I note that a month ago the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a resolution calling on the Romanian Government to create such democratic internal conditions where Romanian citizens will not feel forced to leave the country en masse. During the Bucharest consultation, the Romanian side went as far as accusing the Hungarian Government of giving assistance

to people fleeing to Hungary not because of its voluntarily undertaken contractual commitments and Humanitarian principles, but rather in the hope of dollar aid.

'The Romanian side to the talks regarded all questions pertinent to Romanian Hungarians as its exclusive internal affair, even denying the fact that the national minorities could play a part in the relations between the two countries.

'The Romanian side also expressed the view that bilateral co-operation would hinder the international efforts connected with the national minorities.

'At the Bucharest talks, we experienced once again that the Romanian side not only refuses to hold meaningful talks about essential questions, but it also rejects categorically to admit the existence of the problems that could be the subject of subsequent discussions.

'The Hungarian Foreign Ministry has been making mighty efforts at exploring possibilities for the settlement of Hungarian-Romanian relations. However, it does not wish to give up either Hungary's national interests, or its commitments undertaken in the CSCE process and other international agreements. Therefore, we rule out the possibility of unprincipled compromises, nor can we be partners to creating the impression of a compromise for the outside world out of any considerations.

'After the Romanian president had repeatedly expressed his readiness to meet his Hungarian counterpart, the Hungarian side [words indistinct] Mr Iliescu's cabinet through diplomatic channels that Imre Szokai leaving for the foreign affairs consultation in Bucharest, takes along the verbal message of the Hungarian president. For this reason, it was incomprehensible that first the Romanian foreign secretary of state and then the foreign minister wanted to hear the message. After much wrangling, President Iliescu finally met the Hungarian diplomat who said, conveying President Goncz's message:

Hungary attaches great importance to developing good-neighbourly relations with Romania and, in this spirit, Arpad Goncz proposes for the presidential meeting to take place on December 17 in Timisoara where Romanians, Hungarians, Germans and other nationalities have lived together for centuries. He believes that the position of the minorities is a major element of European security, and also a relevant factor of Hungarian-Romanian relations. For the national minorities to be able to fulfil their stabilizing role, they have to be guaranteed all individual and collective rights, together with the institutions required for practising them. On Hungary's part, we assessed the January 5 statement of the National Salvation Front as a promising document.

The Hungarian diplomat stressed that the presidential meeting would only be sensible if it produces a document comprising the principles and most important questions of Hungarian-Romanian relations. He presented the relevent Hungarian drafts to President Iliescu who said that as on December 17 various celebrations were to be held in Timisoara, the Hungarian propsal is unacceptable to him and he had no wish of adopting a document. He also said that he would like to discuss the new date of an eventual bilateral meeting with President Goncz during the Budapest session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty. He pointed out that the presidential meeting would have to cover the relations between the two countries, while the minority issue is not an inter-state problem, rather the internal affair of every country. He said he would be happy if Hungary ensured the same rights to her minorities as Romania to hers.

The Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Hungary invariably believes that, with the display of adequate wisdom and consideration, presistent work has to be carried out towards the normalisation of Hungarian-Romanian relations. To this end, it is ready to conduct expert talks at various levels.

## Soviet Army Regiment 'Unexpectedly' Withdrawn

*LD2011230890 Budapest MTI in English 1737 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Budapest, 20 Nov (MTI)—The Soviet Southern Army Group has unexpectedly withdrawn its reconnaissance regiment from Nyiregyhaza more than six months ahead of schedule. The unit returned to the Soviet Union at the weekend.

The former Soviet military buildings and officer's flats passed into the possession of the local mayor's office.

The premature pullout of Soviet troops from Nyiregyhaza was initiated this spring by the previous city council. The request was, however, rejected on the grounds that, as the soldiers have to reload various armaments in Zahony, they cannot leave before June 1991. The Soviets have so far refused to account for the unexpected decision.

### Mazowiecki Conducts Talks With CSFR's Havel

*LD2011181790 Warsaw PAP in English 1642 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Paris, Nov. 20—Polish Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki met with Czechoslovakia's President Vaclav Havel and Premier Marian Calfa here this morning. The meeting was also attended by Foreign Ministers Krzysztof Skubiszewski and Jiri Dienstbier.

President Havel said that Czechoslovakia had decided to halt the construction of a coke plant in Stonava (off the Polish-Czechoslovak border) and assured the Polish side that the border with Poland will be opened as of January 1, 1991 when the internal convertibility of the koruna is introduced and prices liberalized.

Both sides expressed hope for a rapid liquidation of the Warsaw Pact.

The meeting also considered the question of a possible growth of the number of refugees from East European countries.

### Mazowiecki, Skubiszewski Meet Foreign Counterparts

*LD2011224290 Warsaw PAP in English 1926 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Paris, Nov. 20—On the second day of the CSCE summit in Paris today Polish Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki held a number of meetings with the heads of states and governments participating in the forum.

He met with French President Francois Mitterrand to thank him for France's support and friendliness during the recent two-plus-four talks.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki touched upon the question of the Polish debt. Although numerous countries have declared their understanding for Polish postulates on debt reduction, none of them has made any decisions yet. Someone should make the first move to show the way for others, he said.

Mazowiecki and Mitterrand also discussed the question of lifting visas for Poles and a future treaty on friendship and cooperation between Poland and France, already being negotiated.

Francois Mitterrand assured the Polish premier that France will defend Poland's interests relating to her debts in the Paris club of creditors.

This morning Tadeusz Mazowiecki met with Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel and Premier Marian Calfa. Hungarian Premier Jozsef Antall joined the meeting to discuss cooperation between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

Premier Mazowiecki reiterated that Poland is ready to join the so-called Pentagonal Group and recalled that Italy has supported her in this regard. Poland might become a bridge between the group of Baltic countries presently being formed, and the Pentagonal Group.

Premier Antall opined that Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia should cooperate with and support one another in the Council of Europe or the EC. A country which has a stronger position should assist the others, he said.

On Monday evening Premier Mazowiecki met with Dutch Premier Ruud Lubbers to discuss the situation in Poland and Europe, including Poland's efforts to be associated with the EC.

The Polish premier encouraged Dutch business circles to invest in Poland.

The sides also discussed the question of lifting visas.

Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski met this morning with his German counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher. They discussed a schedule for work on a Polish-German treaty on good neighbourliness.

In the coming days, before a meeting of experts to be held in Bonn on November 26 and 27, drafts of the treaty worked out by both sides are to be exchanged.

The Polish side would like the talks to conclude by the end of January so that the treaty could be signed in February.

Skubiszewski and Genschr also discussed bilateral relations in view of the treaty signed on November 14.

Minister Skubiszewski also met with French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas and thanked him for the French assistance during the two-plus-four negotiations.

They discussed the lifting of visas. Dumas declared his support for the undertaking but said that other ministries do not share this view.

Skubiszewski told Dumas that the French Embassy in Warsaw has obtained a building to house a French information centre to be set up soon. He invited Dumas for the opening ceremony of the centre.

Accepting the invitation, the French minister underlined that the centre will play a significant role in the development of bilateral relations.

### Skubiszewski, Genscher, Dumas Discuss Relations

*LD2111000390 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1900 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski had talks today with the head of German diplomacy, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Among other things, they discussed the timetable of work on the Polish-German good-neighborliness treaty. There was also a meeting between Minister Skubiszewski and French Foreign Affairs Minister Roland Dumas.

### Russian-Language Weekly To Begin in 1991

*LD2011204590 Warsaw PAP in English 1613 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] [No dateline as received] With the advent of 1991 we will start bringing out a new illustrated Russian-language weekly, "POLSKOYE OBOZRENIYE". The new publication will be featuring information on Polish politics, social issues, culture, sports as well as economic issues, finances, exchange quotations and commercial news.

We do welcome suggestions with regards to the making of this publication. For those interested, please inquire at: 28-64-07 fax, 28-06-77, 29-71-67, 28-00-01 ext. 454, 450, telex pap-ex 814822.

### Gdansk Transport Strike Over; Agreement Signed

*LD2111095490 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0700 GMT 21 Nov 90*

[Text] An agreement has been signed in Gdansk between the Municipal Transport Enterprise strike committee and the special commission of the town council. Talks lasted through the whole night. As a result of these talks, the transport enterprise received a credit amounting to 20 billion zlotys. The agreement having been signed, buses and trams are resuming service.

In Gdynia, transport was functioning normally even earlier. In Radom too, where the strike was suspended after the agreement was signed last night, buses have resumed service.

### 'Desperate' Katowice Miners Continue Strike

*LD2111114990 Warsaw PAP in English 0901 GMT 21 Nov 90*

[Text] Katowice, Nov. 21—First reports sent in to the National Mining Commission of Solidarity say that miners working on the first shift in the strike-hit collieries resumed work this morning but a group of desperate miners of the "Kazimierz-Julisz" continues a hunger strike. Also a group of miners in the "Grodziec" pit have gone on a hunger strike.

### Poll Results Show Walesa First, Tyminski Second

*LD2111053590 Warsaw PAP in English 2326 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Warsaw, Nov 20—In a poll carried out on November 17 and 18 by the CBOS public opinion polling centre, 28 percent of the polled declared that they would vote for Solidarity leader Lech Walesa in presidential elections; 21 percent for Stanislaw Tyminski, an independent candidate; 17 percent for Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki; 7 percent for Polish Peasant Party leader Roman Bartoszcze; 5 percent for Wlodzimierz Cimoszewciz of the Social-Democratic Party; and 1 percent for Leszek Moczulski, leader of the Confederation for Independent Poland.

Asked who will win the elections and become Poland's president, 66 percent of the sample said that it would be Walesa.

### Candidates' Interviews Not To Be Rebroadcast

*LD2011101690 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0530 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Lech Walesa have granted interviews to the BBC Polish Service, but due to time limits set by the National Election Commission for Polish Radio and Television they will not be rebroadcast by Polish radio, and can be heard only on the BBC wavelength. Absurdity has reached its peak, writes GAZETA WYBORCZA. Two candidates for president of the Polish Republic, one of whom holds the office of prime minister, and the other of whom is the most popular politician in Poland and the leader of Solidarity, have to use the British radio to address the Poles, just like Sikorski and De Gaulle when they addressed their nations during the occupation. Such a thing had never happened before. We are under occupation by the National Elections Commission.

### Election Campaign in Rzeszow Examined

*AU1311162190 Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish 10 Nov 90 pp 1, 6*

[Jagienka Wilczak report: "Who Is Pro and Who Is Against?"]

[Excerpts] In the Lech Walesa election headquarters in Rzeszow, they say that only the center and anything right of center counts. This neophyte attitude could be a backlash against the fact that for years Rzeszow was firmly ultra-red. They are trying to undo all that in ultra-fast time.

Campaign workers in the headquarters are racing against time. "The whole election machine started rolling with some delay. We have enough slogans, but few committed campaigners, and those we do have are slow," they say. The signatures lists were brought back to our headquarters late, even though clear deadlines were specified, and twice weekly there is an express courier run to Gdansk. The last signature lists had to be sent especially so that they would get to Gdansk before the registration date of candidates.

A decision was made to carry on collecting signatures right up to election day. Not for registration purposes, but to keep a running analysis of the electorate: Who is pro-Walesa, who is against, and who has not made up his mind.

In this election campaign everything passes through Gdansk. The lists with collected signatures flowed to Gdansk and in return Gdansk sends instructions and other election paraphernalia, namely, posters, slogans, and leaflets. The "Solidarity" National Commission decided to support Walesa's candidature. Taking their lead from the top, the regional organization, the Rzeszow

Citizens Committee promptly declared its support for Walesa. The decision was binding, but not all committee members followed it to the letter. The head of Rzeszow "Solidarity" put out two lists and started signature collections for both Walesa and Mazowiecki. His reasoning was that both candidates had the same "Solidarity" pedigree. As a result he received a severe reprimand from the regional board. Additionally, lists were double-proofed to ensure that no worker should be seen to be supporting Mazowiecki. Nevertheless, the Voivodship Central Office "Solidarity" chapter voted to be nonpartisan in the upcoming election. This decision was highly controversial, because it is well known that the voivode is strongly pro-center.

The headquarter's campaign staff were thoroughly vetted before being taken on. This is no laughing matter, because there was intense suspicion that ranks might be penetrated by undesirable elements. In a nutshell, they feared a fifth-column. That is why staff had to prove they had clean hearts and minds.

The headquarters staff were chosen from the three election organizations, namely, from the regional "Solidarity" chapter, the Citizens Committee, and Center Accord. They even went as far as to elect a person to act as liaison coordinator with the Gdansk headquarters. Leszek Szczepanik, chairman of the local Citizen's Committee was chosen as the person of unimpeachable loyalty. After his election, however, there was an unexpected telex from Gdansk saying that Jacek Merkel did not want to see any prominent persons at the head of local election headquarters. The region responded immediately, a meeting was convened, and Wojciech Siemaszko, one of the more unimposing regional board members was selected. Everyone felt satisfied, but there was consternation when somebody suddenly remembered that Siemaszko had abstained from voting when the region voted to support Walesa. Next morning, the Rzeszow daily A-Z carried this item and speculated whether the Citizens Movement-Democratic Action [ROAD] had not already infiltrated the center's ranks. Siemaszko had to explain that he had now seen the light. Nevertheless, both Siemaszko and Szczepanik went to Gdansk for the nomination (friends of both took bets whether they traveled together on the train). Nobody knew which of them would get the official blessing. As it turned out Merkel gave the official blessing to Siemaszko, but doubts still remain.

Gdansk will also accept the people who are put forward by the regional headquarters as election officers. It was decided to put forward election officers in all election constituencies. People were puzzled: How will Gdansk react to this? That is why the local Citizens Committee, called for all possible speed—documents had to be forwarded to Gdansk for approval and returned in time—and cautioned its people that election officers must be individuals who could be trusted implicitly. Who knows, various tricks might be tried on election day and it would do no harm to keep a close eye on the election commissions. The committee also suggested that proposed members of local election commissions should be Walesa people, as this would set an example to voters and in the deciding phase would increase commitment.

There is little election propaganda to be seen. Andrzej Kucharski, secretary of the local Citizens Committee and election campaign member, says that there will not be a large-scale poster campaign. What is the point in trying to sell someone like Walesa? The history of the last 10 years are his best campaign strategy. This is not to say that they will not put up posters. The first stage of the poster campaign was ready before Walesa arrived in Rzeszow.

The second stage will be ready just before the elections. They already have the poster showing Walesa in a Pilsudski-like pose. Wherever the passer-by stands, Walesa's eyes will be on him. There is little in the way of other election materials. There is leaflet and poster with the official Center Accord stamp and a brochure (without an official stamp, which is a breach of election regulations) entitled: "Why Him?" An anonymous author provides the answer: "I would like Walesa to become president, because he is the most talented political player in Poland today. I would like Walesa to win, because I do not find his workers' language a handicap. I like to hear such talk (...) I find his way of speaking quite acceptable. It conveys the truth. My stomach turns when I hear somebody who is a 100-percent intellectual talking to me in incomprehensible language. I find such a way of speaking unpleasant, because it hides lies." [passage omitted]

Kucharski stresses that Walesa is standing for the presidency as a private individual, not as "Solidarity" chairman or the head of the citizens committees. That is why the main principle of this presidential campaign is based on the philosophy of impartiality. Nevertheless, this philosophy does not seem to prevent the Walesa camp from using the "Solidarity" tradition, legend, and logo. Thrown into the election battle, these are great assets. Union links are also used readily and headquarters only accepts people who have been delegated for this work by the "Solidarity" factory committees. But, there is complete silence on money. Remuneration for loyal campaigners is still to be agreed.

The Walesa election headquarters is not entering into alliances with any other party. Recently, however, the PAX Association has thrown its support behind Walesa on the specific instructions of the church. The church itself, however, declares strict impartiality. On the local level, the local branch of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN] has also decided to back Walesa, despite the fact that signatures were officially being collected for Leszek Moczulski. Rumor has it that the reason for this is that before he became secretary of the local Citizens Committee, Kucharski was an important activist in the KPN camp.

Liaison workers in the outlying townships say that the rural areas are firmly behind Walesa and there will be no boycott of the election. The campaign in the villages is also conducted by the three allied forces, namely: Workers' "Solidarity," Farmers' "Solidarity" and the local citizens committees.

Nobody asks about concrete program and this suits the people from the Walesa headquarters in Rzeszow. When suggestions were invited as to who should be the next prime minister, the name Balcerowicz cropped up. This caused embarrassment, because up till then the government's economic program was under constant bombardment. "Walesa, means a shake-up and for many people that is sufficient. People have decided to reject the philosophy of a clean break with the past. They are saying that a complete shake-up would be very useful," says Walesa campaigner Konkel.

However, if one is to analyze the signatures on the lists, it will become clear that the people who have thrown their support behind Walesa are in fact from the former nomenklatura. They will feel much safer with somebody who has clearly said that Poland need a strong left foot as well as a right one.

The lists with signatures from the city of Lancut and the surrounding area were handed in at headquarters by Dr. Wit Tybulczuk, head of the Voivodship Central Offices, who is generally respected by everyone. Judging from the lists submitted, it appeared that Lancut and the whole surrounding area was firmly for Walesa. Next day, however, Wladyslaw Debski, a teacher, arrived at Rzeszow and accused the Walesa headquarters of fabricating facts. Lancut clearly wanted to vote for Mazowiecki, regardless of the fact that its surrounding area supports Slisz and Slisz supports Walesa. The proof was clearly visible in the lists of signatures that Debski handed over to Mazowiecki's local election headquarters. He was quickly bundled out from the Walesa local headquarters. [passage omitted]

Things are different in the Mazowiecki local election headquarters. Everyone who calls by is asked to join the campaign staff. Acquaintances from Walesa's local election headquarters (situated on a different floor, but in the same building)—with whom they worked underground, but who today work for the other side—usually greet them with the words: "Hello commies, still working for the Jews?" Similar messages are left on the answering machine in the bureau. [passage omitted]

"The Mazowiecki election committee arose spontaneously, because there is no branch of ROAD in Rzeszow. We call ourselves a group of citizens," says Jan Wycislak, its head. [passage omitted]

"It was only when we founded the committee that I realized how frightened people really were. They are afraid that somebody will paint them as Reds or Jews," he says.

When the committee advertised in the local press and hung out our banner, the phones started ringing. "Solidarity" members phoned in saying that they support us, but are unable to show it outwardly, because in the factories they are under pressure to support Walesa. Nevertheless, many offices, factories, and institutes have broken ranks and brought lists with signatures for Mazowiecki. Walesa's headquarters claim that the Mazowiecki team has only managed to collect 200 signatures. The Mazowiecki election headquarters remains silent, they know exactly how many signatures they have and they see no need to boast. Wieslaw Rozycki, a sociologist, says this does not matter, because even if they have collected less signatures, the most important thing is to differentiate between true and declared support. The true support will become manifest on election day, when the voter is left alone with the ballot paper to make his decision. Anyway, Poland has seen many people in the past who claimed that the whole nation was behind them. [passage omitted]

The Mazowiecki local committee believes that programs and not myths will win. They have cabled Warsaw saying that it is imperative that Mazowiecki visit the area soon. This is dictated by the principle that one assembles one's main forces where the danger is greatest. Only Minister Izabella Cywinska has come to date. The prime minister's visit is scheduled for mid-November and Walesa has already visited Rzeszow and Mielec.

True to their campaign philosophy, the committee has decided not to delegate election officers to local election commissions. "The State Election Commission will be supervised by independent judges and that is sufficient guarantee for us that the elections will be conducted impartially," they maintain. Those who suspect manipulation of election results just prove how difficult it is for some of us to free ourselves from past ways of thinking.

What worries Wycislak is not who will win, but whether after the election the opposing camps will be able to work with one another.

## Mazowiecki Cited on Germany, Walesa, Church

*AU2011120190 Frankfurter/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 17 Nov 90 p 12*

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki by correspondent Edith Heller "directly after the signing of the German-Polish border treaty in Warsaw": "We Have To Rely on Our Own Strength"]

[Text] [Heller] What did you feel when the border treaty was signed?

[Mazowiecki] I was very content that we managed to conclude the matter so quickly, that there were no delays. I felt the seriousness of the hour, because I understand and respect Minister Genscher's words that this decision was not easy for the Germans and for him personally.

[Heller] What is now most important in the relationship between the two peoples?

[Mazowiecki] The most important things today are openness and cooperation and, in the broadest sense, the opening of the borders. The advantages of the abolition of compulsory visas will be greater than one difficulty or the other which cannot be prevented with visas either—advantages that result from the coming closer together of our societies and, above all, of the young generation. Openness in the fields of culture and economic cooperation is also important, because I fully agree with Chancellor Kohl that the border must not become a border of civilization.

In my view, overcoming the division into an "A" and a "B" Europe—as I call it—is a very basic question. Of course, this does not mean that we can balance the different standards from one day to the next, but that it is important that both parts of Europe cooperate so that the development of the civilization and of the economy develops its dynamism in both parts.

[Heller] Do you believe that Poland has a chance to catch up with Western Europe and to at least approximately balance the existing differences?

[Mazowiecki] I think that the chances are very big that a dynamic process will start in Poland, because we are already on the path to a free market economy. Our situation is far more difficult than that of, for instance, the former GDR, because we do not have a "big brother" to take care of balancing the level of development within a brief period. We have to rely on our own strength and on the processes of all-European integration.

[Heller] I would like to come back to the meeting in Frankfurt/Oder again. Can you tell me how you managed to make the Chancellor make concessions to your wishes?

[Mazowiecki] Both of us made concessions to the other. We—the Polish side—agreed on having both treaties ratified together. The chancellor made the concessions of signing both treaties one after the other. Since one treaty was already finished, there was no reason not to sign it immediately. I think that the chancellor—with whom I have talked often and with whom I have achieved a certain degree of understanding—has realized that the matter is important and that it would have been incomprehensible for our two societies and for Europe, if we had postponed the signing.

[Heller] Which role does Germany policy play in Poland's domestic policy?

[Mazowiecki] It is very important for all people here, and, in particular, for the inhabitants of the western parts of the country, for whom this involves a feeling of stability. It is no secret that there existed and still exist a lot of fears concerning Germany, also because we are now dealing with a united, very strong, and economically dynamic German state.

No wonder that concerning this question many people are torn between fears and the hope for new chances, in particular in the field of economic cooperation. In my view, it will depend on a prudent and far-sighted policy of the governments of our two countries whether it will be possible to reduce the fears and to strengthen the belief in the chances.

This is also linked with the problem of the German minority. As I have said repeatedly, we as a state are ready and obligated to fully respect the rights of the German minority and to set them down in the big treaty along the same principles that apply to all other minorities. In short, the issue is the realization of European standards, as they were set down at the conference of Copenhagen and the CSCE human rights conference.

[Heller] What does this mean in detail?

[Mazowiecki] This means in detail that we do not agree to any kind of "special rights," because we then would have to fear the return to unpleasant traditions and conflicts between the Germans and the Polish population. In my view, it is very important that external influences, in particular from the FRG, confirm the minority in a friendly and good relationship with their Polish fellow-citizens and do not support the demands for special rights that would lead to a split in the population.

[Heller] Did the German side agree to this?

[Mazowiecki] I found full understanding for this view in the talks in Frankfurt.

[Heller] Can one say that Chancellor Kohl helped you in the election campaign for the office of Polish president?

[Mazowiecki] I think that no one can interfere in this election campaign from the outside and that this was not the chancellor's intention.

[Heller] What kind of president does Poland need?

[Mazowiecki] A president, who is elected in general elections, cannot just have representative functions but he has to have real, essential rights. In our country the situation is a bit unclear in this respect because the new constitution will be the one to decide the president's rights. However, he will be responsible for the cooperation of the state organs, will decide on the directions of the government's policy, will have special rights in the fields of foreign and defense policy, and, of course, will be the guardian of the Constitution.

[Heller] Thus, the Polish model of the presidency will be more like the French than the German one?

[Mazowiecki] Yes, even though it will not be directly copied. Apart from the formal powers, the president's understanding of democracy is also important. I want the president to be responsible for the coordination of state actions within the framework of his constitutional

rights. I am struggling for this—and not for a situation in which the president may do everything but need not account for anything.

[Heller] In Krakow you said that you decided to run for the office on order to spare the Polish democracy from unpredictable tremors. What justifies your view that the Polish democracy would be in danger if Lech Walesa became president?

[Mazowiecki] I do not make any accusations, I only express certain fears—fears that the "acceleration," which Lech Walesa is striving for, might lead to an upheaval. If one accelerates a vehicle too much it might keel over. I am also afraid that a presidency which is not bound by responsibility might throw the country into a certain chaos.

[Heller] What are you accusing Walesa of in detail?

[Mazowiecki] The restructuring of the economy continues to require patience—however, it also requires the engagement of the population. But one cannot promise that everything will change immediately. If one says, for instance, that everything depends on replacing the so-called nomenklatura, one misleads the people, because first, the nomenklatura has been largely removed, and, second, there are no panaceas. One cannot promise to fulfill all demands for higher wages, either, without, at the same time causing the return of inflation, which would mean the greatest misfortune for the country's economy.

[Heller] But why are you firing so few people? Is your gentleness toward, for instance, the television employees not already turning against you?

[Mazowiecki] You are right about the latter. As regards the nomenklatura, the accusations are mostly of a demagogic nature. Just think of the changes in the government, in the Interior Ministry, in the military, in the public prosecutors' offices, and, not least, the large-scale local reform—what is left now is mostly not under the authority of the government but under that of lower institutions, such as, the local administration or the workers' councils.

[Heller] Why are you not at least removing some of your ministers and other associates?

[Mazowiecki] Please, keep in mind that if I make any changes I have to take into account beforehand whether parliament—as it is now—agrees with them. I have repeatedly advocated early parliamentary elections.

[Heller] I would like to ask you about your relationship with the church. Lech Walesa wears the badge of St. Mary on his lapel—but you, too, changed your mind twice under pressure from the church. At first, you were against the introduction of religious instruction in schools, and at your first press conference a year ago you also came out against the initiative for a law to ban abortion, which was discussed at that time. Do you not think that, regardless of who wins the elections, the church will have a lot to say in Poland?

[Mazowiecki] The allegation that I changed my mind is a one-sided interpretation—I have always been of the view that the educational aspect is of fundamental importance in the question of abortion. However, I think that legal protection is also necessary—in this respect, the scope of the threat of punishment must naturally be discussed. And religious instructions was finally reintroduced on a voluntary basis.

Concerning the influence of the church on public life, I say: Yes, this influence exists. There is no doubt that the Catholic Church in Poland has a very strong position. But one must not forget that it earned this position—in the period of the totalitarian governments, when for many ears it was the only free voice of the society, which spoke up to defend the people and the human rights. The church struggled for its strong position. One has to take this into account, in particular because the spheres of influence of the church and the state overlap often and good coexistence is necessary. Of course, direct interference by the church in the sphere of the state would be something different.

[Heller] This was the case concerning religious instruction—the church did not want this question to be discussed in parliament. After all, one could have changed the laws first and then legally reintroduced religious instruction.

[Mazowiecki] I think that this is a misleading interpretation. This kind of reintroduction will, after all, later on be examined in practice and legally regulated. In addition, completely practical aspects played a role in this connection: The new school year was just around the corner.

[Heller] Where do you get your strength from for your work as a man and as a politician?

[Mazowiecki] A few months ago I was in Stalowa Wola—an important industrial center, which was a center of antitotalitarian resistance during martial law. At that time I had contact with the people there and I now returned as prime minister. An enormous crowd had gathered at the church and I was supposed to speak to them. And I felt: You must not disappoint these people. This feeling is important for me. I get strength from the thought that I must not disappoint the people during the difficult restructuring of our country.

## Mazowiecki Discusses Solidarity, Reform, Europe

*AU2111130190 Warsaw PAP in English 2014 GMT 16 Nov 90*

[Text] Warsaw, 16 November (PAP)—After 45 years of communism the most important thing is to learn that one cannot expect everything from the state and to learn how to resolve contradictions in a democratic way, said Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki in his interview for the

Krakow-based TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY headlined "I Believe in Society's Maturity."

"The division of Solidarity is painful. Not the very act of the split, but the way how it was carried out, the fact that it did not proceed in a more natural way, that it was rapidly speeded up by the declared 'war at the top.' But I do not think that all of the common achievements and ethos was wasted. This which, in my opinion, remains and should remain is the idea of civic society."

While referring to the popular phrase of the "thick line" which is needed to separate the past from the future, Tadeusz Mazowiecki said among other things:

"It is not that we do not want to take the former nomenklatura to account. I understood this term (taking to account) as the beginning of a new period, the orientation at the evolutionary pace of changes, but not at a situation when changes, including personal changes in the administration, do not take place. These changes, in my opinion, have already been very big. I did not and I do not think that people who abused their power for some personal profits or who committed crimes should not be taken into account.

"They should be taken into account and this happens with so called 'nomenklatura companies.' Therefore I think it should not be mystified and that putting such a charge (against me) is demagogy. I am aware, however, that in many communities and towns there exist informal alignments and that many people have the feeling that the changes have not gone deep enough. However, I think that today, citizens and their self-governments should embark on the continuation of these changes."

The premier also discussed the perils stemming from the economic reform for a part of Polish society.

"While dividing national income, the state must take into account certain important social areas. It must not be expected that in every difficult situation the state will interfere. In many domains, shortages will be eliminated through the very mechanism of free market economy. But certain scope of state interference is obviously possible and necessary."

Asked about prospects of Poland's return to Europe, Tadeusz Mazowiecki said: "The experience we have encountered, the salvation of ourselves, own tradition, own system of values under a totalitarian system is something precious which Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe can convey to the rest of Europe. In this massage enormous role is played by Christian values and all that allowed us to survive.

"I think that we have a lot to give to others and that we should want this. I do not mean any special mission but certain cultural convergence between the two parts of Europe."

If he won the presidential election, Mazowiecki would try to come to terms with his opponents in the current campaign to agree upon the principles and forms of coexistence and first of all to improve its climate.

### Mazowiecki Interviewed on Military Reform

*AU1911084390 Warsaw POLSKA ZBROJNA in Polish 13 Nov 90 pp 1,2*

[Interview with Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki by Irena Baczynska; place and date not given: "The Army Is the Nation and it Should Only Serve the Nation"]

[Text] [Baczynska] More than three months ago, at a meeting with senior military personnel, you mentioned the need to institute profound changes in the military and, in particular, the need to return the Polish Army to the nation. Do you think that this basic call for a reform of our Army has been realized?

[Mazowiecki] I think that the military is consistently and effectively rebuilding its strong bond with the nation and with society. Much has been accomplished in this area. All that was politically one-sided, foreign, and facade-like about the military has been discarded. The military has shown that it can adapt to present-day requirements. It is ably developing a new image that is based on historical experience and on patriotic, national traditions. These traditions always met with the approval of society and that is still the case today. The cultivation of these traditions in the military is a guarantee that Poland will remain an independent state.

Public opinion polls have shown that respect and a positive attitude toward the military are deeply rooted in public awareness, and this stems from Polish historical experience. Even during the most difficult periods in the postwar history of our country, the military occupied a high position among the institutions that were held in esteem by society. Quite simply, in our history, the Army always was an important element in our national life.

One also has to be aware of the fact that the military is not only a structure and institution, but is made up of people above all. Among an enormous number of officers, there always was a strong and natural need to identify with the nation. Many of them found it painful to accept the restrictions on the sovereignty of the Army and the functions and tasks that were ascribed to it in a totalitarian, one-party state.

I would repeat what I said at the meeting with military personnel in July once again: "The military played a very important role in bringing about the peaceful change in the nature of our country." The 4 June 1989 election results in the closed military voting districts provided excellent proof that the military rejected the old system and of their desire to create a completely democratic, civic state.

Witnessing the authentic character of military activities both on the macro level and the revival and strengthening of ties between individual military communities and their local communities, there is no doubt in my

mind that the military will not waste the opportunity that it has to find itself in the mainstream of national life. Today, the military is experiencing the same difficulties—the poverty stemming from the present economic situation—but it also shares the hopes of a better future, and it wants to build the future together with the nation.

[Baczynska] Let us remain on the subject of the role of the military within the state. What do you consider the military's most important tasks to be in a democratic, sovereign Poland.

[Mazowiecki] I would like to begin by saying what I do not want to see; what should never again occur in Poland. I am thinking of the June 1956 Poznan events, December 1970 on Baltic coast, and everything that 13 December 1981 entailed—tanks in the streets, young men in uniform who were bearing weapons directed at their own people. The military has resolutely rejected such a function, and I firmly believe that it has done so forever. An army that serves the nation should be a bulwark of the democratic order and a force that has a stabilizing effect on social and state life. This is not an easy task today because of painful experiences of the past

However, I think that the changes that have already taken place in the military, not only in the spheres of structure, organization, and personnel, but also in the sphere of mentality, will enable it to recover public credibility as a school for life. The military can become an important element in the educational system in a democratic state, because it can exercise a direct influence on hundreds of thousands of young people and can shape their civic, patriotic, and national attitudes.

[Baczynska] However, the changes that have and are taking place in the military's educational function are not apparent to everyone. In some communities, there still is that stereotype of the Army as an institution that is helpless with regard to shortcomings in interpersonal relations and is unable to combat them effectively. To what extent do you think that progress has been made in making military life more humane and democratic?

[Mazowiecki] I think that much has been accomplished, but there is still a lot that remains to be done. The propaganda image of the military that was fed to us over decades contained many blank spots. There often was a basis for being concerned about what might happen to a son, brother, or husband who had been called up. There were effectively no social controls over life in the barracks. The situation today is different, but that does not mean that all is well. It is possible to issues directives that would make military service for the young man less harsh and onerous and, I know, such directives are being issued, but you cannot make the overall situation more humane by issuing an order.

It is, above all, a question of changing the mentality of part of the personnel, its attitude toward soldiers performing basic service; it is a question of respecting human honor and dignity, and the rights of the individual in a hierarchical structure such as the Army has.

I believe that institutional mechanisms for overseeing relations within the Army have to be created as quickly as possible. I am not just thinking of public supervision exercised through parliament, but also of appointing a spokesman for soldiers' rights as well as appointing men responsible for welfare in every military unit. It is difficult to talk about humanizing military life, if there is not at least some marked improvement in the enormous economic problems with which the military is grappling. I am fully aware of how serious an obstacle this is and how strong an impact economic difficulties have on the rate and effectiveness of change in the military.

[Baczynska] You have raised an issue that is being very extensively discussed in the military. The material situation in which military families find themselves is bad; not only older personnel are afraid of the planned cuts in pensions; fewer and fewer young people are seeking admission to military academies and higher officers' schools; units' combat equipment and social and living conditions at bases are deteriorating.

So, it is realistic to ask whether Poland will be able to afford the Army that our fatherland needs today.

[Mazowiecki] I realize that this is a question that had to be asked. I also realize how very important it is. Poland has to take account of the actual geopolitical situation at the present time and the possible ways in which it might evolve. What do I believe to be the most important aspects of the situation?

First, there has to be a strong army. For the time being, we cannot allow ourselves to carry out unilateral disarmament. Today, pacifist tendencies are day-dreams. Guarantees for European security have to be created first. I do not want to go into detail, that is the domain of experts, but I know that a smaller Army, but one that is better equipped, more efficient, and well trained requires appropriate expenditure above all.

Second, a way of settling military matters will have to be found although Poland is poor. I know that cheap sentimentalism is becoming a thing of the past. Today, a good soldier is one who is well armed and well equipped above all. The material plight of the military is a natural consequence of the state of the national economy, but one day we may all pay the highest price because of that.

Third, I am firmly convinced that the government's economic strategy will bring about an improvement in Poland's economic situation. In my view, the military must also find itself among the professional groups that will benefit from that improvement. It is a question of our fatherland's secure and sovereign existence.

[Baczynska] What you have said can only partially allay the concern felt by personnel. These are difficult times, and they make such declarations ring hollow. We have

heard such statements for many years and we, the Army, have paid a high price for that.

[Mazowiecki] I am the prime minister; I am running for the office of president, but first and foremost I am a Pole. In all honesty, I can say that the affairs of the Polish Army are very close to my heart. I feel respect and profound understanding for the military's declaration of political neutrality. All Poles are now faced with having to make important choices and decisions.

I have already said, and I repeat, that the military can in no way and under no circumstances become a bargaining chip in political disputes. The president may change, the government may change, and parliament may change, but the realities of foreign and national defense policies are objective and independent of whichever option triumphs in the presidential or the parliamentary elections that will come later. My goal is a secure Poland, although I realize that views about the way in which this is to be achieved may differ. At at a meeting with military personnel, I heard an officer say something that impressed itself on me: "That the Army is apolitical does not mean that the Army is politically illiterate." Of course, the military's political neutrality can never be at variance with the state's democratic system. Every soldier must be guaranteed the right to vote as he pleases, but the Army as a whole must stand above all political divisions. The times when the Army was subordinated to a single political party can never be allowed to return. The Army is the nation and it should only serve the nation. On the other hand, we are all—parliament, the president, the government and all of society—responsible for its strength and its ability to defend.

## Presidential Candidate Cimoszewicz on Elections

*PM1911095690 Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 30 Oct 90 p 3*

[Interview with presidential candidate Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz by Jacek Lindner on the occasion of election campaign visit to Gdansk Voivodship 29 Nov 90; place not given; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz collected the second largest number of signatures from persons supporting his nomination as a candidate for the presidency of the Polish Republic. Yesterday he visited the Gdansk Voivodship for a series of election meetings.

[Lindner] Are you aware that you are the most criticized among all the presidential candidates

[Cimoszewicz] This depends on how you assess the intensity and degree of criticism. If you consider the number of the people who have criticized me, I trail far behind Walesa and Mazowiecki.

[Lindner] You are contesting the election as a representative of the left. What does this term denote?

[Cimoszewicz] It denotes a political orientation which should take an active part in the sphere of economics, but also in that of social concerns. It is a movement which does not profess the principle of "Look After Number One and Rely on Yourself," especially in times of crisis. During such periods, greater attention should be given to the materially underprivileged groups.

[Lindner] Do you mean a kind of capitalism with a lightning rod for the protection of the underprivileged?

[Cimoszewicz] Yes, we can accept this term as close to our aims.

[Lindner] But let us now go back to the discussion of the left-wing orientation. After its merger, the Polish Socialist Party [PPS] refused to support your candidacy....

[Cimoszewicz] It is regrettable that the so-called past injuries and old wrongs that the Communist Party inflicted on socialists are still more important for them than the values we share. I do, however, believe that the time will come for this situation to change.

[Lindner] On which section of the electorate do you pin your hopes?

[Cimoszewicz] It is difficult to make predictions here. During the campaign I will address a variety of social groups and I hope to persuade many people who are guided by reason rather than emotion.

[Lindner] Do you believe that we are witnessing the gradual clericalization of public life in Poland?

[Cimoszewicz] I do—and I find it alarming, because it is not the direction in which I believe a modern and democratic state should develop.

[Lindner] Let us move on to questions concerning the economy. You have used the phrase "social market economy." Is this not, by any chance, yet another invention of newspeak?

[Cimoszewicz] It is, to a certain degree. The term was invented because in the present situation "pure" capitalism still causes much public apprehension. Others use the expression "civilized capitalism." It means the same thing. And the idea itself can be summed up in the assertion that a free market must not be regarded as yet another idol to which all other considerations should be subordinated. The importance of certain social values must be acknowledged, too. Profit must not be the principal goal to be attained at all costs. In any case, this view is shared by the eminent American economist and Nobel prize laureate, John Kenneth Galbraith, who believes that the developed Western states in fact represent social democratic structures.

[Lindner] Among other things, your program stipulates free competition without forced, artificial changes which do not follow from economic calculation of costs and profits.

[Cimoszewicz] Indeed, I wish to stress my opposition to the fetish of privatization. Privatization is not the main concern. Enterprises must be economically efficient and effective, and they should follow directions given by logically placed decisionmaking centers. This is the way we should be going.

[Lindner] You defend the supreme role of parliament in the state. What should the president's role be?

[Cimoszewicz] The president cannot be someone who arranges things. He should guard the constitutional order, which presupposes cooperation and interdependence between parliament, government, and president. Only this kind of configuration can offer us guarantees against a distortion of the state's political life.

[Lindner] What about Cimoszewicz and foreign policy issues?

[Cimoszewicz] I allow no scope for traditional alliances. Poland should be neutral and it should also take great care to ensure that the Germans do not develop better relations with the Soviet Union, or Russia, than we have with our eastern neighbor.

[Lindner] You should choose what to emphasize last in this interview....

[Cimoszewicz] At the moment Poland finds itself in a situation where it faces two threats: a return to dictatorship and authoritarian rule, or chaos caused by ineffective measures introduced by the authorities in power. If we are to avert these two threats, we must develop an adequate social and economic policy and also create the kind of power configuration which will give us a guarantee of averting them. I would not want to see the old saying, "Poles are only wise once the damage is done," become applicable again.

[Lindner] Thank you for talking to us.

## Frasyniuk Speaks Out on Presidential Contest

*PM1611165490 Opole TRYBUNA OPOLSKA in Polish 30 Oct 90 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Wladyslaw Frasyniuk, co-founder of Citizens Movement-Democratic Action (ROAD) group, by Marek Brodowski; place and date not given]

[Text] [Brodowski] You have involved yourself in the running of Tadeusz Mazowiecki's presidential election campaign. Why do you now choose Mazowiecki rather than Lech Walesa, with whom you worked in close cooperation, until recently?

[Frasyniuk] The fundamental difference between the two candidates lies in their perception of democracy. For Lech Walesa, democracy is something that can be decreed by the president. As for Mazowiecki, he is a man who by his very nature holds democracy in high esteem, and so he is interested in building a system in which democracy will be implemented from the lowest level up and each citizen will find an opportunity to decide on things that concern him directly. This is the first and essential difference. The second way in which the presidential candidates differ is their attitude to the law: Mazowiecki has a profound respect for the law and will fight for every citizen to be equal under the law. Lech Walesa is far more nonchalant in his utterances concerning the law, and in meting out justice is guided predominantly by his emotions. This is a trait which you will not find in Mazowiecki. The third difference between them is that Mazowiecki is by nature uncommonly open and tolerant; he has no obsessions about any national minorities at all, which is a guarantee that as president he will lead Poland to the modern-day Europe which respects all national, ethnic, and lifestyle differences and in which everyone can find a place for himself. Thus, Mazowiecki guarantees the kind of democracy in which both an individual sporting an earring and a religious group activist will be treated equally.

[Brodowski] Are all these differences evident in the current election campaign?

[Frasyniuk] The different approach to the style of running the campaign is strikingly obvious. For example, Lech Walesa draws on the widespread hostility toward the government policy, the sense of instability and uncertainty about tomorrow, and the threat posed by the increasing crime rate, while at the same time promising cheap and instantaneous successes. He addresses these promises chiefly to those circles which are disoriented by the prevailing situation and uncertain about finding their own feet in these new circumstances. On the other hand, Mazowiecki is the type of politician who is very sparing in his declarations, who takes full responsibility for what he says, and who does not promise easy successes. He talks about building the type of state in which everyone will be able to arrange and furnish his corner as he wants.

[Brodowski] But the prime minister also appears to reach in his campaign for methods designed to appeal to the populist sentiment. For example, his decision to forego the use of official limousines and to travel by train to election meeting venues. Considering the rank of his office, do you not regard this decision as slightly ridiculous?

[Frasyniuk] I must concede that Walesa is an incredibly shrewd man who takes care to promise a variety of things to different groups and circles, but refuses to face responsibility for the fact that if you want to give to some, you must take away from others. Mazowiecki, in turn, is a man who approaches everything extremely seriously. The consequences of this approach were that as soon as it was decided that the prime minister would run his election campaign outside his duties as head of government and would not be entitled to take advantage of any opportunities that his office might carry with it, he was bound to make up his mind that he would also relinquish the use of an official car. Fortunately, the commissioner has provided all presidential candidates with personal

bodyguards and thus averted the possibility of the prime minister traveling without security arrangements. I believe that, were it not for the commissioner's decision, the prime minister would most certainly have protested such security measures. I certainly think that his decision to travel by train for election purposes was a case of excessive scrupulousness; after all, the prime minister's time is considered a priceless commodity in all efficiently run states. The more so as there are many people who would be only too glad to let the prime minister use their private cars—the latter easily matching his official Lancia in speed and luxury.

[Brodowski] What are your impressions after the official election meetings which Tadeusz Mazowiecki has held to date?

[Frasyniuk] The majority of those who attend these meetings have already decided to support Mazowiecki. All they want at this stage is to have their decision confirmed. There are on the whole few people who support the other candidates or other options. Some people come out of pure curiosity, without having made a firm decision. There have been several amusing situations in our campaign. Recently, after my appearance on the television program "One Hundred Questions For...", I received a letter from a viewer in Bielsko-Biala who told me that I convinced him with my arguments so successfully that, as a result, he would withdraw his support for Lech Walesa and vote for... Leszek Moczulski instead.

[Brodowski] What will you expect to happen if Tadeusz Mazowiecki wins the election and becomes president?

[Frasyniuk] This kind of question is always difficult and quite awkward to tackle, but I will nevertheless take the opportunity to answer it. Well, let me tell you unequivocally: I do not link my own activity in the election campaign with hopes for gaining any kind of temporal goods, positions in government, or similar privileges. I would like to tell you quite frankly that my financial circumstances have always been comfortable. For example, in 1980 my earnings totaled 18,500 zloty [per month], so I joined the strike not to protest my low wages, but because I felt I was a slave. I was only too aware that my qualifications were being wasted; I saw that there were numerous errors being perpetuated in such areas as work organization, for example, but I could not do anything about it. On the contrary, if you came out with any new ideas at all, you were as a rule assigned either an inferior vehicle or a more difficult route to cover. If I have now parted ways with Walesa and moved over to support Mazowiecki, I was motivated by the same reasons as all that time ago: I would like to see Poland become a fully democratic country, to know that the past 10 years given to Solidarity have not been wasted, and to have an assurance that everyone in Poland has the right to make the decisions he himself considers correct.

[Brodowski] But what will you do if Lech Walesa wins the election? After all, you have resigned from your trade union position....

[Frasyniuk] If Walesa wins the election?... I would say that, from an ethical viewpoint, I will then find it even easier to make my decisions. First, I could become active in opposition and undertake the task of creating genuine, responsible opposition structures in Poland. And I certainly do know how to handle such a task: For the past 10 years I have headed and led groups of people dissatisfied with the existing situation, so I know how to get them organized. I could also return to my original occupation: I love big trucks and I have always liked driving long journeys. In any case, I think that it is high time we got used to situations where, if a person decides to resign from his public position, it need not necessarily mean that someone had knifed him in the back. It may be his own, personal decision and there is no reason to kick him for it.

[Brodowski] Your adversaries point out that until the moment of breaking up with Lech Walesa you had a very comfortable, cushy job at his side, involving much foreign travel....

[Frasyniuk] We happen to live in a country where foreign travel has not been traditionally the privilege of many. I assume that this is the reason for the criticism you quoted. I accompanied Lech Walesa on two major visits—to the United States and to the FRG—but I can honestly say that these two were certainly the hardest. On the other hand, I have traveled abroad quite frequently in connection with establishing foreign intraregional links—for example, between Wroclaw and Strasbourg, or Wroclaw and Milan—but these visits were strictly unofficial. I believe that people who decide to support our region and bet their money on the guy named Frasyniuk are fully entitled to demand that he start investing in the milieu from which he originated. I suppose one reaction is to begrudge me these visits, but another, better one would be to think of ways of enabling everyone to travel abroad. My trips were made precisely for this purpose: They served to establish contacts between schools and to arrange reciprocal visits for the young people of respective regions and vacation exchange schemes. They will readily accept Poles there, for example, for three-month paid training projects, but only on condition that we do not plan to stay behind and settle there, because this would cause problems. In turn, our side's problem is that we do not have adequate accommodation facilities for foreign visitors.

[Brodowski] You have traveled the road from union activist to politician. In the light of your own experience, do you believe that a politician will find it as easy to remain faithful to his ideals as a trade unionist?

[Frasyniuk] I believe that it is irrelevant whether you are a politician, a trade unionist, or a self-government activist. Wherever men are in public office, they must keep faith with their own values and ideals, because if

they betray them, they become nothing more but characters for hire. In any case, all those who were involved in Solidarity from August 1980 onward became political activists straight away. I should also like to clear up one more misunderstanding: Occasionally, people have said that Frasyniuk betrayed his working class milieu by pursuing a political career. Well, from the very beginning all of us activists were interested in bringing on a political change. And in this we succeeded. However, in order to maintain a modern-style trade union today, we must, first and foremost, fight for our enterprises to remain profitable. To this end, we should change our position from that of a union whose activity centers on demands for compensatory pay increases to that of a union which shares in the management of its enterprises. It was unfortunate—and I am quitting the union with a heavy heart over it—that the resolutions passed at the Second General Trade Union Congress are not being implemented at all: that we are increasingly moving over to the compensation-demanding positions. In those enterprises where the unions insist on seeing changes take place, the situation has indeed improved, but in those where they maintain their demand-making positions, it is predominantly the employees who lose out. I know that the course I am advocating is more difficult even than all the protest actions taken over the past 10 years, but after all we are masters and managers here and we should make the most stringent demands of ourselves in the first place. This is why I interpret the notion of "acceleration" not as a personal revolution, but as provision of favorable conditions for achieving a more active involvement on the part of society in the process of designing and implementing the reforms.

[Brodowski] Thank you for talking to us.

## Balcerowicz on Economic Challenges in 1991

*AU1511115890 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12 Nov 90 (Economy and Law Section) p 1*

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz by Piotr Aleksandrowicz; place and date not given: "The Enterprise as Owner"]

[Text] [Aleksandrowicz] One hears more and more that in January 1991 there will be fundamental changes in our economic conditions.

[Balcerowicz] January 1991 will be a difficult month, but the extent of the changes will be smaller than those implemented in January 1990. At the beginning of 1991 we shall begin to feel the effects of the new payment conditions in our trade with CEMA countries, although in some sectors the effects of this will be less painful because it was implemented earlier.

[Aleksandrowicz] Talking about 1991 conditions, one has to mention interest percentage rates and loans. For two months now the interest rate has been below inflation, contrary to economic policy forecasts.

[Balcerowicz] We agree with the Polish National Bank that the basis of our monetary policy should be a healthy interest rate, although this would not necessarily be in every month, but over several months. One cannot apply this instrument blindly.

[Aleksandrowicz] With the price consolidation that await us in January, can we expect to see the reintroduction of, for example, a monthly or a two-month interest rate?

[Balcerowicz] Personally, I cannot see this happening.

[Aleksandrowicz] Will it pay to invest next year, or will the clash between savings and consumption still favor consumption?

[Balcerowicz] The draft budget and other instruments have been geared toward further development. I hope that the Sejm approves this strategy, because this will prepare the ground for increased investment. The government's strategy is to stimulate investment in our infrastructure.

[Aleksandrowicz] What about the individual? Will individuals find the privatization program opportunities attractive?

[Balcerowicz] Every citizen should have the opportunity to participate in the process, not just through investment bonds, but also by purchasing shares with the assistance of loans.

[Aleksandrowicz] Many directors are engaged in talks with prospective foreign partners. Will the negotiations be productive?

[Balcerowicz] One must not get the wrong idea about the discussion on the draft of the act regulating business activities of foreign companies and individuals. This discussion will help us produce a good and thorough draft, so that it is acknowledged by important foreign institutions such as the World Bank. Within three weeks, we expect to be ready to decide on the likely subject matter of the draft.

[Aleksandrowicz] What will the new principles of trade with CEMA be like?

[Balcerowicz] As regards Czechoslovakia and Hungary they will reflect those with the West. This means current world market prices and settlements in convertible currency. We hope to change to the same principles in our trade with Bulgaria, Rumania, and the USSR.

We realize that firms that export to CEMA countries, especially to the USSR, now find themselves in limbo. We have offered these enterprises help in establishing contacts with foreign capital, in order to support the effort to change. The initial reaction has been very poor and few have expressed any sort of interest.

[Aleksandrowicz] You mentioned the likely extension of liberal principles in foreign trade. What will these be?

[Balcerowicz] We hope to abolish the tax on coal exports after the second quarter of 1991 (if the situation on the internal fuel market is favorable) and the list of goods subject to export tax will be substantially shortened.

[Aleksandrowicz] Are you planning to revalue fixed assets?

[Balcerowicz] Yes, towards the end of the year fixed assets will be revalued by 190 percent, but at the same time we shall make a one-time adjustment of depreciation rates from 10 to 15 percent.

[Aleksandrowicz] What about dividends?

[Balcerowicz] We are suggesting that dividends be lowered from 32 to 20 percent, with simultaneous increases in the enterprise establishment funds.

[Aleksandrowicz] What about directors' attitudes to privatization?

[Balcerowicz] Privatization will proceed quicker if we have initiatives from the field and if more privatization projects are submitted to the Ministry of Ownership Changes.

[Aleksandrowicz] In your television appearance there was a definite note of caution for directors not to make ill-judged decisions. What positive contributions are you hoping Polish managers will make?

[Balcerowicz] I touched on two elements, namely, to be careful before taking steps that may worsen the position of their enterprise in the upcoming months, for example, shortsighted outflow of financial reserves and by allowing their enterprise's competitive edge to decline in relation to other competitors on the Polish market as well as abroad. The second element is an erroneous encouragement to greater activity and a search for new markets. The danger is that the present market may come under intense pressure. The need to make savings within the enterprise is a third element. There can be no reform of the economy, if individual enterprises do not reform.

### Assembly Examines PSM Creation, EEC Adherence

*AU1911193990 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1838 GMT 19 Nov 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 19/11/1990—During today's debates of the Assembly of Deputies the leader of the FSN [National Salvation Front] Parliamentary Group, Liviu Muresan, drew the Parliament's and government's attention to the necessity and opportuneness to make an official application for Romania's joining the Common Market and to set up a state secretariat specially in charge of that matter.

The afternoon debates took on a stormy aspect when representatives of some parties harshly criticized the creation of the Socialist Labour Party [PSM].

Mr. Dan Martian, speaker of the chamber, promised that the highly disputed creation of the new party would be examined in Parliament according to the law in force. The Assembly of Deputies next studied the bill on public finance, a normative act meant to give legal expression to the government's financial policy and strategy consisting in decentralization, autonomy of state-owned units, passage toward a market economy and privatization.

On today's session deputies were also informed that a legislative proposal had been submitted to the chamber's Permanent Bureau by the UDMR [Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania] Parliamentary Group concerning the tax paid by childless persons.

### Anticommunist Rally Protests Founding of PSM

*AU1911195990 Bucharest Domestic Service in Romanian 1800 GMT 19 Nov 90*

[Text] This afternoon, a march of silence was organized in Bucharest by the Association of Former Political Detainees [AFDP] to protest the founding of the Socialist Labor Party [PSM], which was assessed by the demonstrators as continuer of the Romanian Communist Party [RCP]. The demonstrators' column took off from the Revolution Square and proceeded, orderly and without incident, along this route: Victory Square, Romana Square, Magheru Boulevard, University, and Victory Alley. Along the whole itinerary, the demonstrators chanted antigovernmental, antipresidential, and anticommunist slogans.

At 1730, the column reached Revolution Square, where a short rally took place. The rally was addressed by AFDP President Constantin Titu Dumitrescu and by Octavian Radulescu and Dumitru Dinca. Mr. Titu Dumitrescu warned against the real danger of the emergence—less than 11 months since the revolution—of the former Communist Party, which, over a period of 45 years, has claimed more than 3 million victims. At the same time, Mr. Titu Dumitrescu accused Romania's current leadership of incompetence and asked that all democratic forces in the country pool their forces to make the government resign by 1 December. Likewise, the president of this association expressed the hope that this will happen without violence, so as to properly celebrate 1 December.

### * Cunescu on Future of Social Democratic Party

*91BA0056B Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 20 Oct 90 pp 1, 2*

[Interview with Social Democratic Party (SPD) Chairman Sergiu Cunescu by Dora Mezdrea; place and date not given]

[Text] [Mezdrea] Mr. Sergiu Cunescu, as we learned from ROMANIA LIBERA, on Monday 1 October 1990 you had a meeting with several NSF [National Salvation Front] representatives (Messrs. Claudiu Iordache, Scortan, and Sincai) which, according to Sorin Rosca-Stanescu's article "Parties in Danger" was not exactly routine, since, as we further learned, you "barred other members of the party leadership from attending the meeting," except for Mr. Traian Novac, "a friend of Mr. Iordache's and the head of the SPD organization in Timisoara." Can you tell us what you discussed with the NSF representatives and why you didn't allow the presence of other SPD representatives at the meeting?

[Cunescu] On my return from New York, where there was a meeting of the Socialist International, I learned that during my absence an article appeared in ROMANIA LIBERA—a newspaper that I appreciate—which gave some information and presented a scenario very unfavorable to our party. Essentially, the article stated that I and some aides of mine had a secret meeting with Mr. Claudiu Iordache and some aides of his, and that the objective of that allegedly secret meeting was, among other things, to discuss a possible merger between the SPD and the NSF. On the basis of this completely incorrect report a whole scenario was embroidered which the author—a journalist that I also appreciate—wanted to parlay into a sensational article, but managed to produce merely a piece of scandal. He built a totally unlikely scenario that was very unfavorable to our party and especially to me personally. Later he explained to me that his intention had been of the purest and that on the contrary, what he had meant to do was to call attention to the fact that our party must be wary of outside influences. Naturally, I told him that he needn't concern himself with this and that anyway, if he wanted to be of help to us he should have presented a difference scenario. And what was it all about? Mr. Claudiu Iordache let us know through one of our party members in Timisoara, more precisely one of the leaders of our Lugoj branch, that he wished to have a protocol meeting with us to get acquainted. I had exchanged a few words with him in Timisoara—I didn't even know that he was vice chairman of the Front—and we once shook hands in the hall of the Chamber [of Deputies]. Naturally, I agreed to meet and get acquainted. Our party is accustomed to calls from various leaders of other parties, and there's never been any special problem about any such visit. For

example, we met with Mr. Corneliu Coposu, chairman of the National Peasant Party—for whom I have special respect—and no one thought it was a secret meeting, although it was just the two of us and we exchanged ideas on politics. This time, in order not to be disturbed—this is standing procedure for every call—when we receive deputies, senators from other parties, foreign delegations, or ambassadors and I ask not to be disturbed, I choose a few aides to attend the discussions. In this case, I took advantage of the fact that the heads of the Timisoara and Lugoj branches were in Bucharest for a national conference. I asked them to sit in and make it an even number: three NSF delegates and three of us.

[Mezdrea] Can you tell us the names of the other two representatives?

[Cunescu] From our party there were Mr. Novac, the head of the Timisoara branch, and Mr. Ion Vereb, the head of the Lugoj branch. Mr. Novac is a member of the party's Steering Committee. Like any other protocol visit, the discussions were kept general. On this occasion, we talked about social-democratic principles. Why? Because Mr. Claudiu Iordache told me at the beginning that they are in the process of organizing the party and are attempting to establish a new, democratic identity—something that had actually been reported in the press earlier—and that their doctrine was beginning to lean toward social democracy. So that was the gist of the discussion. Another thing I want to add is that they are reportedly getting rid of people who have become discredited and intend to organize a truly democratic party. I continued the discussion in the same vein and talked about what real democracy means, especially contemporary democracy. I particularly highlighted the principles that must be observed and called attention, for example, to the fact that we struggle for freedom and are against those who struggle against freedom; that we are for social justice and against those who support privileges; and finally, that we struggle for solidarity and are against actions aimed at creating division in the society. These are basic values, but they can be attained only through truth and democracy. One cannot engage in social democratic politics—i.e., make social and economic reforms, before democracy is established. And to establish democracy, there must exist an atmosphere of complete truth; it is for this truth that we struggle, and we will never make any concession in this respect. We would be happy to see as many trends toward social democracy as possible in our country, and I think that every party is interested in having as many currents toward democracy as possible.

[Mezdrea] In your opinion, what are the chances that the NSF, which is a very heterogenous party—made up not only of a reformist wing and a conservative wing, but also trailing behind a big ballast of activists or neo-ambitious men who don't really have an ideology—to really become a social-democratic political group?

[Cunescu] This, of course, is the most difficult problem, which we discussed, too; I cannot exactly quote what was said because I didn't think I might have to repeat it, but this was discussed, too. I pointed out that social democracy was not just words, but was something that has to be demonstrated; it has to be preserved and not be besmirched. Our advantage is that we represent the real social democracy; we view ourselves as a standard of political morality, and from this viewpoint, even though we are not many, we are very jealous of our prestige. We have credibility in the country and, what is very important, we have great credibility abroad, both among the Socialist International and among many democratic movements. As for the Front, I want to make it clear that we do not interfere in the internal affairs of other parties in general, nor do we allow ourselves to comment on their affairs, although many other parties do. One thing I want to mention, namely that our discussion was extremely civilized. I was also interested from another viewpoint: It was my first opportunity to talk to a NSF leader who was not a former Communist Party member. From that viewpoint it was a premiere, and I was pleased to note that the statements that Mr. Claudiu Iordache made about our meeting were also fair. So, in keeping with the spirit of democracy and dialogue, we had a correct discussion but the interpretation given in ROMANIA LIBERA was totally out of place.

[Mezdrea] If the meeting had no publicity purpose, how did the news of it get to ROMANIA LIBERA?

[Cunescu] First of all, there was no point in commenting on such a routine—not to say banal—meeting. In itself the fact that it was discussed showed bad will. Perhaps the journalist wanted to use it positively, but the intention with which the information was passed on to him was bad, in the sense that it was distorted. The information could have been obtained from anyone, since everyone knew who our visitors were, but it was reported wrong. By whom, I don't know. This is something I cannot find out from the journalist unless I take him to court because he is protected by the right not to provide details. I don't think I'll go as far as that, although it would be useful to know where it came from. The fact that the article appeared in my absence and that the facts were distorted to the point of that absurd scenario shows that someone had some nasty intention. I don't know who. In point of fact, I was recently warned that there would be attempts to compromise me and I can imagine why some people may be interested in that, but I never thought ROMANIA LIBERA would be the vehicle for such an action; perhaps it was chosen because it is the most credible, it is a serious newspaper, that's precisely why I was surprised. This is the work of someone who doesn't wish me and the party well.

[Mezdrea] That article contained another surprising statement: "Someone has several of the leaders 'in his pocket'." What can you tell us about that?

[Cunescu] I don't know what that is based on and once again, I could only find out by suing the journalist. Of course I'd like to know if anyone in our party were in the NSF's 'pocket.' I'm not excluding the possibility of secret

infiltration, no party does. It's very possible; fortunately, it didn't have any effect on us. At a meeting with county delegates we had in Bucharest a week earlier I was delighted to note that all the county organizations understood what the truth was and what was happening, they unanimously expressed support for our position, and our unity remained intact.

[Mezdrea] I was dwelling on this statement precisely because this type of method—blackmail, "having someone in one's pocket"—was a typically communist method, part of their arsenal...

[Cunescu] I was utterly surprised by the contents and style of that article. It was depressing to see that article in ROMANIA LIBERA, very sad. I don't know how ROMANIA LIBERA will manage to live it down. Mr. Stanescu came to see me and explained what his intentions had been. I gave him an interview, of course, I'm curious to see when it will be published. I was as little sour as I could be, but I am left with a bitter taste about a newspaper that stooped to such a thing.

[Mezdrea] The fact is that the journalist's initial premise was a real one and one that should give us all pause, namely the fact that the NSF intends, as can be seen in the documents drafted by the NSF Steering Collegium, to change its name into the "Social-Democratic Union" (the union being formed by absorbing several parties or groups with social-democratic leanings, as an added means of attracting left-wing intellectuals). Similarly, the NSF intends to get in motion "active groups" whose mission is to act against "extremist movements," or in Mr. Rosca-Stanescu's parlance, "those who challenge its policies." The government plans to "eliminate them by sponsoring competitive organizations within the same social segments, or organizations with the opposite aims. Such organizations will become active with help from the citizenry, churches, professional associations, etc., by October, when an outburst is expected from the extremist protest movement." Consequently, if the NSF turns into the Social-Democratic Union, a change that no one can prevent, that does not necessarily mean that it will swallow up the SDP?

[Cunescu] The NSF can call itself Social-Democratic Union because every party can select any name it wants, but the name is not what this is all about. Social democracy has to be practiced, implemented, proven. Unfortunately, the article in question did indicate the probability of such a situation. Once again, I repeat, the idea of some future cooperation was not even suggested. Mr. Iordache said only one thing to me, toward the end, he asked if we have some special documentation on social-democracy to give them to read. That's the extent of our cooperation. In point of fact, even AZI stated that there will be no merger with the SPD as long as its leader is Sergiu Cunescu.

[Mezdrea] We all know that the NSF's strongest temptation in matters of ideology was social democracy. But from what we have seen so far, despite all its declarations, the NSF is at best closer to the Asian model, the one that combines a certain economic liberalism with an authoritarian leadership that recognizes order and hierarchy. What are the chances, nevertheless, that it wil become a social-democratic party as it claims?

[Cunescu] It is only normal that certain currents and ideas will come to the surface within such a large heterogenous party that is the client of a power. There are all kinds of people in it: former members of the nomenklatura who still have the thinking and reactions of the doctrine with which they lived their entire lives, while others came more recently to the support of a large group that ensures them a job. But there must also be people who think deeply and attentively about the interests of the country and who, we hope, will assert themselves by creating a democratic party. I suspect that this is a smaller group. There is still room for a truly democratic party in the Romanian spectrum; such a party that won't take 100 years, like us, to prove democracy, but it will still need five to ten years!

[Mezdrea] In a nutshell, social democracy is the ideology of the redistribution of the national wealth. I would like to ask you, what is left to distribute in Romania after 45 years of communism?

[Cunescu] No, it's not quite like that. What is important in contemporary democracy, which took several decades to crystalize in its new form, is the fact that it became very close to many European democratic currents once it accepted the mixed economy as a very efficient economy and gave up certain principles like the nationalization of most of the means of production—that is evidently a very modern concept. The great advantage of social democracy is that it assimilates all of humanity's actions that are efficient and that contribute to freedom and to the full assertion of the individual. Because as social-democrats we are interested in ensuring that the individual enjoys dignified living conditions in all respects: culture, economic situation, and political situation. Modern democracy is a life style and a style of government. And even if it is not in power, it wields great influence in all the countries even on the parties in power which in half a century have succeeded in making a great contribution to raising the living standard and the level of social life in the West.

[Mezdrea] As is known, much of the national wealth belonged to the Communist Party, although exactly how much is not known. What is the SPD doing to recover this enormous wealth?

[Cunescu] We haven't done anything, although a small portion, which is nothing compared to the gigantic fortune of the communist party, we also suffered losses when we were outlawed; at the time we also lost our assets, but there is no comparison to the huge fortune of the Communist Party. We haven't done anything to recover it. Perhaps in the future. This can only be done

under a legislation dealing with the status of economic assets. So far we don't have such legislation.

[Mezdrea] How do you explain the failure of the historical parties at the elections?

[Cunescu] The historical parties won about one third of the votes they expected to win. It's very simple: The revolution was seized from the very first day, and since then everything possible was done to destroy the political opposition by spreading fear in every form among the people, blocking every form of electoral propaganda, and subjecting the people to the most horrible disinformation. All this evidently had an effect on a population that for 50 years, that is two generations, had known no democracy and had lost the habit and practice of democracy. I will repeat what I said on other occasions, namely that before the war we had a democratic governemnt—imperfect, but democratic—a democratic constitution, and alternate governments. But the last two generations have seen none of that. And thus, in the situation and atmosphere fostered by the Front, the first outcome was that great electoral victory, won in we all know what conditions, so we don't need to discuss them anymore. However, it seems to have been a fatal victory.

[Mezdrea] If that's the situation, and we all know that it is, and without proposing any simplistic or extreme method, how can one nevertheless discuss, negotiate, or suggest a dialogue with people guilty of so much?

[Cunescu] Fortunately, the one who came to see me was not that guilty...

[Mezdrea] But he belongs to the same party and in such cases the responsibility is not assigned individually...

[Cunescu] He belongs to the same party. I don't want to grade politicians, but in itself the fact that he was not a Communist Party member meant something to me. And there must always be discussions and dialogue, because had dialogue been cultivated we wouldn't have landed in the dire straits in which the country is now. So dialogue is a must and must be conducted as a genuine dialogue, as an exchange of ideas. I also want to add that one of the requirements of contemporary social democracy is to always try to understand the interests of the political opponents, too.

[Mezdrea] And the call for dialogue and tolerance must come from the opposition, the mocked and humiliated opposition; now the opposition is also expected to teach the ones in government the virtues of dialogue.

[Cunescu] That's right, we must understand our political opponent, but we must never relinquish the principle of truth, we must be uncompromising on that. However, when there exists a social interest, the respective problem must be debated. Dialogue is the essence of honesty and political life must be honest and rest on truth.

## * 'Long Silence' of Republican Party Explained

*91BA0072A Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER in Romanian 25 Oct 90 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Republican Party Chairman Ion Manzatu by Iulian Constandache; place and date not given]

[Text] [Constandache] Professor Manzatu, we noticed a long silence during which you were absent from or didn't participate in the political life. Should we think of it as a vacation?

[Manzatu] There was no vacation but a series of unexpected events, circumstances, and situations that contributed to better clarifying my attitude toward the current political spectrum, the Republican Party, and especially toward my former colleagues in the PNUC [Provisional National Unity Council]. I want to stress that I was profoundly disappointed and that I feel enormous regret, after being chairman of the PNUC for four months. Because of certain appearances I was accused of supporting the actions of the NSF [National Salvation Front] as the dominant political force and especially its prominent leaders, Messrs. Ion Iliescu, Petre Roman, N.S. Dumitru, and others. This is my first statement in this connection and I want to make it clear that it was not a matter of supporting a certain person or political line; I was interested in and I sought means and solutions—according to my lights—apt to hasten Romania's overcoming the disastrous situation in which it was and still is and to allow us to eliminate the possible obstacles that obstruct our opening to Europe and to the world. Unfortunately, certain NSF leaders had and still have other intentions; they didn't play fair; they used the PNUC members by involving them in what appeared to be a sincere dialogue, but which was actually designed to serve their own purposes.

[Constandache] What seemed insincere and disloyal to you?

[Manzatu] I'll give you an example: This is the first time I'm publicly stating that in spite of the frankness and openness with which I cooperated with all the political groups and personalities belonging to the PNUC, I later learned that for almost three months I was followed, shadowed, and watched by the secret service that the PNUC Executive Bureau maintained to defend national interests, not to resume the practices of the Communist Securitate. I was probably not the only target and I suspect that my phone calls and all my moves continue to be watched. This means that under a pretense of reciprocity, the representatives of the ruling party are far from being frank and honest. And another thing. Immediately after the elections, the same prominent NSF representatives offered me the tempting position of ambassador to UNESCO. I declined, because I realized that the offer was designed to remove me from the country because I had probably become inconvenient. In any case I would not have let myself be dragged in any direction opposed to my principles and interests and those of my supporters. I also want to point out, in order

to clarify my several months of silence, that under the dictatorship I was viewed as an undesirable. Now the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service], which seems to have adopted the repressive practices of the securitate, has me filed under 'absolutely undesirable.'

[Constandache] Nevertheless, after the role and position you had in the PNUC, where you stood out as a prominent political personality and enjoyed popularity, how come you didn't manage to secure a seat in Parliament in the elections?

[Manzatu] There are certain reasons for that. First of all, the Republican Party didn't start out with the idea that it may become part of the governing power. Our purpose was to help, to prevent the restoration of Communist organizations, to eliminate incompetent factors, and to support economic, political, and social programs apt to help Romania overcome the crisis. We did not focus on securing positions and jobs, but on supporting actions and directions. For that reason the Republican Party hesitated to formulate an electoral campaign calculated to make it known to the people. The second mistake was our alliance with the Party of Romanians' National Unity (the former AUR), whose leadership was not honest. They always put themselves first on our common lists, with one exception, and our propaganda was consistently boycotted, as happened to myself in Brasov. Although we had many supporters and sympathizers, many votes went elsewhere, I don't know to whom. But this is already history. Now the Republican Party has regrouped, has eliminated the disrupting factors, and has redefined its position as a center-right party. In order to eliminate any possible confusion, our position signals the fact that we will not permit any return to the past or to elements inherited from the communist system, which we wholeheartedly hope has been forever demolished.

[Constandache] You have anticipated my next question somewhat. We understand that the Republican Party has reorganized and adopted a firm political line and position. Would you mind giving us a few more details?

[Manzatu] The Republican Party began its reorganization by electing section leaders; for this purpose it identified competent personalities with recognized moral qualities who wanted to become involved and who have already revitalized the party's activities. Our revised statute and platform-program lend us a modern, logical, and flexible structure. Similarly, we are in the process of unifying all the Republican forces. A first step in that direction was the convention with the National Republican Party of Cluj, which is very popular in Transylvania. We also have close contacts with the Republican Union, and the unification of all the Republicans is close at hand. I want to add that we are in a dialogue with center-right and right-wing parties and have eliminated some of our reservations about participating in antitotalitarian fora. The Republican Party will actively participate in all the actions of those opposition bodies. I think that the time has come to put aside all personal ambitions and demands and to understand that the situation that occurred in 1946-47 must not be repeated, especially since the Russian tanks are no longer here.

[Constandache] Professor Manzatu, I have carefully examined the new platform-program of the Republican Party and I noticed a very great similarity to social-democracy. I know that republicanism is not a doctrine, just a movement. Nevertheless, I thought it had different views...

[Manzatu] There is nothing new in the fact that the programs of the parties that emerged after December 1989 contain about the same essential ideas on rescuing the economy and devising new equilibrium structures for Romania's social and political life. The Republican Party's program did not seek a doctrine, but took shape in keeping with the country's urgent and long-term needs. We tackled connected issues and focused on practical requirements. In this there may be social-democratic nuances. I am quite familiar with the nordic countries and their systems; we admire their successes, but we didn't start out from the same basis. Our model is a synthesis of British conservatism for stability, American republicanism for action, and German Christian democracy for depth. Naturally, these systems are not diametrically opposed, but share many common elements. Our objective is precise: We want a parliamentary republic with clear-cut separation of powers, complete freedom for all solutions, and genuine and well understood democracy—including free press, radio, and television to represent the fourth estate in the state of law.

[Constandache] Such a complex approach imparts you a firm stand on the governmental program and its implementation.

[Manzatu] I want to suggest a comparison. What is happening is like a physician who wants to treat a patient without examining him. The NSF stated that the Communist economy that we inherited was a disaster. Fine. But what has been done to find out what was wrong with it, to thoroughly examine and diagnose the industry, agriculture, services, and social structures? During discussions at the PNUC delegates used to say: Why don't you begin at the beginning? Why don't you call in specialists, experts, engineers to determine the technological situation, equipment, organization, production preparations, and the mutual links among industrial units? The treatment can come after that. The government, however, hammered out an economic alternative and suggested valid principles. But you can see to what they are being applied and with what means. For example, one vitally important area that was not included in the governmental program is R&D. In other words, find your own! We have more than 250,000 cadres, with extraordinary potential, who are now in disarray. Thousands of specialists are leaving. They are not leaving in order to earn a few dollars extra, but because they once again feel useless here. I am quite familiar with the situation from the inside. We are losing

irreplaceable assets. We keep talking about foreign investment. I'm all for it, but who should carry out the projects? Who will be our talents, who will help us master know-how, engineering, and management? This is only one alarming example from a long list I could cite. The essential factor that the government program has missed is the following: The program generally deals with the society but has lost sight of people as individuals. Once again we are repeating the past. Once again we fear that the individual may come out of his uniformity and get rich. We, on the other hand, believe that a rich country should have rich people.

[Constandache] Professor Manzatu, you were on the phone while I was waiting. I wouldn't want to commit any indiscretion, but I heard you say: "We want to change the face of the intelligentsia and of the youth!" How?

[Manzatu] From my own experience I have realized that the future of the world lies with the grey matter. Intelligence can be developed and expanded only by educating people. The future will belong to the nations with a high level of intellectuality, because even the most lowly craft will require special skills. Look at Japan: Automation has eliminated hundreds of thousands of jobs. But they invested in people. The people were regrouped and taught how to think and how to produce results that require brains. This is what a high level of intellectuality means. Unfortunately, the tense atmosphere in our country, which culminated in the June events, created an anti-intellectual phobia. Because of disappointments and of the fear that the freedom of creation will once again be restricted, the intellectuals continue to sit on the fences. It is our duty to boost their morale. We want to draw them in, especially the young people, university and highschool students, and to pay them careful attention. We must send them off to school and ensure that they are not afraid of challenges and that they come back to build their country. Once again, I'm not saying anything new. We are one of the nations with the highest intelligence quotient. By creating a superior educational system we will secure cadres for all the fields vital for Romania's prosperity. I want to stress that our primary investment must be in people and education, in their competence and skills. This is the most profitable investment. All the equipment, technologies, and programs are no good if there is no one to develop them. I want to add that we attach primary attention to children. Both to disadvantaged children, whose fate we can do something to improve, and to particularly gifted ones, whom I would like to invite to contact the Ecological University or the Television with a view to putting together special groups. We hope to get a good response to this appeal through your newspaper, which I appreciate.

[Constandache] Thank you.

## Secret Police Democratization Committee Criticized

*AU1911193690 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 14 Nov 90 pp 1, 2*

[Al. Gavrilescu article: "The Danger of Political Recklessness"]

[Excerpts] One cannot ignore the catastrophic effects and proportions of the current political play for power, which is increasingly being displayed now, on the eve of the commemoration of the bloody December 1989. The crusaders of the street, dressed in revolutionary costumes, want lots of blood, so that the country can end up in ruin and social disintegration, and the monopoly of extremism can become the symbol of that kind of state in which constitutional freedoms will never bear fruit. Offended and pushed to the periphery by the almost brutal failure of 20 May, a part of the opposition has perseveringly sought to acquire a structure which can legitimize its activity of reconquering the electorate, by maneuvering the leanings of peripheral groupings obsessed by arbitrariness and totalitarianism further to the right. The recurrence of this style, derived from very sad historical experiences on which the contemporary political science has passed its verdict—Edward Shils had warned as far back as 1956 that "those who flirt with extremism, end up becoming its victims"—accentuate the paranoiac ambiguities of those who resort to all sorts of means to motivate their aggressive and neurotic goals. [passage omitted]

The abusive and forceful violation of democratic norms, sponsored by customers disposed to go to war for gaining power, endanger public freedoms. The recent "Secret Committee for the Democratization of the Police" created in Timisoara and other 20 counties—a news item taken over from the Timisoara Society's publication "TIMISOARA"—clearly warns that: "The police are not obliged to violently repress protest demonstrations against an incompetent government...and will support the people in the exceptional circumstances that now appear to be imminent."

There is no doubt that the danger of political recklessness is a reality. Protests have become ever more threatening, ultimatum-like, and most serious. Such organized aggressions against social peace are no encouragement for the government in the implementation of reform—on which our future existence depends—which is criticized by the opposition as being two slow or more liberal than the liberals. The premeditated planning of destabilizing activities, with the sinister complicity of extremism, and the campaign of ethnic and religious intrigues in Ardeal can isolate and defeat Romania. Seen from this angle, the opposition cannot pretend that it does not know the price of such actions. The rest is just political subtlety.

## Ceausescu's Brother-in-Law Agachi Goes on Trial

*AU1911210690 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1819 GMT 19 Nov 90*

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 19/11/1990—The Prosecutor's Office of Bucharest's Fifth District sent Neculai Agachi—brother-in-law to the ex-dictator—to trial on the charge of embezzlement with particularly grave consequences.

The defendant, who worked for the Bucharest "Central" foodstuffs enterprise, by substituting labels that attested low or medium quality with labels attesting superior quality, managed to create and appropriate a financial surplus of 10,420,326 lei over 1985-1989.

The first term for the trial was set for November 23, 1990.

## * Government Statement on Freedom of Expression

*91BA0056A Bucharest AZI in Romanian 21 Oct 90 pp 1, 2*

["Government Communique"]

[Text] In connection with the articles and statements aired in certain dailies and on television concerning the alleged tendency of the state administration to control the mass media, thus restricting its freedom of expression, the government's Press Office is empowered to make the following clarifications:

1. Romania's Government, faithful to its program-platform calling for the establishment of a real democracy and for building a state of law, hereby reaffirms that it recognizes and supports the legitimacy of the press as the expression of the critical and ethical consciousness of the public, without any interference from the executive power.

Along the same line, the government recognizes and respects the right of the press to independence and diverging opinions, to diversity and response, and to confrontations of views, in the implementation and strict observance of basic human rights.

2. In this context, the fact that the Free Press Publishing House, the successor of the former Scinteia Publishing House, was changed from a state institution to a private and autonomous company under the name the National Publishing House demonstrates precisely the fact that the government intends to ensure the independence of the mass media in accordance with the requirements of a market economy. The above-mentioned change was effected on the basis of Law No. 15/1990 on the reorganization of state economic units into autonomous companies and commercial associations; this kind of decision, which awarded decisionmaking and operational autonomy to a former state publishing house, thus eliminating any possibility of government interference, can certainly not be interpreted as an antidemocratic act, but on the contrary, as an act of liberalization.

Like in the case of other former state publishing houses, consideration is now being given to organizing the National Publishing House as a commercial firm.

In consequence thereof, the National Publishing House is an autonomous legal entity for whose actions the government cannot be held responsible.

3. In accordance with the same principle of the freedom of expression, a series of newspapers were established simultaneously and after the outbreak of the Revolution, while others continued to appear as the successors of certain prior publications under the same name or under new names.

To the extent that it can be proven that a group of journalists came to a civil agreement among themselves under which they associated for the purpose of bringing out a new newspaper entitled TINERETUL LIBER, the government has no choice but to recognize the existence of this civil association, whose merit consists of having brought the name of the respective newspaper to public attention. Consequently, it is up to the State Office for Inventions and Trademarks to decide whether a commercial name or trademark not registered as such but popularized by prolonged prior use by another entity, can now be registered by a different entity. The government, however, has no say in this procedure.

As for the assets of TINERETUL LIBER and other publications that are in the same situation, the question will be resolved directly with the National Publishing House in the case that the economic administration of the newspapers in question was handled by that publishing house. However, the administrative relationship between a newspaper and a publisher are not subject to governmental intervention either.

4. In connection with the above, it was a regretable mistake that a certain official engaged in discussions and negotiations which embroiled governmental bodies, i.e., the Mass Information Department, in matters that did not fall under the jurisdiction of the government. The discussions thus held on issues outside the realm of government decision generated ambiguities, creating the false impression that there could be any control of the media by the administration.

5. As for the criticism leveled at the draft Press Bill and the Bill on the Audiovisual Media, we must point out that it is unfounded. Indeed, in keeping with a much older agreement, the government allowed the Associatioin of Romanian Journalists to draft the bill. On the other hand, the audiovisual media bill was drafted by a group of experts who drew on the model of similar laws in West European countries. Since the opinion that the formulas valid for old European democracies may be viewed as antidemocratic by the young Romanian democracy, the government did not pass the draft bill.

Thus, the text criticized on television and in the press was not the text of any document officially issued by the government.

6. Proceeding from the fact that the principles of the independence of the press and the openness of the government are a matter of state policy in a democratic society, the Romanian Government believes that its relations with the press must be subsumed to the public's legitimate interest in receiving correct, complete, and prompt information.

For that purpose, a Public Information Department was established within the Council for Public Reform, Relations, and Information, directly under the deputy prime minister in charge of reform and relations with Parliament. At the same time, the Department for Mass Information and the position of state secretary in charge of that department were repealed already on 18 October 1990. The new form of organization is expected to remove all suspicions and to demonstrate the fact that the government wishes to correctly inform public opinion on its policies and has no intention of manipulating or controlling the mass media.

7. In view of the debates that took place in the past few days on the issue of freedom of expression, the government takes note of and appreciates the position expressed on the Romanian Television by the newsdesk director on the independence of opinion and financial autonomy of the station.

Indeed, financial independence is the guarantee for the operational independence of any company and is the concrete manifestation of the principles jointly shared by the government and the mass media.

Faithful to these principles and in keeping with the position expressed by the Romanian Television, the government will no longer subsidize its programs; the funds earmarked for covering its budget deficits will be used for social welfare programs. We hope that thanks to the quality of its programs, the Romanian Television, which will soon have to compete with private television stations, will be able to secure an increasing number of subscribers, thus being able to handle its deficit, which came to 56 million lei already on 31 August 1990.

At the same time, we believe that the freedom of expression of the television will not extend to irreverent remarks about the government or refusals to broadcast official communiques.

## * President Iliescu's RFE Interview Published

*91BA0057A Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian 16, 17, 18 Oct 90*

[Interview with President Ion Iliescu by Nestor Rates of Radio Free Europe, on 5 October in New York]

**[16 Oct p 3]**

[Text] [Rates] Mr. President, welcome to this broadcast. I want to point out that this is the first time that a Romanian president has given an interview for Radio Free Europe [RFE]; I want to hail this premiere as asignificant event in itself. You are ending your first state visit to the West as head of the Romanian state; please sum up the results for us.

[Iliescu] First of all, good evening and greetings to the RFE staff. This first appearance is not coincidental; it is in line with the opening that marked our arrival in New York. This visit was occasioned by our presence at two major international events. The first was our participation in a summit meeting devoted to children, organized by UNICEF and sponsored by the United Nations, which was attended by more than 70 heads of state. Romania's presence at this event was described as important in view of the attention it got from the many participating heads of state. Not incidentally, at this historic moment marked by a wide opening in international political life, heads of state and government devoted their attention at this event to the children, in other words, to mankind's future. This was the incentive that prompted us to accept the invitation and to mark Romania's presence at this summit discussion on basic issues concerning the protection, development, and education of children.

We conveyed Romania's message—an expression of our gratitude for the feelings of solidarity shown by states and public opinion representatives both in Europe and on other continents and by UNICEF itself, which during this interval very actively supported the endeavors of Romanian society on behalf of children. Thus, the first thing I want to highlight is the success of the summit meeting as demonstrated by such a large number of heads of state, and the opportunity it gave us to have many contacts with heads of European states, neighboring states, Latin American, African, and Asian states, as well as with representatives of the U.S. Administration. We had two first meetings with President Bush, with Secretary of State Baker, with Mr. Scowcroft, other officials, and with the U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, Mr. Pickering, who showed us receptivity and friendliness. Today (5 October—ed. note) I met with Mr. Kissinger; I also met with other prominent figures in public and economic areas and the meetings will continue tomorrow.

The second major event was the 45th UN General Assembly session which, as many heads of state and the secretary general stressed in his introductory report, marked an important point for the world organization and for international life in general. The changes that occurred and continue to occur in East Europe are changing the continent, the entire world, and the climate of international relations. This was also reflected in the discussions held in the General Assembly, which thus marked an important historic moment for the international community. I think that Romania's presence was

also important. This was our first appearance since the December Revolution, after the elections, and after the establishment of the new state institutions, and this was an opportunity to present Romania's voice, positions, and views on the international political arena to the world forum.

[Rates] Indeed, Mr. President, the United Nations provides an ideal stage for a debut in the world diplomatic arena but its bright lights should perhaps not leave in the shadows a less glorious reality, namely the fact that Romania's reputation is at present not among the best in the world and that many governments—especially Western, which are the ones Romania needs most—are profoundly disappointed with the current Romanian realities. What happened? Romania had the world in its pocket, so to speak, on 22 December, only to lose it so quickly and so deplorably. What would you answer those who asked why? What did you tell those with whom you had talks here, in New York, who probably raised these matters?

[Iliescu] The things you are stressing in your description of the situation are no longer entirely applicable. Of course, we, too, are saddened by the image that Romania acquired in the wake of the violent events that took place. But one must understand the specific situation in which political life evolved in Romania after the December events. To say that we had the world in our pocket is a bit much. Of course, immediately after December there was a natural, positive reaction that welcomed the change as such—Ceausescu's overthrow—which was the same in Romania as in the rest of the world. We can say that there were a few days of general and national enthusiasm and of national consensus regarding the overthrow of the old regime and of Ceausescu. But that is what happens after any revolutionary event. That is followed by a settling stage when events, issues, people, positions, and options begin to crystallize. In our case, the option for an open and pluralistic political life was reflected in the emergence of very diverse orientations. The manner in which things developed in Romania was different from all the other East European countries, where the process took longer in time and allowed for a psychological adjustment of the society, something that gave the events a calmer note. Although, as you see, the relative initial calm in those countries is also being followed by very tense moments, as for example in the Soviet Union, where Gorbachev and his generation introduced a note of change in the political life; five years after this opening began to be promoted, they are now confronted by greater tensions than they suspected. Poland began this kind of opening long before that through the Solidarity Movement. They had more time to allow the opening to settle, to mature, and to be prepared, but their fundamental political and economic problems are still today fairly complex and very difficult. Hungary began to seek solutions for the transition to a market economy long ago; it has a solid experience behind it, but its problems are not at all simple and it is facing great political difficulties. Yugoslavia adopted this path long ago, 40 years ago, but its problems are becoming increasingly complicated.

[Rates] But none of these countries suffered for having these difficulties or problems as much as Romania's image did...

[Iliescu] ...what about the situation in Kosovo? So, how shall I say, the specific characteristic of the Romanian process must be understood—how internal tensions led to a profound crisis that hit the Romanian society in all areas: economically, politically, socially, and morally. As I have been saying since the beginning, in December, assuming political responsibilities at a time of crisis involves a great personal risk for those who take such responsibilities upon themselves. The difficulties are still to come, and indeed, in time the problems accumulating in political life increased in complexity. When it became possible to have open confrontations of ideas, they assumed extreme forms, too; there was extremism and violent extremism, too, beginning on 12 January. Let's not talk only of what happened with the miners in June, but of 12 January, 18 February when the government building was ransacked, the ethnic conflict in Tirgu Mures in March, the notes that were heard even during the electoral period, involving even objective factors. This is the profound crisis that Romanian society suffered and still suffers, which we inherited, and which breaks out in such forms. We hoped and still hope that after the elections things would fall into place differently. We were very sorry that only three weeks after the elections we had to go through such outbursts of fanatical violence that even led to attacks on institutions. These were not coincidental matters, things did not happen at random; newspapers were attacked, economic institutions were ransacked, and there were extremely violent attacks on the Police, the Interior Ministry, and the television station. This naturally stirred powerful emotions in our society. The society saw that the institutions that represented the power, how shall I say, for which the people had voted, had opted, were in danger; Parliament was just being convened, and all that caused the majority of the population to worry about these developments. And while that was happening, the bodies of public order showed themselves incapable of ensuring public order. In what country in the world does it happen that a policeman will not react when attacked, or that the Police building is ransacked and it is not capable of defending itself? Would such a thing be acceptable here, in America?

[Rates] Yes, to the authorities.

[Iliescu] Well, of course, everything that happens, if an individual is attacked, the government is held responsible. This of course contributed to weakening the regime and its public order institution, as was only normal. So the version that the government had itself organized this whole matter...

[Rates] But this is not the question; the question is how this movement was suppressed after it had actually ended because it is said that by the 14th, when the miners came, all the attacks were over.

[Iliescu] The miners had started out in the evening of the 13th under the influence of what television had shown was happening on the 13th, the threat to the democratically elected institutions of the country. The miners cannot be manipulated; this whole version that the miners were manipulated, that someone organized them, sent them, called them—it doesn't hold water, only those who don't know this kind of people can believe that they can be manipulated. These are the same people who in 1977 bravely raised up against Ceausescu, and they won't allow themselves to be manipulated by Iliescu or anyone else, to go pell-mell to Bucharest at someone's order.

[Rates] The conclusion from the events of the 13th, 14th, and 15th is that those of the 13th were the work of impassioned people, so to speak, while those of the 14th and 15th were the work of organized groups brought in from the provinces.

[Iliescu] But I'm saying that I did not endorse it; I expressed my disapproval about all the acts of violence, including the violent reaction to the violence, that wasn't what we needed. They didn't do the authorities and the government any good, the acts of violence perpetrated on the 14th and 15th. What I said was that violence always begets violence, extremism begets extremism, and all the extremes feed on each other. This was of course a regrettable occurrence primarily for us, for the government, and for the ones in power.

[Rates] What I meant to say was that the difference was that these groups were brought in by the government; you know what the criticism against you is, that you asked them for help; you greeted the miners when they arrived in Bucharest and you thanked them when they left. You didn't express any regret then, the regret came later, and some say it was for the international reaction to the events. For somebody in the West to see assault squads brought in to do the job of law enforcement and assume functions that only the legitimate forces of order can carry out—check people's identity, arrest people, etc.—all this leads us 40-50 years back to precisely the forces that you hold responsible for this crisis.

[Iliescu] It can lead even farther back, to America itself. To the time when the American society was still in its incipient phase and when citizens' self-defense posses defended themselves in American towns as a legal matter of course.

[Rates] That was 200 years ago.

[Iliescu] Yes, Mr. Rates, but we have a sick society, psychologically affected by the December events; the police were psychologically affected by the fact that they were implicated. The police, or police troops. How do you explain the fact that the police building itself was ransacked and the police did not react? Does anything like that happen in any Western country? Does any American policeman have any complex—we've seen very well how the American police act here, in New York—does he have any complex when faced with violence, does he wait for orders from anyone before taking an extreme measure like opening fire on people? This is precisely what the Romanian police could not and cannot do.

[Rates] Allow me to ask you, in retrospect, do you have any regret about January, February, May, June? If you had known then what you know now, would you have acted differently? In today's interview you spoke about mistakes; you said that at the press conference, too, but you didn't say what the mistake had been.

[Iliescu] Not only mistakes, but weaknesses, too. It is not enough to want to do better, one must be able to. However, during a period marked by so many convulsions mistakes were inevitable; weaknesses turned out to be inevitable, too, precisely because of the characteristics of our development. In point of fact, in December, when I took this upon myself, when I was entrusted with the responsibility of the chairmanship of the new provisional body that was formed then, I said that we were assuming a tough responsibility. Assuming political responsibilities at a time of profound social crisis involves a particular risk. A risk in the most accurate sense of the word. A skillful politician, I said then, does not take such responsibility upon himself; he prefers to remain on the side, to stay in opposition, to criticize, and to accumulate electoral points for the future. We have enough people busy doing this; at the time when the PNUC [Provisional National Unity Council] was formed I volunteered—and I had a few tense moments—to let anyone else have the pleasure of assuming such a responsibility and leading that provisional body; I had no takers, because it's not easy to assume such a responsibility. I took a risk, someone had to; history and the people will judge whether we did right or wrong, will judge us for what we did right and what we did wrong. I am not afraid to answer for everything I have done.

[Rates] And what is your conclusion?

[Iliescu] I don't think that I have intentionally done anything wrong; however, both before and after the provisional period, our actions frequently produced other outcomes than we intended, and that goes for the June events, too; there is no doubt that we bear our share of the responsibility.

**[17 Oct p 3]**

[Rates] With your permission I would like to change the subject a bit... You talked about December. The history of the Revolution is being continuously written and rewritten. Extraordinary confusion has been created in the minds of many. I know that you rejected the idea of a coup d'etat that allegedly supplemented or superimposed itself on the popular Revolution; I don't think that

in the present circumstances there is any point in discussing this with you now. But I would like to ask you—it is a rather personal question, but one of great public interest because it can contribute to elucidating a few problems. What did you personally do between 17-22 December? By the evening of the 17th something had already transpired about Timisoara. We ourselves at RFE had broadcast the first reports. Where were you, what were you doing, whom did you see, what thoughts preoccupied you during those days of the Romanian Revolution, because we must agree that they were all days of revolution, not only 22 December.

[Iliescu] That was a period when I was closely watched. Ever since the spring of 1989 actually, there was not even any attempt to do it discretely, in other words, I was followed on sight, there were always two-three cars ahead of me, I was followed wherever I went; my wife, too; whoever came to see me was also followed when they left. My phone calls were watched; I was working at the SCINTEIA House, at the Technical Publishing House, and I was warned by several people, but I realized myself that I was under permanent scrutiny. So that from a practical viewpoint it was difficult for me to have contact with various people, other than the normal contacts whom I was currently seeing. I myself was careful because it was dangerous and I didn't want to cause trouble for people that might have been in contact with me. So, during that period, during those days, too, I was under permanent watch, I couldn't have done anything; if there had been a plot—I assume this is what you were thinking—organized by people with an organized network, we would have had to be in contact. I didn't have such problems. But I did register the outbreak of the event in Timisoara, especially since I had some work at the printers' in Timisoara and, through a telephone contact, I realized that one couldn't talk to Timisoara anymore. I realized that something fateful was happening. In fact, I had been thinking of just such a thing for a long time. The entire evolution of the crisis of Romanian society was pressing in that direction, in other words, there was no chance that anything similar to what happened in other countries could happen in Romania, so the only way out was an explosion, a social explosion. No one could foretell when it would occur but it was bound to happen and any spark would have sufficed to trigger this process; this had long been clear to me. I realized that Timisoara was going through it, that it was the detonator.

[Rates] I have serious doubts about any plot, so that was not the purpose of my question. But why should you have been watched and followed in those days since, as you said, you were not a party to any plot—if there was one—you didn't sign the letter of the six, and you didn't take any public position; why did they think you were so dangerous?

[Iliescu] How can I put it, I was perhaps the first person publicly criticized in 1971 at the famous ideological meeting, when the open break with Ceausescu occurred, after his tour of Asian countries; on that occasion I was accused of intellectualism, and later I was removed from my party position. This won me the sympathy of many circles of intellectuals and of people who knew me. Then came a long period when I was sent to Timisoara to be 'reeducated.' I worked in Timisoara, I worked in Iasi, and I wasn't a man to hide my thoughts; thus, my very way of thinking and looking at things was a permanent provocation concerning what was happening in the country and how things were handled. Consequently, people perceived me as a potential opponent or a permanent opponent of the regime. The very fact that at one point people were saying that I had known Gorbachev since my youth—I don't even know who could have started such a rumor. Friends? Certain groups? I still don't know, in any case, I never had any relations with Gorbachev.

[Rates] When exactly did you decide, in what circumstances, and in contact with whom did you decide to assume a responsibility—I suppose you didn't from the beginning think of becoming president—to assume a responsibility in Romania?

[Iliescu] It didn't even occur to me, but as a person involved in social and political activities since my early days, I felt a responsibility to be present at the process that was beginning, and that's when my aides at the Technical Publishing House came to tell me what was happening. This was after the afternoon meeting on the 21 December, overnight there had been disturbances, as you know. On the 22d, I was at the office; my colleagues came and told me what had happened; afterwards, when the groups of young people broke into the television station, with Mr. Dinescu and Mr. Caramitru, I immediately left with a group of people from the office.

[Rates] You were at the Publishing House?

[Iliescu] Yes, at the time I was at the Publishing House.

[Rates] You were quoted saying that you came out in your pyjamas.

[Iliescu] Not true, I went directly from the Publishing House to the television station. There I found a general atmosphere of enthusiasm on the one hand, and complete disorientation on the other. There was nothing, nothing structured or organized to provide a semblance of organization. When I came to the television station, the people took me to Studio 4. There I found Caramitru and a number of other people. I was invited to address the crowd; it was my first address to the country, after which we all went to the Central Committee, where there were also lots of people; what happened there is known.

[Rates] But, if I recall correctly, in your first speech on television you said: "I talked on the phone with General Stanculescu and he ordered the troops back to garrison, etc." When did you talk to him on the phone? You must have talked before you appeared on television.

[Iliescu] I don't think that happened then at the television station, I don't recall exactly. That was the first

moment in the afternoon of the 22d when I went to the television station and addressed the country directly and appealed to all those who were capable of contributing to organizing structured activities to meet me at the Central Committee headquarters—that was my first address. Later, a lot of people gathered there. I was later told that there had been all sorts of attempts, that Dascalescu and Verdet had showed up. A gathering was spontaneously formed and we began to think about drafting a proclamation. We began working on it at headquarters but we were interrupted by shooting from inside the building. I talked with the defense minister from there to see who was at the ministry, and we went to the ministry; there we finished the draft, after which we met again at the television station, where that list of people was posted, some of whom were present and other who had been included simply out of respect for what they represented to the Romanian dissidence, including the committee and the well-known proclamation with its 10 points and the options that the FSN [National Salvation Front] was planning.

[Rates] And the Army and the Securitate spontaneously accepted them without any discussion?

[Iliescu] There was no contact as such with anyone representing the Army or the Securitate. The only body was the one that was formed and which included as representatives of the Army two generals who had been present and active in this action: Gen. Stanculescu and Gen. Voinea, who had been recommended by the very people who had been with them.

[Rates] Mr. President, since you are in the possession of new information about the terrorists, would you share them with the listeners? Who were the terrorists? Today at the press conference you were asked whether there had been Palestinians among them. If I am not mistaken, Silviu Brucan recently mentioned 30 Palestinians on several occasions. Even the Bucharest radio and television said that some foreign terrorists had been seized, etc. Today you denied, as you did during all the months since the Revolution, that there had been any Palestinian, Arab, or any foreigner among them. What are the latest reports? Can light be finally shed on this painful question?

[Iliescu] Of course. At the moment I don't think that we have sufficient data to present a complete report. Personally I don't have such data, but history will clarify this one way or another; some facts may remain a mystery forever, others may be clarified in time; I don't know what information Brucan had when he made those statements, he may possibly have more data than I do. The bodies that made all the investigations, talked to all those arrested, and are following the trials will examine everything that has been gathered so far; I personally have not yet had an opportunity to do so, namely to look at all this information and refer to it. The respective bodies will do their duty fully and will process all the material gathered, but for the time being I don't think that we have sufficiently precise data to tell exactly who the gunmen were. The whole situation was so confused, the system of communication was so flawed, it was a veritable war of nerves, of disinformation. At one point we knew that several helicopters had been sighted flying toward Bucharest, but that turned out to have been false, so that are still many unclarified mysteries.

[Rates] In that case, perhaps you can tell me why they cannot be clarified, what's the obstacle?

[Iliescu] Personally I cannot even name those in possession of all these secrets.

[Rates] Today you said in your speech to the General Assembly that you intend to carry out a smooth transition, without convulsions and disturbances, to a market economy. How smooth can such a radical change be, how smooth do you expect it to be?

[Iliescu] This is how I would like it to be. The process, however, is complex. The transition from the rigid structures of a mechanically conducted, administrative-bureaucratic centralized economy to a modern economy based on the laws of market economy that requires a far greater flexibility, the principle of mutual dependencies and components among the economic agents of the society, and self-monitoring and adjustment systems is not an easy process, and that goes for the structures themselves, the economic mechanisms per se, as well as the human factor, which is perhaps the most complex element and which has to assimilate all these new techniques and mechanisms. Many of the old structures are still in place because of people who may be honest, but who have become used to having every decision made for them regarding both their plan as well as their finances and material. Now, however, many of the mechanisms that handled and decided these things have disappeared, so they have to assume responsibilities and take initiatives, and as we are finding out, people have great difficulties adapting to these realities. So the process is complex from all these viewpoints. We hope to clarify all these difficulties that we expect to encounter. A first step along this line is the climate that has been created in Parliament, which is now working on a whole package of laws designed to regulate this process of transition; so the climate in which this parliamentary work is progressing is favorable. Although there are differences and a variety of approaches to these things. However, at the discussions we often hear very reasonable and rational proposals which are then reflected in the bills adopted by Parliament. We think that this climate will improve—it is what we wish and hope will happen. Whether we will succeed or not remains to be seen.

[Rates] Mr. President, why not take this opportunity to explain to our listeners in short what the present difficulties and problems are, why a market economy is needed although it implies "privatization," which probably implies unemployment, which probably implies inflation. Wouldn't you like to take advantage of this opportunity to explain this?

[Iliescu] Certainly; I talked about this during the electoral campaign, too, and in the FSN program with which I ran, namely about the transition to a market economy. At the time it was clear to one and all that this entire process will not be easy at all. First of all because of our tough legacy in the economic area and in people's living conditions; it was clear that we didn't have the means to quickly dispose of these difficulties. That a market economy is a must is something that life has demonstrated. The market economy existed even when it was not recognized as such, because we are living at a time of historical development based on commodities production and on the relationship between commodities and money. The laws of the market economy functioned even in societies based on a centralized economy and even when they were not taken into consideration. The effect of ignoring these laws was precisely what caused the bakruptcy of this economy, and the centralized, rigid management showed itself incapable of meeting the very dynamic requirements of contemporary development raised by the dynamics of technological development and of the massive penetration of science and technology in contemporary economic life. All that these centralized economies have demonstrated was the inability of these rigid structures of centralized leadership to meet the requirements of a modern economy. Structuring the national economy according to the laws specific of a market economy is a very difficult process that requires demolishing the old structures of rigid organization, administration, and management, developing the capacity of all the economic units to adapt to those laws, creating specific structures in the area of production units, financial and banking system, etc., developing the private sector, diversifying the forms of ownership, and the coexistence of a private and a publis sector. Privatization alone is not a solution, that's looking at things too simplistically. Mere privatization does not solve the problems in the developed countries; everywhere there is a private sector and a public sector.

[Rates] Not in America.

[Iliescu] Even in America. There are various forms in America, but in Europe, in Italy, France, England, and other countries, there is this coexistence between a private and a public sector.

**[18 Oct p 3]**

[Rates] Many of the critics of the present administration say that the process of transition to a market economy is going slowly—despite the feverish parliamentary activities of which you spoke—and that one reason for it is that the government is reluctant to assume the risks that a more rapid pace would imply, the risk of inflation and unemployment, of which I didn't hear you talk in your reply to the previous question.

[Iliescu] I hadn't finished everything I had to say, but you're helping me with this question. Some say it's going too fast, others that it's going too slow, you can never satisfy everybody. The truth is that everyone would like Romania's economic difficulties solved as quickly as possible. Realistically speaking, we must hasten the process of establishment of the legislative and legal framework for the action and structure of a market economy. Naturally, some of the criticism may be legitimate, but it must be said that the government is making rather great efforts, because coming out with this package of laws is not a simple matter either, and it requires time to have them discussed in Parliament, because things are not being done mechanically, as was the case in the past. In fact, you see, it is also a matter of a complex; everyone was used to everything being decided at once, by a flourish of the pen, from some center; now, however, we must get used to all the procedures of a democratic regime and of the separation of powers. It is true that we can expect difficulties in the social area; in fact that is the question that concerns us the most. Thus, on the one hand we are obligated to go toward a market economy and to ensure the necessary efficiency in economic and production activities. This will generate convulsions and negative social effects. How well we will manage to maintain the necessary balance and not lose control of inflation is difficult to foresee. Efforts are being made to maintain this balance as far as possible. Similarly, very many units will have trouble keeping their personnel; there will probably be some unemployment—not probably, certainly, because there is already latent unemployment. The measures we took to keep personnel on half time and at half pay are in fact the marks of indirect unemployment.

[Rates] A last question, if you'll allow me. Nicolae Manolescu recently wrote in ROMANIA LITERARA that if what happened and what is happening in Romania follows an elaborate destabilization plan, then the plan belongs to a nationalistic wing of the Securitate, whose mouthpiece is the magazine ROMANIA MARE. You have often talked of the threat of an extreme right: the Iron Guardists. This may or may not be a threat but there exists what could be described as a very visible and noisy nationalist guard, identifiable as such, with all the classical, virulent chauvinistic and antisemitic manifestations, which strangely enough, passionately and often very aggressively supports the FSN and the current regime. What is your attitude toward this extreme end of the political spectrum?

[Iliescu] It cannot be said that it has a close relationship of mutual aid with the FSN. Yes, it is true that there are extremist elements and that there are extremist manifestations in our public life. Personally, I always spoke against any form of extremism, whether it concerns the national question or political confrontations. All the extremes feed on each other, the extreme left on the right and the other way round. In a democratic society these must be minimalized to allow an equilibrium force to assert itself. For our people, who always rejected any form of extremism and did not join in various forms of extremism, I think that the only way is that of equilibrium and of pushing to the fringes all the groups and means of expression of the extremists. I do not in any way approve of either manifestations of nationalism or of escalating the forms of rejection of dialogue. But their disappearance will probably

depend on the maturation of our society; we need more extensive civic and social education, patience, and the strength to listen to other views and to prefer dialogue to monologue. Unfortunately, however, we are all marked by this complex, each one of us seeks to impose his own monologue without listening, without lending an ear to other opinions. We must all educate ourselves in this spirit, this is one of the fundamental elements of promoting a democratic life in our country.

[Rates] I'm afraid the time alotted for this interview is up; I don't know how you feel about it, but for me it passed very quickly; I had a lot more questions that we should have discussed; I want to thank you very much, Mr. President, for this interview, a first for [Radio] Free Europe. Thank you.

### Young Liberals Propose Version of Transition

*AU2011123790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1138 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 20/11/1990—The National Liberal Party (Young Wing) criticizes the government's reform programme "for having attempted a restructuring of the socialist economy without going deep into its foundation, which is state property, preached as "the ownership of the whole people", an economic nonsense which brought us to the brink of catastrophe". In their opinion, privatisation should have preceded price liberalization. As it was thought out, the social cost will be enormous and the effects, doubtful".

The liberals are also critical of the "Cojocaru version" which they label as "of socialist extraction" but which part of the press opposes to the governmental programme which they object to. In their view, Cojocaru's version proclaims the necessity that the national wealth should be distributed cent per cent more or less equally to all the Romanian citizens, ignoring that such an operation, done mechanically, might block the economic mechanisms just because it disregards the stringent need of the drained Romanian economy for an infusion of capital to help it survive.

The young liberals think that the privatisation of the national wealth should be carried out in a combination of all three forms:

a. Wealth distribution to all those who slaved in 45 years of communism to make it,
b. Compensation for and restoration of abusively confiscated, expropriated or nationalized private property against the provisions of Item 8 of the very Constitution of 1948, seeing that such reparations should not generate social inequity.
c. Sell-out of shares from the social capital of the present production units.

The Young Wing of the National Liberal Party are hereby bringing to public knowledge a parliamentary initiative, that is a draft law of privatisation which they intend to submit to public debate.

### * Statement of Bucharest University Solidarity

*91BA0047C Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 14 Oct 90 p 3*

[Unattributed report: "Declaration of Bucharest University Solidarity"]

[Text] After the overthrow of the Communist dictatorship in December 1989, the Romanian people hoped that the totalitarian structures would be completely dismantled and a democratic society would be rebuilt.

For a short while, the first acts of the new power created an illusion of national consensus around the ideas of real political pluralism and elimination of the centralized economy. All the requirements were at hand for our country to join the ranks of civilized nations. Unfortunately, instead of the rebirth expected, today we note that the erosion of Romanian society is spreading, while the moral, political, and economic crisis is deepening. The main causes of this situation seem to be the following:

—Perpetuation of discrepancies between words and deeds, between programs and how they are implemented, and between what is being said inside the country and abroad.

—The obstinate preservation in all the areas of outdated and dysfunctional structures and of incompetent or morally compromised persons implicated in the economic disaster of the country. Animosity among the various segments of the society, discreditation of certain ethnic or professional groups, and systematic vilification of prominent cultural personalities, including many dissidents of the former regime.

—Absence of responsible reaction by the authorities to the major events that recently marked the Romanian society. Absence of honesty, hypocrisy, and a policy of half measures and of disguising the truth on important issues concerning the December rebellion and the entire process of change in which the country subsequently became engaged.

The almost ineluctable conclusion is that the present rulers have not shown the necessary political will to achieve the reforms they promised, and that the country has come to an economic, social, and moral impasse. Once again Romania risks being placed on another developmental track than the other European countries.

Along this line, we are deeply concerned about the present massive emigration, especially of young people, and its potentially catastrophic effects for the country's culture and economy.

Established for the purpose of fulfilling the moral and civic mission that this situation creates for every responsible conscience, the Bucharest University Solidarity Association [BUSA] is aimed at focusing the efforts of the academic and scientific community on promoting a democratic process in Romania.

The university faculty, researchers, students, and other citizens who will join BUSA will act to promote a better understanding of the role of each segment of the society in the process of recopvery of the country, for regaining confidence in our own forces, and for regaining the place in Europe and in the world to which our country is entitled to aspire.

BUSA, which incorporates men of culture and art, professors and researchers, engineers, architects, physicians, and economists representing all the areas of science and culture will attempt to offer models and realistic and efficient practical solutions for the continuation of a strategy of development of the Romanian society. BUSA views the youth as the main force of the country capable of guaranteeing its rebirth, and intends to act to fully awaken the consciousness of the youth.

BUSA supports the Appeal of the University Personnel of Timisoara in the hope of forming a National Alliance, which we view as an important step toward the convergence of all the Romanian democratic forces.

**Steering Committee**

Bucharest University: Lecturer Emil Constantinescu, prorector of the University; Prof. Nicolae Manolescu; Prof. Zoe Petre, dean of the School of History; Prof. Athanasie Trutia, dean of the School of Physics; Prof. Dan Radulescu, department head; Prof. Alexandru Valentin, dean of the School of Philosophy.

Bucharest Polytechnical Institute: Lecturer Petre Gladcov; Lecturer Mihnea Moroianu; Assistant Dan Radu; Serban Vasile, head of projects.

Prof. Victor Rebengiuc, rector of the Theater and Film Academy; Lecturer Mario Smigelschi, dean of the School of Architecture; Prof. Mircea Spataru, rector of the Academy of Art; Prof. Gheorghe Boldur, Academy of Economic Studies; Lecturer Aurel Demian, Technical Military Academy; Prof. Alexandru Popovici, prorector of the Ploiesti Petroleum and Gas Institute; Engineer Ioan Radulescu, director of the Institute of Geology and Geophysics; Dr. Mircea Borcos, Institute of Geology and Geophysics; Engineer Mihail Tranca, Institute of Technological RD for Transportation; Dr. Cecilia Motas, Institute of Biological Sciences; and Dr. Victor Barsan, Institute of Nuclear Physics.

## * Voican-Voiculescu on Signs of Anti-Semitism

*91P20022A Bucharest AZI in Romanian*
*27 Oct 90 pp 1, 3*

[Remarks by Senator Gelo Voican-Voiculescu in the Senate; date not given—first paragraph is AZI introduction]

[Text] In the belief that the discussions in the two chambers of the Romanian Parliament present an interest which often exceeds the limits of these legislative bodies, our newspaper has published and will continue to publish certain remarks of the members of the Senate or the Assembly of Deputies, with the conviction that they represent documents for the present-day history of Romania. The following statements by Senator Gelu Voican-Voiculescu, presented at a recent session of the Senate, fall into this category.

[Voican-Voiculescu] I am asking the government to state what position and what measures it intends to take in regard to the increasing amount of antisemitic propaganda which is appearing, particularly in a certain part of the press.

I am taking this step to protect Romanian public opinion, in time, from the risk of the incorrect accusation of antisemitism, which might be made by generalization. We must react before the echoes of the intensification of this antisemitic campaign affect our entire society, which will underservedly become the object of the disgust of the entire world. It is necessary to keep in mind the image which can be formed about a country, about a government which neglects such a state of affairs. We know that international public opinion is very sensitive to this type of manifestation. Misusing the freedom of the press, the first antisemitic attacks were noted in February 1990, more or less veiled attacks, which appeared in certain newspapers. We might have believed, certainly, that, to a great extent, such manifestations were part of the "arsenal" of an election campaign carried on with a total lack of scruples and of responsibility.

But once the signal was given by the political forces involved in this election campaign, the antisemitic tendencies continued, expanding after the elections. In addition to the insulting articles, the denigrations, insinuations, etc. with direct antisemitic references, the "protocols of Sion"—that notorious fakery which has been called upon ever since the beginning of the in all peak moments of antisemitism—was published once again, in serial form.

Another journal published the serial "The Other Face of Israel," restating the most classic antisemitic leitmotifs.

Some publications resort to the perfidious tactic of denying the antisemitism, while practicising antisemitism in a more unrestrained manner under the protection of this denial. Others use the term "jidan" [yid, or kike], in plant terms, as often as possible.

With the daily infiltration, issue after issue, of the insidious poison of racial hatred, the results show the seriousness of this escalation which is taking place before our eyes. Some things are downright alarming: the attack on the Oradea synagogue; the desecration of the Jewish cemetery in Tirgu Mures; numerous instances of graffiti in some cities.

What have the government and its organs of local administration done to remove from the walls of some Brasov buildings slogans such as: "Down With the 'Jidani' in the Government," "Once Again, The 'Jidani'

Are Leading Us," written with large letters? The indifference to such inscriptions which have been there since 31 August 1990 is also alarming.

Since the Jewish community living in Romania today is smaller, with a high average age level, the reappearance of antisemitism is only a pretext, aiming to disturb people in a society which has been so greatly traumatized after 45 years of communist dictatorship.

Should we wait until the old people in our small Jewish community feel the signs of discrimination as a result of the influence of antisemitic propaganda on the public at large?

Should we wait until the spillover from the general dissatisfaction has its repercussions directly on the few Jews who live among us before we understand the seriousness of the danger to which we are exposing ourselves?

The reappearance of antisemitism is all the more dangerous since it is taking place on a receptive terrain, addressing itself to generations which are ignorant of the atrocities which were the results of such manifestations. For today's youth in Romania, the Holocaust is an abstract concept.

Any resumption and relaunching of antisemitism is a truly criminal action at this time when we know that the inferno of the concentration camp, the monstrous extermination—in a word, the entire Holocaust—are all the result of antisemitic campaigns begun in the same manner and tolerated with the same irresponsible indifference.

Today we know where such propaganda, initiated in the foul pages of some "chauvinistic" newspapers, leads.

Are new victims from among the eternal "scapegoats" necessary so that suitable measures will be taken?

Bordering on antisemitism without Jews, such as in Poland, the current antisemitic diversion, promoted in a provocational manner by a certain irresponsible press, which misuses freedom of expression, creates tension and disorder, which are so damaging to our life in society.

The danger of the phenomen which it brings into discussion affects the fate not only of the Jewish community, which is small in today's Romania, but also of the entire democratic society which is being built in our country.

As history has shown us, it is only one step from antisemitism without Jews to the most serious forms of destabilizing and disturbing law and order. The disturbances which began with antisemitism concluded by involving the entire society in an unimaginable nightmare.

It is a sad lesson which Romania and Europe, in particular, experienced as in a nightmare during Hitler's time. As we have seen, the black death, which, initially, seemed to be affecting only Jews, ultimately affected all humanity. Millions and millions of dead represented the cost of the blindness of politicians who were incapable of evaluating the long battle which began with antisemitism.

Even now, at present, the whole world is anxiously following the events in the Gulf where another champion of war against the Jews is proving to be capable of endangering the peace and order of the entire civilized world. For years, Saddam Husayn has been encouraged to arm himself, in the belief that the only victim he would aim for would be Israel; now the results of this foolish tolerance are returning like a boomerang against the very ones who supported him. This is at the price of a threat to our peace and quiet and the peace and quiet of all.

I am not using any forced analogies. This is a paradigm of the most uncontrollable forms of destabilization which threaten a third world war.

In bringing this problem to your attention, I have in mind not only the future fate of the members of the Jewish community in Romania. But also, to an equal extent, the stability and order of the entire Romanian society.

Also, we must not allow the image of Romania in the world, the way in which our democratization process will be judged, to be shadowed by this proliferation of antisemitic propaganda, brought by an irresponsible press. In order to execute a vigorous prophylaxis against the hideous scourge of antisemitism, I appeal to all parties and political groupings to take a firm stand against this evil diversion, which is actually a pretext for poisoning our public atmosphere and destabilizing our social life. More than ever, Romania needs to keep her reputation as a hospitable and civilized country, without persecutions and exclusivism, in which all ethnics coexist in peace and harmony, in the traditional Romanian humanity.

We have the noble duty of defending and maintaining this beautiful image of Romania.

### National Peasants Party Delegation Visits Hungary

*AU1911173390 Bucharest DREPTATEA in Romanian 13 Nov 90 p 1*

[Excerpt] At the invitation of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and its president, Mr. Prime Minister Ioszef Antall, a delegation of our party paid a friendly visit to Hungary on 7, 8, and 9 November. The delegation was made up of Messrs. Corneliu Coposu, Gabriel Tepelea, N. Ionescu-Galbeni, Adrian Marino, Marius Luputiu, Pompei Groza, Costin Borc, M. Barcan, and Horia Luputiu.

The aim of the visit was to intensify relations between the National Peasants (Christian Democratic) Party of Romania and the MDF, to exchange information, and to discuss ways and means to improve Romanian-Hungarian relations in order to achieve fruitful cooperation without harshness.

Because Hungarian Prime Minister Mr. Joszef Antall was sick, the head of the Hungarian side in the talks with

the Romanian delegation was Mr. Sandor Leszak, vice president and acting president of the MDF. The meeting took place in Budapest.

The discussions were attended for the Hungarian side by Minister of Interior Balazs Horvath; Ferenc Kulin, MDF vice president and president of the Committee for Culture of the Hungarian Parliament; Gyorgy Csoti, MDF vice president and president of the Foreign Police Commission; MDF Economic Committee chief Laszlo Maroti; Foreign Policy Committee member Julia Balogh; MDF Presidium member Sandor Csori; Judith Feher of the Minorities Bureau; Gusztav Molnar, government counselor and member of the Foreign Policy Committee; Abel Baszi in charge of minorities affairs; and government counselor Joszef Pataki Balint.

On 7 November and on 8 November the hosts gave a dinner and luncheon in honor of the Romanian delegation which were attended by the MDF leaders. [passage omitted]

### Ministry Statement on Hungarian Minister's Visit

*AU1911155790 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1512 GMT 19 Nov 90*

["Foreign Ministry Spokesman Throws Light on Hungarian Envoy's Mission to Bucharest"—ROMPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 19/11/1990—The Press Department of Romania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent the following communique to ROMPRES for broadcasting:

"In connection with the news published by the Hungarian daily newspaper 'MAGYAR NEMZET' in its Saturday 17 November issue, according to which Imre Szokai, deputy secretary of state at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, handed a written message to President Ion Iliescu from the Hungarian President Arpad Goncz, the spokesman of the Romanian Foreign Ministry is hereby authorised to declare:

"The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses its surprise at the manner in which the Hungarian deputy secretary of state Imre Szokai understood to carry out his mission to Romania, which he visited in the period 15 to 17 November, 1990 to continue the talks started in July this year with the secretary of state of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, Romulus Neagu. On his arrival, Mr. Szokai informed the Romanian authorities he was bringing a message from President Goncz to President Iliescu.

"During his interview with the Romanian Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, on 16 November, the latter informed his guest that he had been empowered by President Iliescu to receive the message on his behalf. Mr. Szokai motivated that he had been commissioned by the Hungarian president to hand the message personally to President Ion Iliescu, because the message contained specific proposals and consequently could hand it over to no one else. For conveyance to somebody else, Mr. Szokai said, he would have needed the authorisation of the Hungarian president whom he said he could not reach, because Hungary's president was visiting South Korea. At the time he said he was ready to stay over in Bucharest until President Iliescu could make himself available for no more than ten minutes to receive him and the message.

"Under the circumstances, in spite of a very tight schedule, President Iliescu, accepting the proposal made by the Romanian foreign minister, squeezed in the reception of the Hungarian envoy in the evening of 16 November.

"This revealed that Mr. Szokai had no message to relay to the Romanian president from his Hungarian counterpart and that he had misled the Romanian foreign minister. In fact, Mr. Szokai verbally conveyed certain proposals which in no way justified a top level reception, while they could only too well be transmitted by ordinary diplomatic channels.

"Such manners are against the elementary code of procedures among diplomats, against the good faith that should prevail in diplomatic negotiations.

"During his reception by President Ion Iliescu, the Hungarian dignitary conveyed, by word of mouth, on behalf of Hungary's President Arpad Goncz, the proposal for a Romanian-Hungarian top level meeting at Timisoara on 17 December 1990. The Romanian side found the date inconvenient and suggested that the two presidents could agree on a date mutually acceptable during an exchange of views that could be arranged for 9th December, when they were both supposed to attend the conference in Budapest of the Warsaw Pact Consulting Political Committee. The Romanian president also came up with the idea that talks could be held on the very date of the conference, during the latter half of the day.

"The Romanian president particularly insisted that during the meeting, the sides should give up matter-of-fact, old-style approaches and that the talks should be exclusively focused on substantive issues in the Romanian-Hungarian relations, on finding the essential lines of these relations."

### Iliescu Views Hungarian Relations as 'Important'

*LD1911115490 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1100 GMT 19 Nov 90*

[Text] Romanian President Iliescu, who is among those attending the Paris summit, said prior to his departure that he considers the close cooperation of the countries in the Danube Basin important. Shortly before that he signaled to Hungarian diplomacy that he still does not know when the planned meeting of [Romanian and Hungarian] heads of state will be possible. It is also a fact

for the time being on account of the Romanian stance that there is no question of reopening the Hungarian Consulate in Cluj.

## * Minister Comments on Trade With USSR

### * 6 Billion Ruble Annual Trade

*91BA0020A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 3 Oct 90 pp 1, 5*

[Interview with Anton Vatasescu by Ion Teodor; place and date not given—first paragraph is ADVARUL introduction]

[Text] The agreement for a meeting of chairman on the Romanian-Soviet Intergovernmental Committee on Economic and Technical-Scientific Collaboration was signed in Moscow last week. A number of problems of the greatest importance for trade exchanges and methods of payment between the two countries were discussed on that occasion, on an entirely new basis compared with the systems already in use. In view of these considerations, we asked Mr. Anton Vatasescu, minister in charge of industrial and trade activity and chairman of the Romanian delegation on the committee, for some explanations.

[Teodor] Mr. Minister, first please give us a more general estimate of the context in which this meeting took place.

[Vatasescu] I would mention from the start that in the last few months Romania has sustained three very serious blows, all three in the energy field, with serious effects upon its national economic development. On the one hand I am referring to the 40 percent decline in the domestic output of coal, the 20 percent one in that of natural gases, and the 12-13 percent one in that of petroleum. These declines cannot be attributed to exhausted resources, as some are trying to explain them now, but are due to lowered labor productivity as in the other industrial sectors as well. On the other hand, through no fault of ours this time events have taken place in the Gulf that are to cost us, by raising the price of petroleum, about $500 million a quarter or $2 billion a year, for which our unretooled industry and weak agriculture as it is now cannot compensate. Finally, and now I come to the third blow, the declining outputs of all our industrial sectors has placed us in the alarming position of being unable to meet our contractual export obligations, with all the consequences of that.

[Teodor] Can you tell us how important economic exchanges with the Soviet Union are to Romania, so that we may understand those consequences?

[Vatasescu] It is good that you asked me that question because I would like to explain the matters as accurately as possible. I have heard talk in the city to the effect that we are no longer exporting to the Soviet Union. Is such a thing possible? Deliveries from the USSR account for about 10 percent of our electric power consumption, 20 percent of our petroleum consumption, and about 30 percent of our natural gas requirement. Annually, Romania exports goods worth about 3 billion rubles to the USSR and imports products also worth about 3 billion rubles. I stress the point that we are importing products vital to our national economy, such as crude oil, natural gases, electric power, cotton, asbestos, iron ore, pulp, newsprint etc. Under these circumstances the consequences of exports reduced clearly for no particular reason except declining production are truly alarming. Accordingly we concluded last year with a surplus of 230 million rubles and by 1 September we had a deficit of 360 million rubles, so that our Soviet partner started to warn us, logically enough, that he will reduce his deliveries of petroleum and natural gases. And while you can buy electric power and petroleum elsewhere when you have much money, which we do not, we have no source of natural gases. Therefore these warnings from the Soviets, combined with our nondeliveries, are threatening the state of the fourth quarter very seriously.

[Teodor] We understand you had no easy mission in Moscow.

[Vatasescu] By no means easy. Actually we had two main objectives, to explain the state of the deliveries in the fourth quarter and, secondly, to see how to approach 1991 in the context of the new mechanism of trade relations to go into effect in the Soviet Union as of 1 January, which will very greatly affect us. We did have a general clearing, that is a certain exchange of goods, agreements for crude oil, where we have been about 30 million rubles in arrears. But as of 1 January 1991 we will no longer have a general clearing and payments will have to be made in freely convertible currency. To be sure we agree in principle with this system, which is characteristic of a market economy, but in practice its application will present a great many problems, especially because the balances, or debts, that we will have at the end of the year will also be converted into dollars. Yet we must realize that there is no other solution. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Bulgaria have already signed this accord. We have been unable to so far and we intend to sign it on 15 October. We will be unable to make agreements without this accord and without agreements we will be unable to conclude contracts for 1991. Of course we reviewed the two parties' positions on the visit to Moscow, that is we proposed to proceed with a governmental clearing in terms of dollars for 1991, but not through actual payments in convertible currency for each contract because we do not have the liquidity to make the payments. Because of their nature we dispatch our goods quarterly, let us say, but payments for gases are invoiced monthly. The Soviet partner did not agree to this proposal because the economic agencies are no longer financing it either and therefore the partner does not want to credit those exchanges. Another problem is settling the arrears we will have on 31 December. We insisted on being permitted to honor the overdue contracts from this year throughout 1991. The Soviet partner reluctantly agreed only to the first quarter of next year for honoring the overdue contracts.

[Teodor] The prospects do not look very encouraging, and so please tell us how you evaluate the result of the discussions that were held.

[Vatasescu] If I tell you that I came back more optimistic than I was when I left I think I will have said it all, although we are still going to renegotiate some of the problems that are now being discussed. But I am more optimistic because I realized that our products are valuable and essential to our Soviet partner and expected by him. I would just like to mention some of the products we are exporting to the USSR because I have also heard many discussions of that subject. Right after 23 December we announced that we would no longer export food products, and so we are not discussing them any more, but we have great arrears in many industrial products such as drilling rods, petroleum equipment, spare parts, pumping units, industrial fittings, "Aversa" pumps, tractors, excavators, cement, touring cars, machine tools, gondola freight cars and those for bread grains, chemical equipment, engines and many others. What then is to be done? We have agreed to try to settle the arrears for the fourth quarter and we specified in the signed agreement that the Soviet partner will recoup his arrears toward us. Therefore if we are very sincere and will deliver the goods contracted for we will receive the products specified for the fourth quarter.

[Teodor] And do you believe that the Romanian industrial units will meet their contractual obligations?

[Vatasescu] We have made innumerable analyses and reschedulings of these exports lately, almost like the last regime. We have found that the enterprises are not even honoring the contracts concluded among themselves and are interfering with each other. And then, when we did not accomplish very much with analyses and requests, we decided to make a list of all enterprises and subsuppliers who have not honored the contracts they concluded and to determine with the Department of Electric Power the segments [transele] of the units to be sacrificed, which will no longer receive electric power if that resource will be lacking because of nondelivery of the products specified for export. I do not think it is right to share the little we have with both those who are in earnest and those who are not. But I hope matters will be corrected in the fourth quarter and we will not have to take such measures. It all depends on us and on how the work is done in each industrial unit.

## * Main Products Traded

*91BA0020B Bucharest AZI in Romanian 3 Oct 90 pp 1, 3*

[Report on interview with Anton Vatasescu, minister for industrial and trade activity, by Ileana Coman; place and date not given]

[Text] In the spirit of an auspicious sincerity and a dialogue wherein any question can be asked to get a correct answer unadulterated by half-truths, Mr. Anton Vatasescu, minister for industrial and trade activity, returned to Romania from the proceedings of the Mixed Romanian-Soviet Intergovernmental Committee, where he headed our delegation, and informed us about the questions on the agenda. The special importance of this meeting lies in the significance of the points taken up, which have major direct and extensive effects upon the Romanian economy in this final quarter of the year and for the 1990-91 period as well.

"In the last two to three months, I must tell you, we have sustained some serious blows with a real and powerful impact upon the future of our economy," Mr. Minister Vatasescu adjudged at the very start of the conversation. "I am referring to the decline in the industrial output of coal by 40 percent, in that of gases by 20 percent, and in that of petroleum by 13 percent, and that too not because our resources were exhausted but because of an alarming drop in labor productivity in the respective activities. The effects, aggravated by the events in the gulf, will cost us about $500 million a quarter or $2 billion in price rises alone, and these losses cannot be made up by an industry that is still unretooled and in which no effort is being made and by a weak agriculture."

"The situation is also alarming as to our relations with our Soviet partner. After we started out in 1990 with a favorable balance of 230 million rubles, on 1 September we logged a debit balance of 360 million rubles (We expect it to be 400 million rubles by the end of the year) and we were warned that deliveries of petroleum and gases will be cut drastically.

"Since we set out for the meeting in Moscow on those premises, you will understand why I was rather pessimistic about the results of the conversations and interviews."

[Coman] You said, dear Mr. Minister Vatasescu, that you came back more optimistic. Could you also tell us why?

[Vatasescu] As of 1 January the Soviets are no longer accepting the general clearing terms and are demanding payment in freely convertible currency, which has suddenly put us $400 million in debt. On 15 October, when we too are to conclude an agreement with the USSR (Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Bulgaria have already signed it), we are proposing to proceed in 1991 on the basis of a governmental clearing but not of actual payments because we lack the liquidity with which to pay. It is still possible for us to resort to bank credits, but they would automatically lead to higher prices, or to a technical clearing.

We would have liked to be able to settle the existing arrears throughout 1991, but the Soviet partner agreed to stagger them for the first quarter only. We hope to negotiate this vital point for us on 15 October.

But the reasons for my optimism in spite of the foregoing are based on the fact that the products we export to the USSR are very important to them. They are industrial products, goods in great demand, while our exports to

the Soviet Union amount to 3 million rubles and we import as much. And it is obvious that maintaining such a market, under the present conditions when nothing can be forced in international trade, is vitally important to us. There are accordingly further reasons why it is urgently necessary to maintain very good relations with the Soviet partner, which appears possible, although not without difficulties, because both parties have expressed the desire to keep the volume and structure of the exchanges at last year's level. Our partners took a constructive and receptive attitude throughout the conversations, which was a favorable factor for our joint activity.

[Coman] What are the main products that the Soviet Union delivers to us?

[Vatasescu] I can tell you briefly that 10 percent of our electric power, 20 percent of our petroleum, and 30 percent of our natural gases come from the Soviets. You realize what it would mean if they cut us off from those resources. We could still find electric power, for much money, as well as petroleum, although on difficult financial terms too, but there are no possibilities for gases. Yet our nondeliveries have interfered with Soviet industry, which is prohibited by the terms of some firm contracts. Yet we have had it granted, if we succeed in recovering the arrears in the fourth quarter, that they will try the same thing, which would be entirely desirable. Moreover we are still getting pulp, asbestos, iron ore, and cotton from the Soviets, products important to our economy without which it would be difficult for us to manage. I think the fact should be stressed that though we did not solve our problems in the course of this meeting, no door was closed to us. Resources for products is a highly favorable exchange. Therefore, it all depends on us. We will receive additional energy at the rate of seven to nin kilowatt-hours [as published] a year if we deliver cement and ARO [not further identified], as well as eight to nine cubic meters of gases, 5 million tons of crude oil, and coal (we would need coking and energy coal especially). Soda, electric ranges and linoleum are no longer requested of us, or other products for which we have capacities but which we cannot deliver in assured quantities on time. We are also involved in building civil and industrial capacities with overdue completion dates that have been rescheduled for 1991. Moreover the structure of the Romanian delegation and that of our Soviet partners reflected the problematic complexity central to the conversations.

I would like to mention once more that there are many reasons for us to behave toward the Soviets as loyal and reliable partners. Price terms with them are specific and the exchanges are advantageous both in the nature of the products, as I said, and in geographic proximity. Moreover we have tried to pay for collaboration in achievement of common objectives 85 percent in countertrade and 15 percent in freely convertible currency. The problem is under discussion.

[Coman] Mr. Minister, please formulate a prognosis for the Romanian economy in this final quarter of the year under the circumstances you have pointed out.

[Vatasescu] In consideration of three important factors (loss of our own resources due to the decline in labor productivity, the rise in prices for petroleum due to the uncertainties created by the situation in the gulf, and the need of securing some more heat and electric power and a nutritional standard comparable with that in the third quarter), the balance of trade will show a huge deficit of about $1 billion. We will have to take action in order to create a better image of our country and the credibility necessary for obtaining credits, so that we can still remedy some defects that way. But we can accomplish absolutely nothing unless we work, I am certain of that. I was an enterprise director for 10 years and I worked with capacities, equipment and people we also have today. Being familiar with these things, I maintain that we have the reserves and the potential needed to recover. It is intolerable for us to be poor. Romania is not a poor country. It is an impoverished country.

[Coman] To return to the meetings in Moscow, how would you describe the stage they are going through now?

[Vatasescu] Although the conversations were very restricted and the time for meditation very short, we had a feeling that it may be even more difficult than it is here. It would be desirable not to imitate the Soviet perestroyka stage by stage and to boldly accelerate the reforms in order to secure a healthy economy framework. They are traumatizing and radical operations, but we must bear in mind that no surgery can be performed without pain, and in four to five years we should be able to hold out on the basis of a competitive, adaptable and flexible modern economic organism.

With the Soviets, the proportions are impressive and I think the hesitations are all the greater because there are more problems. In any case it is a very interesting lesson that we should think about. As for us, we are starting a life that we should have for a long time. Unfortunately it was our life itself that was exhausted.

### Army Will Not Prevent Republics' Legal Secession

*LD2011152090 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1323 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Belgrade, 20 Nov (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Army will not prevent republics in their attempt to decide on secession through constitutional and legal means, former chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Armed Forces, now retired General Stevan Mirkovic, said in an interview which will be published in tomorrow's issue of Belgrade's TV NOVOSTI.

However, any violent or willful attempts in this sense must be stopped by force, said Mirkovic, who is also one of the initiators of the yesterday founded League of Communists-Movement for Yugoslavia. The party is believed to be the successor of the dissolved League of Communists of Yugoslavia and its initiative board includes several former and current military officials and also state and communist party leaders.

It is clear to everyone that the Army would not interfere in political conflicts and struggles, but says Gen. Mirkovic, if there was danger of bloodshed in Yugoslavia, the Army would surely not stand by idle. In different parts of the country there have been attempts at creating armed formations, national armies. Whoever has an army, also intends to use it, and this is a danger for the country wherein lies the role of the Army, believes Gen. Mirkovic.

Gen. Mirkovic does not underestimate the danger of civil war—"We were very close to it in Croatia this summer", he says and notes that the most warlike have done well to withdraw.

"I believe that the Army's stand has contributed to this", he set out. As regards the army, Serbs dominates the national structure, especially the commanding personnel, he stated, because this reflects the country's national structure. However, "in relations within the Army and the Army's attitude toward society, there is not a shred of Serbian nationalism felt,", he added.

Asked was the time ripe for a civilian to assume the post of defense minister, Gen. Mirkovic replied that the reasons against this still prevailed.

### Solidarnost Holds Belgrade Antigovernment Rally

*LD2011212390 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1946 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Belgrade, 20 Nov (TANJUG)—Solidarnost (Solidarity), an association for assistance to the Yugoslav Province of Kosovo, today organized an antigovernment rally in Belgrade, managing to attract 150 of the 1.7 million Belgraders.

The participants in the rally chanted "Down with the (Yugoslav) Government," with an occasional slogan against Serbia's ruling communists, who have recently joined forces with the Serbian Socialist Alliance.

A week ago, Solidarnost held a similar rally in the same place, outside the Yugoslav Government building, and on that occasion managed to attract one hundred people.

Just as last week, Vice-President of Solidarnost Jovan Glamocanin accused Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic of "contriving a huge anti-Serbian plot." He described Markovic as another Tito (the late Yugoslav President Josip Broz, who had ruled the country for many years), "professing a Yugoslav orientation in order to divide the Serbian people."

### Comparison of Markovic's 15 Nov Assembly Speech

*AU2011155690*

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian on 16 November on pages 2 and 3 carries "excerpts" of the speech Federal Executive Council President Ante Markovic delivered in the SFRY Assembly on 15 November. The BORBA version has been compared with the Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Serbo-Croatian version published in the 16 November East Europe DAILY REPORT, beginning on page 56, revealing the following variations:

Page 57, column one, first partial paragraph, last sentence reads: We were prepared to face such problems and have prepared a policy and appropriate legal mechanisms needed to lessen their severity. (supplying queried wor and rewording)

Same page, same column, first full paragraph, second sentence reads: Since the changes in the old relations inevitably encroach on the interests of certain structures of society, because the division of power in any society is based on a certain type of relations, it was to be anticipated and expected that there would be resistance of the "political" nature, the strength of which is based on a monopoly such as can only exist in conditions of a monotype ownership structure and whose interests were brought into question by the reform, that they would react and oppose reform. (supplying indistinct words)

Page 66, column one, fifth full paragraph, first sentence, through page 68, column two, second full paragraph, second sentence reads: Domestic and foreign funds should in fact be used to provide support in restructuring the existing enterprises and in creating the ones capable of competing. Without this, there can be no growth in general, and in particular, a qualitative growth which will be reflected in the altered structure of the economy congruent with the demands of the market and international competition. Without such enterprises there can be not only economic growth, but also a rise in salaries and standard of living.

The economic recovery presupposes removal of the loss-making parts of the economy. This requires a reduction in the social product in several sectors. In fact, the

switch to the strict market criteria differentiates between producers, while the elimination of inflation as the redistribution mechanism—considering the current volume of expenditure which cannot be covered by production—must lead to a fall in production, something that is an inevitable transitional phenomenon during a structural turn-around and while new, efficient investments from all sources are being activated. Therefore, in 1991 we reckon that the social product will fall, although not as much as this year, but it will still be sharp.

Even if we assume the optimal combination of all factors, it will still not be less than about 2.5 percent.

On the other hand, the budgetary framework for determining all forms of distribution was chosen with a view to the trimmed social product and the still modest chances for the inflow of foreign capital in the form of credits and loans and direct foreign investments. The overall expenditure will have to be reduced to the existing, objective material levels. This, first of all, demands a tight monetary policy in 1991, which should curb inflation, that is, bring about price stability and preserve the convertibility of the dinar. However, to ease the pressure of the restrictive monetary policy on business activities, it is necessary to ensure all necessary preconditions for an efficient functioning of other macroeconomic policies, especially in the field of public expenditure and wages. Only thus will we secure conditions for carrying out the policy of stable exchange rate, without which it is impossible to avoid an inflationary spiral in general indexation.

To avoid a further drastic fall in productivity, export activity, and the standard of living, and to prevent social tensions, we believe that in 1991 the basis of the day-to-day economic policy should proceed from convertibility of the domestic currency at the fixed 7:1 exchange rate in relation to the Deutsch mark.

To ensure efficiency and productivity in work, and the ability of our enterprises to compete on world markets, it is necessary to ensure that the inflation is no higher than the mentioned 1.5 percent—on average—per month.

To accomplish these goals, we must focus on the economy of supply, which demands the preservation of the already achieved degree of liberalization of our relations with foreign countries and the setting up of the single Yugoslav economic space and the commodity and services markets as a part of the European and world markets, which do not allow and do not acknowledge any fragmentation with countries. Strong foreign currency reserves are backing this policy through their support for exports of goods and services.

A key factor for economic activity and the success of the economic policy in the coming year is the guarantee of funds for investments and the conditions for their efficient use. This prime economic issue is also related to the political sphere, or rather to the stabilization of political conditions in the country.

Accounts show that $2 to $2.5 billion dollars (through financial and commodity credits and joint investment) is the minimum net inflow of capital from abroad necessary to compensate for lost depreciation [izgubljena amortizacija] and encourage the process of structural changes with regard to the lack of domestic capital, particularly in enterprises in the social sector. Without this, the fall in investments in the coming year would amount to more than 10 percent. Therefore, a greater or lesser decline in economic activity, or the social product, in 1991 is directly related to the state of political stability in the country, or the foreign investors' assessment of the degree of the non-commercial risks attached to investment in Yugoslavia, considering that economic prerequisites, including the validity of our reform, have been given high appraisals.

The forthcoming financial rescue of banks will create conditions for them to operate profitably. This will facilitate a cut in bank interest rates which will in turn give rise to propensity to invest. Equally important is the fact that on this basis effective investments, as appropriate for a market economy, will be guaranteed. Equipping the economy to direct funds toward profitable projects—including infrastructure, but primarily small and medium-size businesses, and housing construction—will on the other hand be speeded through the creation of systemic opportunities for enterprises to directly raise funds abroad, which will also have the effect of lowering the interest rates in the country.

Successful investment also implies the creation of appropriate financial structure and a series of adjustments to financial mechanisms. Unlike 1990, when the dominant task has been the formation of a commodity market, the prime task of economic policy in 1991 must be the formation of a money market, a short term securities market, a capital market, as well as to bring closer the cost of capital to real market relations which are allowed and demanded by our economy.

This is conditioned by the financial rescue of our banking and financial system on the basis of a special program compiled by a group of well-known experts from Spain, specializing in these problems, together with a group of experts from the Yugoslav National Bank and the Federal Agency for Securing Deposits and Rescuing Banks. This program has been compiled on the basis of the results, in fact on the basis of the findings of an analysis of the situation in our banking system, prepared by the British consulting firm Coopers Lybrand and Deloitte together with the Yugoslav social accountancy service.

The analysis has shown that doubtful debts and losses in the overall banking system in our country amount to 144 billion dinars which is about $12 billion. Doubtful debts and losses are 3.1 times higher than the starting capital of the banks involved, and account for 57.8 percent of the total deposits, or 35.9 percent of the banks' total assets. Of course, these losses are not evenly distributed among individual banks and individual areas of the country.

Most losses have been located in medium-size and larger *banks, and in three republics.*

The FEC proposes that the rescue of banks should be carried out through the combination of leaner measures with the individual improvement measures, and that this operation should begin forthwith. The objective is to, by eliminating the previously created potentials for incurring losses, protect banks from incurring new losses which would through banks' business operations, under the current conditions burdened by the remains of the present system, increase in geometric progression. The banks financial rescue program will be carried out in a way which implies investment of material resources, changes in the ownership structure of the banks, management changes, and the kind of updating of organizations, management, and work method which will enable them to operate profitably like similar financial institutions in the standard market economies. This means that the present practice of putting money into inadequate enterprises and wasteful projects instead of putting it in good firms and firms with prospects and profitable projects must definitely be stopped. Further regulations concerning the banks and the Yugoslav National Bank will create an institutionalized environment which will ensure the banks' proper conduct.

The linear rescue [linearna sanacija] of banks which to some extent signals a property and income rehabilitation of the banks on the basis of certain criteria, will enable a certain number of banks to overcome difficulties which they are currently experiencing, and to carry out their basic activities normally.

According to first estimates, the linear financial rescue program will cover 31.6 billion dinars or 22 percent of the total 144 billion dinars in potential losses. Individual rescue programs will cover 102 billion dinars which is 70.8 percent of the total extent of potential losses. This will be achieved out through the issue of additional capital [dokapitalizacija] by a federal agency via long term federal bonds and also through the issue of additional capital at the republican and provincial level. The biggest burden of rescuing banks (over 95 percent) will fall on the federation.

In this connection the biggest problem is one particular big bank which will require special rescue measures to avoid liquidation. If this happened an entire republic would perhaps face a financial collapse. This bank alone accounts for approximately one third of the potential losses of our entire banking system, that is, over $4 billion.

It should be noted that the linear rescue program applies to dinar and foreign currency deposits under equal criteria for all banks and is therefore equally fair or unfair for all.

In parallel with the financial rescue of the banking system, a section of the economy will also partly undergo the process of financial rescue. This involves financial and income rescue measures which will be taken within the scope of the bank rescue program, as a result of which *a section of the debtors* will be enabled to regularly repay their debts to the banks.

The National Bank of Yugoslavia and the federal budget will support not only the financial reorganization of banks, but will also make possible—by all the other measures—the formation of a money market and a securities market.

For this reason in 1991, as envisaged and proposed in systemic measures, we must stop approving selective and other loans, because they represent the remains of the old system, and must start carrying out transactions on the open market. Ultimately, this could mean that the users of these funds can count on the same amounts of money, except that this money will now be offered to a healthy and economically sound economy, which also means that banks will purchase valuable securities. Guided by their own interest, banks will service these securities for a sound economy with guaranteed demand and payment.

In this way the movement of money will be redirected. The interest rate policy must stimulate savings. A reduction in the banking costs of the financially rescued banks, and the supply of money which will appear on the open market from the budgetary deposits and from the funds of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, will be accompanied by a significant reduction in interest rates, but they will be several percentage points above inflation to encourage savings by both citizens and enterprises.

Within the framework of the balance of payments, next year we are planning to introduce a right for enterprises and banks to raise loans abroad, providing they can guarantee repayments by themselves. In this respect we should take the first steps toward the integration of our financial and banking systems with the world money market.

In this way the role of the National Bank of Yugoslavia will start to change substantially. Its task will no longer be to support production and reserves, but to ensure the quality of our currency and liquidity in our relations with foreign countries, the gradual opening to and inclusion of the Yugoslav banking and financial system in the world development, and the liquidity of healthy banks and enterprises in the country. To bring this about, the process of privatization of our enterprises, both on the basis of internal and especially on the basis of external shares, will have to be accelerated. This will also accelerate the process of the formation of a capital market.

A healthy economic development and the stabilization tasks for next year require a substantial reduction in public expenditure. Public expenditure, which is still running at a level in excess of 40 percent of the social product, must be reduced to 34 percent. As regards this, and from the point of view of its revenues, the federal budget must not be higher than nor must it burden the social product by more than 9.3 percent. It should be

borne in mind that this budget will acquire new functions, especially in connection with the rescue of the banking system, without which the economy cannot be cured and without which the federal budget cannot take a bigger share in the country's social policy.

We propose that the financial resources for the social program be increased from $150 million to $200 million, plus a foreign debt for an additional $150 million, which is a total of $350 million. This will render expenditure higher than the available [revenues], and for this reason it will be necessary to augment it with funds raised through public borrowing amounting to 1.1 percent of our social product. As can be seen, this increase in the federal budget is not to facilitate the traditional way of spending and to impose a financial burden on the economy, but has the purpose of reviving and developing the economy.

The restrictive fiscal policy must take upon itself the main burden of stabilization which is aimed at reducing the costs of inflationary pressures and enabling the economy to retain sufficient funds for restructuring and further development. A novelty in the budgetary policy is a partial deficit financing of the federal budget, which creates opportunities for the state to take part in the security market dealings. It is possible to reduce tax duties of the economy by this much and encourage the expansion of the securities market. In this way the development and mutual coordination of the monetary and fiscal policies are ensured—all with the aim of expanding the market, especially the money and capital markets.

Personal incomes must have the same purpose in next year's economic policy. They must not exceed the framework which is set by the social product. The policy of personal incomes must motivate greater efficiency and labor productivity. For this reason personal incomes which are the result of the above should not be restricted, except when funds are taken out for capital expenditure, and thus the funds necessary for development. However, all those who operate with losses and who are insolvent cannot pay out the wages above the level which represents a threshold of social tolerance. In enterprises where conditions for the transformation of social capital are created, wages will be regulated by collective agreements.

The basic thing as regards this is that the ownership restructuring of the socially owned enterprises should be ensured and motivated as much as possible, not only in the spheres of services but also in production and banks. In this way, particularly through the stabilization of the political situation, we should attract the greatest possible number of foreign investors who would be active partners in the process of restructuring and privatization that is are currently taking place in our country. This is the right way to use new substantial funds so that they are spent on development, instead of on other expenditure.

As I have already said, we also count on receiving at least $2.5 billion from abroad, which must be channeled as much as possible into encouraging the formation of a new economic structure and of small and medium-size enterprises, so as to make sure that this development trend, which started during the first nine months of this year, can not only be continued but strengthened next year while also providing employment for several hundred thousand new workers. In this way we would facilitate the transformation of the social sector which, in this context, must reduce the number of employed workers.

The additional resources for social programs and social welfare which must be set aside at all levels—in municipalities, republics, provinces, and the federation where, as you have seen, the federation can set an example, will make it possible for the social pressure and a solution of social problems to be taken out of enterprises and transferred to society. (supplying queried and missing indistinct passages and words)

### Arms Smuggling to Nation Said Increasing

*AU2011194990 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Nov 90 p 12*

[S. Petrovic report: "After Weapons, Loads of Ammunition Are Arriving"]

[Text] Maribor, 2 Nov—To judge by everything that has been happening in the last few days on the border crossing at Sentilj, Yugoslavia is rapidly arming itself. Apart from rifles, pistols, and revolvers, quantities of ammunition have been arriving too.

Thus, 150 bullets for Winchester rifles were discovered in the possession of two passengers in a Sibenik-registered car, as well as 50 bullets for a Magnum revolver and 100 bullets for a 9-mm Luger pistol. In the same car, 150 bullets for a Luger pistol were also discovered, as well as a small caliber rifle of the 38 type.

A certain Ali Skender from Srbica was detained here for a short time. Customs officers found he was in possession of three revolvers. Some time later, an "Opel Kadet" from Osijek arrived with two passengers in it. One was found to have 50 bullets for a Luger pistol on him and the other had the same amount of bullets but for a .357 Magnum.

A Mossberg rifle and 500 bullets were discovered under the back seat of a car from Krapina. Experts say that this weapon is used for short-range shooting. The next car was also from Croatia. The passenger from Djurdjevac was trying to smuggle 200 22-mm bullets for a Remington revolver.

In the opinion of the competent people on the border, the most active route at the moment for attempts to smuggle arms is the so-called "Krapina connection," which is most often mentioned in the notes of the indefatigable customs officers.

This is the situation at Sentilj However, there are a dozen such border crossings between our country and

Austria and Italy. One can only guess how many such cases are found there and how much arms and ammunition nevertheless enter the country undiscovered. Every day, smugglers and even terrorists are thinking up new ways to outdo the border guards and avoid discovery in this dangerous and illegal activity.

### Economic Figures Issued for First Nine Months

*AU0911082990 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Oct 90 p 1*

[J. Kesic report: "Falling Production, Rising Expenditure"]

[Text] Belgrade—The basic characteristics of economic trends in Yugoslavia over the first nine months of this year are a reduction in production, a fall in retail and wholesale trade, a slow-down in total trade with foreign countries, and a somewhat quicker rise in prices than was planned. In addition to this, as shown by the latest analysis by the Social Accounting Service of Yugoslavia, expenditure has both nominally and in real terms risen a great deal.

In the first eight months, production registered a fall of 10.4 percent in relation to the same period last year. The greatest fall was in coal processing (28.1 percent), nonmetal production (22.9 percent), and the production of iron ore (19.3 percent). From the point of view of the republics and provinces, the greatest fall in industrial production was in Kosovo (24.2 percent) and the smallest in Bosnia-Hercegovina (6.3 percent).

Retail trade fell by 23.8 percent and wholesale trade by 22 percent.

Up to 24 September, the country's entire exports rose by 11.6 percent, which shows a slowdown in its increase in the last few months. In this context, exports to the convertible currency area rose by 17.2 percent, while those to the clearing area fell by 8.6 percent.

Imports rose by 26.5 percent. A far greater rise was recorded in the import of consumer goods (170.9 percent) and production materials (11.5 percent). Exports covered imports by 81.9 percent and a deficit of $2.2 billion was recorded in this respect.

Prices rose somewhat quicker than this year's economic policy envisaged. Retail prices in September were almost double what they were in December last year and recorded an increase of 93.8 percent. Last month alone, they rose by 7.1 percent.

Aggregate net personal incomes paid in the first eight months amounted to 176.2 billion dinars and were nominally 1.348 percent greater than the same period last year. The greatest increase in paid personal incomes was recorded in the work communities of organs and organizations of sociopolitical communities (28.2 percent), in banks and other financial organizations (14.4 percent), and in the work communities of self-managing interest communities (8.3 percent). The smallest rise of only 0.8 percent was recorded in industry.

The total funds allocated for general and joint expenditure amounted to 253.7 billion dinars and recorded a nominal rise of 1.663 percent. Since this rise is greater than the rise in inflation in the same period, this means that all forms of expenditure have also greatly increased in real terms. Funds for general social needs (budgets) amounted to 95.6 billion dinars and for joint needs (public-sector activities) 158.1 billion dinars. Despite all the stories about alleviating the burden on the economy, 53.4 percent of these funds was used for exactly this.

The total monies in giro accounts and other accounts on the last day of August amounted to 94 billion dinars and were up 8.1 percent on the previous month, which had a favorable effect on liquidity in the economy. However, a lot of money is still being transferred from the economy and put into banks (24.4 percent), the budget of the sociopolitical communities (16.9 percent), and self-managing interest communities (14.9 percent).

Bankruptcy proceedings were filed against 771 legal entities, of which 688 were in industry. They have 455,091 employees and unpaid debts of 7.5 billion dinars.

### Information Commission Endorses Public Media Law

*LD1311234590 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1757 GMT 13 Nov 90*

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 13 Nov (TANJUG)—The law on the public information system deregulates this field of activity, and expresses the spirit of the reforms, the SFRY Assembly Commission for Information concluded today, and endorsed the proposed law on information. [passage omitted]

According to Federal Executive Council [FEC] Secretary for Information Darko Marin, the law abolishes monopoly over public information media, gives equal rights to founders of information media, and introduces competition in this field. It also forbids all bans on distribution of newspapers and magazines, as well as all forms of censorship. At the same time, it strengthens the responsibility of those who are used as sources of information, authors, and chief and responsible editors. [passage omitted]

Marin positively appraised the TANJUG program proposal for the next year. The proposal is conceived with a view to the interest of the entire country, and the federal units, too. During the last year, TANJUG broadcast 530,000 items, and in doing so it joined a league of top world agencies. In the next year TANJUG will introduce new programms aimed at making a profit. The main bearer of this drive will be TANJUG's economic unit. Marin also stressed that TANJUG will, however, have to undergo a partial cadre restructuring, and, perhaps, some radical changes. [passage omitted]

Later on the commission supported the main program principles of the Yugoslav Television channel Yutel. It concluded that the FEC and its Secretariat for Information should present the Yutel program and organization concept to the SFRY Assembly. In the meantime, the experimental transmission of Yutel programs should be uninterrupted.

Prior to this, FEC Secretary for Information Darko Marin recalled that the proposal to form Yutel had been launched within the framework of the Yugoslav Radio and Television Network, and that talks about this have been going on for more than a year. In the meantime, the information field has become more region-oriented and closed to information coming from other regions, so Yugoslav has found itself without a television channel which objectively and throughly covers events throughout the country. We had concluded that this is unacceptable, Marin said, and therefore launched the initiative to speed up negotiations regarding an all-Yugoslav television channel. [passage omitted]

It was concluded that Radio Yugoslavia should found Yutel, because as a rule television channels have been so far founded by radio stations. Apart from this, Yutel would strengthen its links with other radio and television centers in the country through Radio Yugoslavia, as this radio station is a member of the Yugoslav Radio and Television Network.

Marin underlined that the FEC proposes to the SFRY Assembly that Radio Yugoslavia be renamed Yugoslav Radio and Television [Radio-Televizija Jugoslavija]. This enterprise would house under the same roof Radio Yugoslavia and Yutel. The SFRY Assembly will be their founder.

With regard to financing Yutel, Marian mentioned the possibility of securing some funds from the rescheduled federal budget, and noted that Yutel equipment, worth 220 million dinars, "belongs to the Yugoslav state" and that its premises also "belong to the Yugoslav state." So far, Radio Yugoslavia set aside 15,000 dinars for YuteL, and the FEC set aside 3,600,000 dinars out of its reserves. No money has been taken from the federal treasury. Regarding the building at Marx and Engels Square, occupied by Yutel, Marian noted that it "also belongs to the SFRY." As far as transmitters on Mt. Avala and Mt. Fruska Gora are concerned, the FEC secured all relevant permissions envisaged by federal laws, he said.

Those preventing Yutel from working are breaching not only federal laws but also international conventions on free flow of information. The defense of Yutel is the defense of citizens' constitutional rights to be informed fully. The FEC and the SFRY Assembly have the duty to inform citizens fully about events in the country, Marian concluded. [passage omitted]

## Croat Parties React to Decision on Republic Day

*LD2011123590 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0948 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Belgrade, 20 Nov (TANJUG)—The federal government warning that it would take measures to ensure that November 29—Republic Day—be celebrated as a holiday in Croatia marks the beginning of a tug of war with the new Croatian authorities.

The Croatian Government, formed by the Nationalist Conservative Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) [HDZ], which ousted the Communists at the May multiparty elections, brought a decision on November 12 that the citizens of Croatia carry on working on Republic Day.

In the view of the federal government, the Croatian Government's decision ignores the federal law regulating the question of [words indistinct] holidays in Yugoslavia.

November 29, Republic Day, is celebrated in Yugoslavia as a national holiday, marking the birth of new Yugoslavia in 1943, during World War Two.

"We have had many holidays. Now is the time to work," Croatian Prime Minister Josip Manolic said.

Representatives of the ruling Croatian Democratic Union said that the decision was "perhaps sudden, but in time everyone will get used to it, and—after all the changes—it is now time to change November 29."

Representatives of the opposition Social Democratic Party of Croatia, however, see this as "another confirmation that Croatia does not care about a joint state—Yugoslavia."

The Socialist Party of Croatia, a Yugoslav-oriented party, called the decision an "insult of the patriotic feelings of citizens who see the Yugoslav national holiday as a synonym for freedom, justice and equality of nations living on Yugoslav soil."

Tour operators expect huge losses and say that "the government has signed a decree which no ideology-burdened economist would sign."

The economic chamber of Croatia said that "in every other country, the minister in charge and his associates would resign after all this."

## Croatian Government Protests Helicopter Incident

*LD2011165890 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1128 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Zagreb, 20 Nov (TANJUG)—The Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs could be left without its helicopter pilots if, according to a conclusion of the Federal Executuve Council, legal proceedings are instituted against them because of an incident which occurred on 17 August when three Zadar-bound helicopters were

returned to their original airport. This prompted the Croatian Government to protest to the Federal Executive Council today because of allegedly erroneous conclusions in connection with the return of the helicopters.

Their protest states that the warning about scrambling fighter planes if the helicopters did not return to their original Lucko airport is not in accordance with current regulations.

"We are warning in advance that we shall not be in a position to accept consequences which would arise from measures demanded by the Federal Executive Council because this would directly threaten the operational ability of one part of the service," the Croatian Government's protest concludes.

### Tudjman Answers Criticism From Kosovar Parties

*AU2111111590 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 6 Nov 90 p 2*

[S. Vranic report: "Questions Off the Agenda"]

[Excerpt] Zagreb—The usual monthly news conference given by Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of Croatia, and his colleagues, which was held yesterday, deviated somewhat from the agenda—as has happened before in previous "tea parties"—because the members of the press did not want to miss the opportunity to ask about details not concerned with the announced topics of the republic's constitutional setup and a confederal project for Yugoslavia. Thus, Dr. Tudjman was able to respond to, or rather, deny the rumor that he receives a general's pension on top of his president's salary.

The journalists were interested in how Mr. Tudjman interpreted the different views regarding Draskovic's visit to Jasenovac and whether the approval for this visit had anything to do with Croatia's stand on the elections in Serbia. Dr. Tudjman replied that he personally did not take part in making any decision in this respect, but that the view existed in principle whereby anyone who expressed a desire to do so would be allowed to visit and lay wreaths at Jasenovac. However, if anyone came with the intention of causing provocation and demonstrating, there was the constabulary service which knew what it had to do.

Journalists were interested in the view of the president of Croatia concerning the charter that was recently adopted by the Assembly of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the political declaration of the Party of Democratic Changes, which contained some basic criticism of the present Croatian authorities. Dr. Tudjman replied that he was not familiar with the contents of the decree but he knew that the present leadership of Bosnia-Hercegovina supported some stands which were close to confederal ones. As regards the declaration of the Party of Democratic Changes, he said that he was not against criticism of the authorities per se "because an intelligent person could learn from the stupidest," but the supporters of this party were the strongest opposition bloc in Croatia regardless of how many votes they would now win at an election. Mr. Tudjman made use of this question to expand the subject and, in the context of criticism of the government, he also mentioned some critics who he said could not be judged positively as regards democracy. He said that such critics abused freedom, and included in the irresponsible statements the one by I.Z. Cicak, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, who reproached the republic's president for not laying a wreath at the grave of Ante Starcevic. Tudjman called this criticism a total lie. He then dealt with the increasing criticism that the government does not have a comprehensive economic program, saying that until recently not one socialist country had one, and "the program that Markovic devised was not only his work but also the work of Croatian experts."

In reply to a question on how he saw the stand of the Kosovo Alternative movement or rather the statements by some of its leaders that Croatia and Slovenia had betrayed the Kosovo Albanians by publishing the confederal (draft) agreement, Mr. Tudjman stated that he did not understand how anyone at all could make such a statement, because the draft of the confederal agreement is based on human and national rights. Moreover, Croatia has expressed its disagreement with the scrapping of Kosovo's autonomy, and the confederal agreement itself should be the work or agreement of sovereign republics and therefore of Kosovo too, if Kosovo is declared a republic. However, he said, no one can expect Croatia to resolve the problem of a republic of Kosovo using arms, in the way that the province was eliminated using arms. [passage omitted]

### Serb Minister Bogdanovic Warns of Kosovo Unrest

*LD2011234290 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1808 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Pristina, 20 Nov TANJUG)—Serbian Republican Interior Affairs Secretary Radmilo Bogdanovic today said that ethnic Albanian separatists are preparing new unrests in the southern Serbian Kosovo Province for late November.

Speaking to a new generation of police academy students in Vucitrn, Kosovo, Bogdanovic assessed that the situation in Kosovo, whose population includes about 90 percent ethnic Albanians, is still grave, but that the Serbian authorities will do their utmost to prevent a repetition of the bloody unrests of 1968 and 1989.

Bogdanovic told the new generation of policemen in Kosovo that about 3,000 ethnic Albanian policemen had resigned from the service in response to a call from ethnic Albanian separatists.

Speaking about former Kosovo Interior Affairs Secretary Jusuf Karukusi, an ethnic Albanian, Bogdanovic said that he is currently residing in one of Yugoslavia's

northwestern republics (Croatia and Slovenia) and that he still supports the ethnic Albanian separatists in Kosovo.

### Kosovo Campaign Viewed; Serb Repression Alleged

*AU2011112190 Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 16 Nov 90 p 6*

[Emin Azemi and Blerim Reka report: "Hunger Will Not Bring the Albanians to Their Knees"]

[Excerpt] Pristina, 15 Nov—A confused and uncertain situation persists over whether free elections will be held in Kosovo at all. At present, only the Party of Democratic Action (which gathers Muslims) is waging an electoral campaign with any degree of success, and at a series of electoral meetings in some Kosovo towns has put itself forward as the sole party taking part in the elections in Serbia which genuinely opposes the current rule of Serbia. Meanwhile, the Albanian opposition has still not decided whether it will take part in these elections, as the main aim of the Albanian opposition parties is to hold free elections in Kosovo. The Kosovo Peasants Party, which has registered at a federal level, recently received the decision of the Federal Secretariat for Jurisprudence and Administration (No. 053/4-1990-13). This party, which now has more than 50,000 members, has also elected a new Presidium consisting of Dr. Hivzi Islami, chairman; Berat Mustafa, secretary; and Dr. Asllan Pushka, Dr. Destan Bajraktari, Uke Xhemaj, Shukri Fetahu, Seladin Ismailaj, Destan Rukiqi, and Ruzhdi Shabani, members.

Among the activities of other Kosovo opposition parties, one must single out today's electoral assembly of the Kosovo Parliamentary Party [Partia Parlamentare e Kosoves], the former Youth Parliament, which is also expected to register with the appropriate federal authorities.

#### The Serbian Till Is Short of 10 Million Deutsche Mark

The attempts to ruin private trade, crafts, and small businesses in Kosovo were the principal topic at yesterday's news conference organized on the premises of the Kosovo Writers Association by the Association of Independent Kosovo Trade Unions. It was stressed that, following the ruination of the many factories and collectives in the public sector, the Serbian "rule-of-law state" is now attacking one of the principal pillars of the Kosovo economy, the small business sector, specifically private stores and craftsmen. Talking about the draconian repressive measures being taken by Serbia to destroy the Kosovo economy, Remzi Hoxha, representative of the small business branch of the Independent Trade Unions, said that in spite of the fact that this property and its production equipment are entirely private, the Serbian state is interfering in such a way as to prevent work from proceeding smoothly, destroying everything in its path. So far, more than 3,000 tickets have been issued by "inspectors" who have come to Kosovo from Serbia and Vojvodina, equipped with forms and rubber stamps from these places, against the 20,000 private tradesmen and craftsmen who took part in the general strike of 3 September. So far, 1,860 verdicts forbidding tradesmen to exercise their professions for one year have been handed out to private tradesmen, of which 550 have been enforced.

Remzi Hoxha went on to inform journalists of the fact that Serbia has so far raised criminal charges against more than 180 private tradesmen. Serbian state violence, he said, is best illustrated by the fact that two private tradesmen were each sentenced to 60 days' imprisonment, one for displaying a national symbol with the slogan "Good luck to the Republic of Kosovo," and the other for a framed photograph of Ibrahim Rugova, chairman of the Kosovo Democratic Alliance.

Talking about the acts of violence perpetrated by Serbia against private tradesmen, Professor Dr. Hajrullah Gorani said that, having ruined factories and collectives in the public sector, Serbia is now also ruining the small businesses which are an important ingredient in the resistance of the hungry Albanian populace. By destroying small businesses, Serbia hopes to bring the Albanians to their knees through hunger, so that they will accept measures of the Serbian state which are against their interests. Gorani said that Serbia, after dismissing Albanians from their jobs, is filling their vacancies, particularly management posts, with Serbs and Montenegrins as state elements, thus permitting closer supervision, and allowing these elements to act as "policemen." This behavior on the part of Serbia will be catastrophic, because professionally substandard individuals are taking the places of professionally experienced personnel, merely because they are Serbs or Montenegrins. Gorani concluded by telling journalists that the Independent Trade Unions have asked the trade unions which were in power until yesterday to allow the Independent Trade Unions to work and to take over various offices, but without success. [passage omitted]

### Bosnian Vote To Be Respected; Coalition Possible

*LD1911233690 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1926 GMT 19 Nov 90*

[Text] Sarajevo, 19 Nov (TANJUG)—Despite all shortcomings, the multiparty elections in Bosnia-Hercegovina are legitimate, and we shall respect their results.

This was stated at this evening's press conference by representatives of all important parties which had put forward candidates at the elections in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The press conference was held at the insistence of foreign correspondents.

The leaders of the Croatian Democratic Community, the Democratic Action Party, and the Serbian Democratic Party, which are in the lead in all seven election units after 20 percent of votes had been counted, stressed that these results do not come as a surprise since the time for change from the long lasting communist rule has come.

Although it will be long before the final results are announced, the leaders of the national parties tonight signalled a possibility of a coalition government.

### National Parties Leading in Bosnian Elections

*LD2111084590 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1136 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Sarajevo, 20 Nov (TANJUG)—The national parties are heading in all the electoral charts after a count of 1.35 million voters' ballots (around 50 percent of the total number) in the first post-war multi-party elections in the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia- Hercegovina held on Sunday [18 November].

Fikret Abdic, a Muslim Democratic Action Party candidate is leading with around 45 percent of the votes among the Muslim candidates running for the republican Presidency while among the Serbian candidates, Biljana Plavsic of the Serbian Democratic Party holds the lead with a little over 25 percent. Among the croatian candidates, Stjepan Kljujic of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Hercegovina, holds around 24 percent of the votes. The leading candidate among the rest of the peoples and national minorities is Ejup Ganic, a candidate of the Democratic Action Party, who is registered as a Yugoslav.

Muslims, Serbs and Croats will have two representatives each in the republican Presidency while the remaining peoples and national minorities together will have one.

The national parties—Democratic Action Party, Serbian Democratic Party and Croatian Democratic Union—are also heading in major electoral districts.

### To Contest 2d Round Elections

*LD1911234390 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1852 GMT 19 Nov 90*

[Text] Skopje, 19 Nov (TANJUG)—Although parties which are included in the so-called Front of Macedonian National Unity [Front Makedonskog Nacionalnog Jedinstva] last week announced that they would boycott the second round of multiparty elections in Macedonia scheduled for 25 November, the Front announced this evening that they would participate in the elections on Sunday.

The front includes VMRO-DPMNE, Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity [Unutrasnja Makedonska Revolucionarna Organizacija-Demokratska Partija za Makedonsko Nacionalno Jedinstvo], MAAK, Movement for All-Macedonian Action [Pokret za Svemakedonsku Akciju], Democratic Union of Farmers [Demokratski Savez-Partija Poljoprivrednika], and People's Party of Macedonia [Narodna Partija Makedonije]. For the second round of voting, these parties have 78 deputies, out of which there are 62 VMRO candidates.

In addition to a great number of accusations of irregularity of the first round of voting on 11 November, the Front parties stated that according to the election law it is now impossible to withdraw their candidates and that they are going into the second round of voting in order not to let their own candidates down.

### Montenegrin Party Leader on Borders With Bosnia

*AU2011083790 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Nov 90 p 4*

[D. Vukovic report: "We Are Diminishing the Borders Just in Case"]

[Excerpts] Titograd—The leaders of the People's Party yesterday briefed journalists on the accusations that are being increasingly leveled at the party, making it impossible for them to work normally. The latest in the series of such cases happened several days ago in Andrijevica where the local veterans threatened them, disconnected the electricity, and prevented them from holding a meeting in the place which has always been used for gatherings of Vasojevici people.

Dr. Novak Kilibarda, leader of the People's Party, particularly stressed the inappropriate behavior of Dr. Branko Kostic, president of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Montenegro, who recently said at a promotional meeting for the League of Communists in Rijeka Crnojevica that the People's Party was anticommunist, pro-Chetnik, and revanchist. The leadership of the People's Party assesses such denigrations as groundless and warns Dr. Kostic that he should act like a supraparty force, considering the post that he now holds. [passage omitted]

The leader of the People's Party also spoke about relations with the branches of the Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. He announced that in line with the signed agreement on the spiritual unification of Serbs, it had been decided that members of the Serbian Democratic Party from eastern Bosnia and western Hercegovina should also be members of the People's Party. "We are already diminishing the borders in case AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] Yugoslavia collapses. It has been decided in a plebiscite that the border between Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro would not be recognized in such a case."

He also stressed that in the case of the confederalization of Yugoslavia, the Serbian people would not recognize the present administrative inter-republican borders, but the Serbs from the eastern parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina would join Montenegro and those from the western parts would join the Knin region. Kilibarda also said that the People's Party not only does not want to sell Montenegro but, if Yugoslavia were to collapse, it intends to expand it not only with the aforementioned parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina but also Metohija. If the political situation in the Balkans were to become complicated, then the annexation of Shkoder would also be on the table. Had Metohija once belonged to Montenegro, we would not

have the kind of problems we do with Kosovo today or at least not to this extent, Kilibarda commented.

Asked to explain the nature of relations between the People's Party and Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement, Dr. Kilibarda said that this movement has great ambitions and that the People's Party welcomed its program, but that it is not identical to theirs.

## Perovic Named Serbian Presidential Candidate

*LD2011193790 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1405 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Text] Belgrade, 20 Nov (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Bloc of Parties has today proposed Dr. Blazo Perovic as its candidate for Serbian President. The Bloc of Parties for which he is candidate includes the Party of Yugoslavs [Stranka Jugoslovena], Party of National Accord [Stranka Narodne Sloge], Yugoslav Workers' Party [Radnicka Partija Jogoslavije], Yugoslav Socialist Democratic Party [Jugoslovenska Socijalisticka Demokratska Stranka], Democratic Pedagogical Party of Yugoslavia [Demokratska Pedagoska Stranka Jugoslavije], Socialist Party of Yugoslavia [Socijalisticka Stranka Jugoslavije], Social Democratic Alliance of Serbia (Yugoslavia) [Savez Socijaldemokrata Srbije Jugoslavije], and Democratic Reformist Alliance of Muslims (Prizren) [Demokratski Reformski Savez Muslimana (Prizren)].

## Vojvodina Opposition Attacks Serbian Authorities

*AU1411162290 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 12 Nov 90 p 3*

[Jovo Paripovic report: "They Do Not Want To Enter a 'Dead-End Street'"]

[Excerpts] Novi Sad—Two Vojvodina autochthonous parties, the Pan-National Democratic Front of Vojvodina and the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina-Yugoslavia, have sent an open letter to the SFRY Assembly in which they insist that the Yugoslav parliament remove from the agenda without debate and reject as unacceptable the document which the SFRY Presidency has named "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." This document aspires to be "a concept of the constitutional setup of Yugoslavia on federal foundations."

Not wishing to go into a deeper analysis of "this provocative and generally unacceptable document," these two parties, which the present regime in the province calls "autonomists," think that the very launching of the document by the incomplete "collective head of state" means "pushing the country into an even deeper and more dangerous political crisis." In their view, this document is a "desperate attempt by the compromised leaders of the so-called antibureaucratic revolution to impose, via the SFRY Presidency, their unitarian pretension on Yugoslavia at any cost, including the cost of the country's disintegration."

### Degradation of the Provinces

In their letter to the federal Assembly the two parties particularly decidedly reject the degradation of the autonomous province and the way the nationalities' rights were treated in the document. They warn that the provinces represent the constituent elements of the federation. Such a crude negation of the autonomous provinces, the letter states, represents an attempt, in the very definition of the so-called "federation," to trick the federal Assembly—as the highest representative and legislative body, according to the existing Constitution—to "sanction" the unconstitutional work and consequences of the antibureaucratic revolution, and endorse their shameful incorporation in the present constitution of Serbia, that of Milosevic.

As regards the treatment of the nationalities and their rights, the letter states that both "more and less numerous peoples in Vojvodina energetically oppose the revision of anybody's rights," and adds that "everybody in Yugoslavia needs a better Yugoslavia than the present one, but not a federation tailored according to the balance of power among the ruling elites of the most numerous peoples, nor anybody's majoritarianism."

Finally, the letter states that the Yugoslav parliament should adopt those constitutional changes whose initiator is the Federal Executive Council, and that the new constitution should be adopted only after a historic agreement has been reached among the true democratic representatives of all peoples and citizens of Yugoslavia and of all historic provinces on the territory of the present day Yugoslavia.

### Statement About Measures of the Serbian Government

These two Vojvodina parties also signed a statement in which they sharply condemned the "package of measures" which the Serbian single party Assembly adopted at the proposal of the republican Executive Council. These measures, according to the statement of these two parties, graphically illustrate the "dead end into which the party in power, its aggressive leadership, and the loyal republican government, led Serbia as a republic and the Serbian and other people and citizens who live in it." The two parties take the view that the so-called "activation of Serbia's sovereignty is a shallow, transparent empty phrase aimed at concealing the obvious orientation of the ruling circles in the republic toward Serbia's secession from Yugoslavia, and thus the disintegration of Yugoslavia." They warn that all this is aimed against the social and economic reform of the federal government. On the basis of these conclusions, the two Vojvodina parties demand an "imminent halt" to these measures and an "urgent recall of the Serbian Government which dared propose such measures." [passage omitted]

## Serb, Slovene Opinions on Federation's Future

*AU1611105690*

[Editorial Report] Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian on 31 October on page 3 carries a 600-word report on the results of two "parallel public opinion polls" conducted by two independent research groups, Varijanta from Ljubljana and Takt from Belgrade, in Slovenia and Serbia on the future setup of Yugoslavia.

The report does not include any information about the polls except that they were telephone polls and that the Slovene sample consisted of 398 respondents while the sample in Serbia proper consisted of 318 respondents. The polls were carried out between 26 and 28 October.

The results of the polls are presented in three tables as follows:

**Table 1. "Which of the following alternatives concerning Yugoslavia's future would you opt for?"**

*(a bar chart with figures in percentages)*

| | Serbia | Slovenia |
|---|---|---|
| A. Disintegration into independent republican states | 3.5 | 16.2 |
| B. Secession of western republics | 3.8 | 36.5 |
| C. A confederal union of the present republics | 1.9 | 31.5 |
| D. A new federal state of Yugoslavia | 28.9 | 4.8 |
| E. Exsiting country | 58.8 | 7.1 |
| F. Do not know/other answers | 3.2 | 3.8 |

**Table 2. "Is it possible, in your view, for Yugosalvia to disintegrate in a peaceful way, that is, through an agreement, without violent clashes and a civil war?"**

*(a bar chart with figures in percentages)*

| | Serbia | Slovenia |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Yes | 36.16 | 67.8 |
| 2. No | 50 | 19.3 |
| 3. Do not know/something else | 13.84 | 12.9 |

**Table 3. "What in your view should be done with Yugosalvia's joint debt in case some republics secede?"**

| | Serbia | Slovenia |
|---|---|---|
| A. Divide it according to how the money was previously used | 64.2 | 77.7 |
| B. Transfer it to those republics that want to sucede | 6.3 | 2.3 |
| C. Transfer it to those republics that want to remain in Yugoslavia | 0.6 | 4.3 |
| D. Divide it among the republics proportionate to their size | 9.8 | 7.1 |
| E. Do not know/something else | 19.2 | 8.6 |

## Popularity of Slovene Parties, Politicians Polled

*AU1611122790*

[Editorial Report] Ljubljana DELO in Slovene on 5 November on pages 1 and 3 carries a 400-word report on the results of two DELO public opinion polls, one on the popularity of Slovene political parties, and the other on the popularity of Slovene politicians.

As regards the first poll, the report states: "The adoption of the new Slovene Constitution would soon be followed by new elections. In our latest telephone opinion poll, aimed at a thorough research of public opinion on social problems (the results were published on Saturday [3 November]), we asked 651 people, who were selected from the telephone directories with a computer, which party they would vote for."

The results of the first poll are presented in one table as follows:

**Table 1. "Which party in your opinion would win the elections after the adoption of the new constitution?"**

*(a graph chart with figures in percentages)*

| | |
|---|---|
| 1. Social Democrats | 11.1 |
| 2. The Greens | 3.7 |
| 3. Slovene Democratic Alliance | 3.4 |
| 4. Slovene Peasants Alliance | 2.8 |
| 5. Christian Democrats | 5.2 |
| 6. Liberals | 0.3 |
| 7. Reformists | 19.8 |
| 8. Slovene Socialist Youth Federation-Liberal Party | 12.6 |
| 9. Socialists | 1.2 |
| 10. Nobody | 7.2 |
| 11. Do not know | 31.8 |

The second poll, the poll about the popularity of Slovene politicians, "was carried out between 29 and 30 October among 651 telephone subscribers from all over Slovenia who were, as usual, selected with a computer." The results of the poll list the Slovene politicians in the following order:

1. Janez Drnovsek
2. Milan Kucan
3. Ciril Zlobec
4. Joze Mencinger
5. Jozef Skolc
6. Ciril Ribicic
7. Bojan Brumen
8. Ivan Oman+
9. Viktor Zakelj
10. E. Milan Pintar
11. Lojze Peterle
12. France Bucar
13. Igor Bavcar
14. Janez Jansa
15. Dimitrij Rupel

16. Joze Pucnik
17. Andrej Capuder
18. France Tomsic
19. Rajko Pirnat
20. Miha Ravnik

### Rupel Distances Self From Jovic CSCE Speech

*LD2011225490 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1827 GMT 20 Nov 90*

[Excerpt] Paris, 20 Nov (TANJUG)—Dimitrije Rupel, member of the official Yugoslav delegation to the CSCE conference, "has today distanced himself" from the speech of SFRY Presidency President Dr. Borisav Jovic, who is heading the Yugoslav delegation.

In a statement to AFP, which under inverted commas says that Rupel is "Slovene minister of foreign affairs," he condemned Dr. Jovic for failing to mention "any Yugoslav problems, particularly the violation of human rights in Kosovc."

Rupel said he had intended to hold a news conference on Slovene stands, but according to him, the Presidency president "did not allow him to do so."

Rupel admitted this is the first time the Yugoslav delegation to an international meeting has been made up of representatives of all Yugoslav republics. He also stated that "President Jovic is the only one among the heads of delegations to the CSCE who has not been elected, while only Slovene and Croatian governments are the result of free elections."

In conclusion, Rupel stated that Slovenes are not "separatists," and on the contrary, they wish to "join Europe," but "Yugoslavia is holding them back," as well as the Croats.

Rupel's statement represents a precedent of its own kind, because so far the CSCE summit in Paris has not recorded that any member of an official delegation of any country "distanced" himself from the speech of the head of his own delegation. [passage omitted]